Cluster 441979 (1984)

Between [the investment advisor firm’s] advice and the guidance of the more well-equipped Committee members . . . , the Court is persuaded that the Committee performed its role adequately.” 89 In our view, this passage means only that, while 86Such equitable relief is available under 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (a), which provides that “[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries” by ER…

See Plasterers’, 663 F.3d at 218 ; see also Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A fiduciary must behave like a prudent investor under similar circumstances . . . .”); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279-80 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that an investment expert’s lack of experience with pension fund management did not affect his qualifications to testify as to what constituted a prudent investment decision in an ERISA case).

Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228 , 236-37 (7th Cir.1990)); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984).

See Roth, 16 F.3d at 918 (“[T]he prudent person standard is not concerned with results; rather, it is a test of how the fiduciary acted viewed from the perspective of the time of the challenged decision rather than from the vantage point of hindsight.” (internal marks omitted) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984))).

See, e.g., EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n, 727 F.2d 566 , 579 (6th Cir. 1984) (using adjusted prime rate); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Expert testimony revealed that at the time . . . other banking institutions were in the market to borrow at a rate of prime plus one percent.

Co., 419 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation modified); (3) a fiduciary relied on an investment appraisal prepared 13-20 months before the transactions and had failed to consider significant changes in the “facts and assumptions” about the company’s business condition that occurred in the interim, Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1469, 1474 (5th Cir. 1983); (4) fiduciaries “passively received a rosy superficial picture of the [company in which they caused the plan t…

We have long measured this duty “according to the objective prudent person standard developed in the common law of trusts,” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted), and have emphasized that ERISA’s “fiduciary duty of care . . . requires prudence, not prescience,” Pension Benefit Guar.

We have long measured this duty “according to the objective prudent person standard developed in the common law of trusts,” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984) (internal quotation marks omitted), and have emphasized that ERISA’s “fiduciary duty of care ... requires prudence, not prescience,” Pension Benefit Guar.

We must evaluate the prudence or imprudence of State Street’s conduct as of “the time it occurred,” not “post facto.” Ibid. (citing Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984), and Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1282 (9th Cir.1983)).

See, e.g., Braden, 588 F.3d at 595 ; Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984).

See, e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[A]lthough common law may have required a prior demand before bringing an action, Congress did not incorporate that 21 doctrine into the ERISA statute.

Although ERISA does not explicitly provide for prejudgment interest, courts can make such awards as part of their “wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief to protect the rights of pension fund beneficiaries.” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 , 105 S.Ct. 565 , 83 L.Ed.2d 506 (1984).

We judge a fiduciary’s actions based upon information available to the fiduciary at the time of each investment decision and not “from the vantage point of hindsight.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B) (establishing that the prudence of an ERISA fiduciary is to be measured in light of “the circumstances then prevailing”); Chao v. Merino, 452 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984)).

We judge a fiduciary's actions based upon information available to the fiduciary at the time of each investment decision and not "from the vantage point of hindsight." 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B) (establishing that the prudence of an ERISA fiduciary is to be measured in light of "the circumstances then prevailing"); Chao v. Merino, 452 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984)).

The district court enjoyed discretion as to the removal of trustees, see Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984); Iron Workers Local #272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1262 (5th Cir.1980), and did not abuse its discretion in declining to remove them.

Forfeiture Remedy First, Katzenberg argues that the District Court erred in concluding that he should forfeit his entitlement to benefits under the plan pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (a), which provides that a fiduciary who breaches his duties under ERISA “shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach ... and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate.” As we have …

Council of Greater New York, 909 F.Supp. 882, 886 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (Mason Tenders) (“a trustee has a duty to seek independent advice where he lacks the requisite education, experience and skill”); Trapani v. Consolidated Edison Employees’ Mutual Aid Society, 693 F.Supp. 1509, 1516 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (“A fiduciary who is ill-equipped to evaluate a claim may have a duty to seek outside assistance.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B) (standard of care measured against “prudent man…

In the Second Circuit, it is well-established that bifurcation rests “firmly within the discretion of the trial court.” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting In Re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1975)).

Rule 42(b) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, a court may bifurcate the trial of issues or claims “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). “[Bjifurcation requires the presence of only one of these conditions,” Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 796 F.Supp. 84, 86 (S.D.N.Y.1992), and the decision to bifurcate a trial rests “firmly within the discretion of the trial court.” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (…

As the Second Circuit has explained, “[t]he court’s task is to inquire whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.” Henry, 445 F.3d at 618 (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Based on these facts, the Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a different fiduciary “acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters,” Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted), would have adopted the same interest rate assumption in the years before the Plan’s termination.

Based on these facts, the Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a different fiduciary "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters," Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 280 (internal quotation Defendants' motion for summary judgment highlights that plaintiff's expert, Claude 3 Poulin, "ha[d] not made a contrary assertion in this case" that the 8% rate was unreasonable.

Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984) (quotations and citations omitted). 92 .

Fund, 982 F.2d 783 , 790 (2d Cir.1992) (same); Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 281 (“it is well-settled that ERISA grants the court wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief to protect the rights of pension fund beneficiaries including the award of prejudgment interest”).

