Joseph Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc. (1984)

For example, in Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1984), the Barrowses sold their manufacturing business for shares in Forest Laboratories, Inc. Their business was then valued at $550,000.

See Barrows, 742 F.2d at 60 (“The holding of Osofsky ... turn[s] ... on the distinction between damages that are speculative and those which are certain.”); see also Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir.1971) (governing rule under 10b-5 is “that a defrauded buyer of securities is entitled to recover only the excess of what he paid over the value of what he got, not, as some other courts had held, the difference between the value of what he got and what it was re…

See Barrows, 742 F.2d at 60 ("The holding of Osofsky ... turn[s] ... on the distinction between damages that are speculative and those which are certain."); see also Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir.1971) (governing rule under 10b-5 is "that a defrauded buyer of securities is entitled to recover only the excess of what he paid over the value of what he got, not, as some other courts had held, the difference between the value of what he got and what it was re…

See Ansam Assocs., Inc. v. Cola Petroleum, Ltd., 760 F.2d 442 , 446 (2d Cir.1985); Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984).

See Ansam Assocs., Inc. v. Cola Petroleum, Ltd., 760 F.2d 442 , 446 (2d Cir.1985); Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984).

Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984).

Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984).

Id. at 58-59.

Plaintiffs thus rely on a “hypothesis about what the parties would have done if the circumstances surrounding their transaction had been different.” Gray, 2020 WL 1904019 , at *26 (quoting Barrows, 742 F.2d at 60).

Barrows v. Forest Labs., Inc., 742 F.2d 54 , 58 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[C]onsiderations of undue delay, bad faith, and prejudice to the opposing party” are the “touchstones of a district court’s discretionary authority to deny leave to amend . . . .”); see State Tchrs.

The resulting “mini-trials” these new allegations would entail pose a grave risk of further delay – an unacceptable proposition given the amount of time that has passed since the filing of the FAC and the substantial amount of pretrial discovery that has already been constitutional rights during OWS protests, is belied by plain readings of both the initial complaint and the FAC, see, e.g., FAC ¶ 2 (“The claims arise from a series of incidents in connection with Occupy Wall S…

Benefit-of-the-bargain damages measure the “difference between the value of what was bargained for and the value at the time [of the transaction] of what was received.” Barrows, 742 F.2d at 57.

Vincent Catholic Medical Centers, 712 F.3d 705, 719 (2d Cir.2013) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim and noting that Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) help to prevent settlement extortion); Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984) (affirming denial of motion to add discovery-intensive claims two and a half years after complaint was filed). .

Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984).

See Brisbin v. Superior Valve Co., 398 F.3d 279 (3d Cir.2005)(citing Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 318 Pa.Super. 90 , 464 A.2d 1243, 1258 (1983))("Though damages for lost profits can be given, they cannot be recovered where they are merely speculative."); Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1984)("A claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages must be based on the bargain that was actually struck, not on a bargain whose terms must be supp…

See Brisbin v. Superior Valve Co., 398 F.3d 279 (3d Cir.2005)(citing Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 318 Pa.Super. 90 , 464 A.2d 1243, 1258 (1983))(“Though damages for lost profits can be given, they cannot be recovered where they are merely speculative.”); Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir.1984)(“A claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages must be based on the bargain that was actually struck, not on a bargain whose terms must be suppl…

The plaintiffs vigorously dispute it, but in the court’s opinion, the expansive nature of the relief which they are now seeking, particularly visa-vis the private landowners, “represent^] a radical shift from the recovery sought in the[ir] original complaint[s].” See Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc. 742 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir.1984) (emphasis added).

Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir.1984).

Barrows, 742 F.2d at 59, 60 .

Levine v. Seilon Inc., 439 F.2d 328 -34 (2nd Cir.1984); Barrows v. Forest Laboratories Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2nd Cir.1984).

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487; cf. Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984) (undue delay, bad faith, prejudice to opposing party are the “touchstones” of court’s discretion to deny leave to amend).

See 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487; cf. Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984) (undue delay, bad faith, and prejudice to opposing party are the “touchstones” of court’s discretion to deny leave to amend).

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that defendants have established a “pattern” of racketeering activity sufficient to state a claim under RICO. 5 Defendants argue, citing Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54 *949 (2d Cir.1984), that the Court should nonetheless deny plaintiffs leave to add their RICO claim because to do so at this stage of the litigation would unduly prejudice them by allowing plaintiffs to change their theory of relief in order to …

The Supreme Court has cited as reasons for denying a motion to amend “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.,” id., and the Second Circuit had labelled “[c]onsiderations of undue delay, bad faith, and prejudice to the opposing party” as the “touchstones of a distric…

See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 , 83 S.Ct. 227 , 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Jin, 310 F.3d at 101 ; see also Barrows v. Forest Labs., Inc., 742 F.2d 54 , 58 (2d Cir.1984) (“[C]onsiderations of undue delay ... and prejudice to the opposing party [are] touchstones of a district court’s discretionary authority to deny leave to amend.”), quoted in O’Hara v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 294 F.3d 55, 70 (2d Cir.2002).

Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Med., 269 F.Supp.2d at 164 ; see Barrows v. Forest Labs., Inc., 742 F.2d 54 , 58-59 (2d Cir.1984) (upholding district court’s denial of leave to amend complaint to effect “a radical shift” in theory of recovery); cf. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 , 83 S.Ct. 227 , 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (recognizing delay and prejudice as grounds for denying leave to amend).

See Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984).

See Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1984).

See Barrows v. Forest Labs., Inc., 742 F.2d 54 , 58-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's determination that leave to amend was prejudicial where discovery was complete and motion to amend was filed two and one-half years after complaint).

See, e.g., Barrows v. Forest Labs., Inc., 742 F.2d 54 , 58 n.11 (2d Cir. 1984).

See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir.1981) (“[T]he purpose of section 28(a) is to compensate civil plaintiffs for economic loss suffered as a result of wrongs committed in violation of the 1934 Act, whether the measure of those compensatory damages be out-of-pocket loss, the benefit of the bargain, or some other appropriate standard.”); see also Barrows v. Forest Labs., Inc., 742 F.2d 54 , 60 (2d Cir.1984) (“The holding of Osofsky ... [turns] on the distinction bet…

See id. (citing Ansam Assocs. v. Cola Petroleum, Ltd., 760 F.2d 442 , 446 (2d Cir.1985)). 167 .

Pelletier, 863 F.2d at 1559 (denying benefit of the bargain damages because the underlying contract was ruled unenforceable); see also Barrows v. Forest Labs., Inc., 742 F.2d 54 , 59-60 (2nd Cir.1984) (“A claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages must be based on the bargain that was actually struck”).

See, e.g., Shults v. Henderson, 625 F.Supp. 1419, 1426 (W.D.N.Y.1986) aff'd 805 F.2d 391 (2d Cir.1986) (complaint alleging fraudulent conduct by fiduciary in violation of Rule 10b-5 dismissed where challenged conduct yielded pecuniary benefit rather than detriment to plaintiff); see generally Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.1984); Levine v. Seilon Inc., supra. A liberal reading of the complaint suggests that the Riegels, who purchased Flo-Con at var…

A claim for the benefit of the bargain may be appropriate where damages “can be established with reasonable certainty.” Osofsky v. Zipf, supra, 645 F.2d at 111 ; see Barrows v. Forest Labor *803 atories, Inc., 742 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.1984).