“The prudence of a fiduciary ‘is measured according to the objective prudent person standard developed in the common law of trusts.’” Sacerdote, 9 F.4th at 107 (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984)). “[U]nder trust law, a fiduciary normally has a continuing duty of some kind to monitor investments and remove imprudent ones.” Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 530 (2015).

P. 42(b); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984) (decision to bifurcate is “firmly within the discretion of the trial court”). 102 Fichare v. AMBAC, ine., 106 F.3d 457, 466 (2d Cir. 1996). 103 Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999), 25 In this case, bifurcation is warranted on all three bases.

The decision to bifurcate is “firmly within the discretion of the trial court.” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984).

P. 42; Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming bifurcation “because the two phases involved different types of evidence”), or where litigation of one issue may obviate the need to try another issue, Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co.,' 763 F. Supp. 28, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding bifurcation appropriate where litigation of one issue may obviate the need to try another issue), modified in part on other grounds, 768 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1991…

At the same time, a fiduciary’s “‘lack of familiarity with investments is no excuse’ for failing to act with the care, skill, prudence and diligence required under the circumstances then prevailing.” Sacerdote, 328 F.Supp.3d at 284 (quoting Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 279). “[T]he prudence of each investment is not assessed in isolation but, rather, as the investment relates to the portfolio as a whole.” Pension Benefit Guar.

See Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. Master Retirement Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 288 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y., 2013) (“Bifurcation may be appropriate where ‘the two phases involve[ ] different types of evidence.’ or where “the litigation of the first issue might eliminate the need to litigate the second issue,”)(citing Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir.1999); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir.1984)).

Whether or not the Court considers the By-Laws on this motion for the purpose sought by Defendants, Plaintiffs have plausibly pled a relationship between the Plan and PSI sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984)).

The statute’s “prudent person standard is an objective standard ... that focuses on the fiduciary’s conduct preceding the challenged decision.” Roth, 16 F.3d at 917 (citing Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984)).

Conn. 1998) (citing Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984)).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), I may bifurcate issues at trial “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” This decision lies “firmly within [my] discretion.” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984).

The decision whether to bifurcate rests “firmly within the discretion of the trial court.” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1975)).

Second Circuit precedent makes clear that consideration of the factors in Rule 42(b) “is ‘firmly within the discretion of the trial court.’” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1975)).

“In determining whether a fiduciary has satisfied this requirement, ‘[t]he court’s task is to inquire whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.’” Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 610 , 618 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984)) (alteration in original).

See Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The decision to bifurcate a trial into liability and damages phases likewise is ‘firmly within the discretion of the trial court under Fed.

Wis. 2013) (citing Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984)).

“Prudence is measured according to the objective ‘prudent person’ standard developed in the common law of trusts.” Whitfield v. Cohen, 682 F. Supp. 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984)).

But ERISA duties are not evaluated from the “vantage point of hindsight.” Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984)).

(EAC ¶¶90.) But compliance with ERISA’s duty of prudence is not evaluated from the “vantage point of hindsight,” Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984)); see Rinehart, 817 F.3d at 63-63 (“ERISA’s ‘fiduciary duty of care ... requires prudence, not prescience.’ ”) (quoting Pension Ben.

The removal of a fiduciary “and the appointment of a person to serve in their stead is appropriate under the statute when [the fiduciary has] engaged in ‘repeated or substantial violation[s] of [his] responsibilities.’ ” Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Marshall v. Snyder, 572 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1978)); see also Brock v. Robbins, 830 F.2d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that “[t]he likelihood that a fund’s assets will be unnecessarily diminis…

See also Rhodes v. Davis, 628 Fed.Appx. 787, 792-93 (2d Cir. 2015) (while prejudgment interest is generally mandatory in breach of contract actions, it is discretionary where the relief granted is equitable); Novella v. Westchester County, 661 F.3d 128 , 150 n.25 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that courts in ERISA cases can award prejudgment interest “as part of their ‘wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief ”) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984)).

“In determining whether a fiduciary has satisfied this requirement, ‘[t]he court’s task is to inquire whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.’ ” Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 610 , 618 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984)) (alteration in original).

With regard to the latter, “it is well-settled that ERISA grants the court wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief to protect the rights of pension fund beneficiaries.” Chao v. Merino, 452 F.3d 174, 185 (2d Cir.2006), (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984)).

Prudence is “measured according to the objective prudent person standard developed in the .common law of . trusts.” Chao v. Meri no, 452 F.3d 174 , 182 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984)).

Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984).

See Exs. 1 & 3 § 11.1 (“Each [fiduciary shall act with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances that a prudent man, acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters, would use in conducting an enterprise of like character and with like aims.”); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984) (“ERISA requires a pension fund fiduciary to act ‘solely in the interest’ of a plan’s participants and beneficiaries, and to discharge his duties ‘with t…

The duty of care includes a duty to perform adequate investigation, which is satisfied only if, “at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, [the fiduciaries] employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.” Id. (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1984)).