United States v. Warren Green, IV (2018)

Id. at 177.

See United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 5 2018) (“Traffic stops are classified as a type of Terry stop, and may be initiated based on a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred.”).

As we have explained, “[a]n unreasonable extension”—and thus a Fourth Amendment violation—“occurs when an officer, without reasonable suspicion, diverts from a stop’s traffic-based purpose to investigate other crimes.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018).

In short, related tasks are the “ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop”; unrelated tasks are “other measures aimed at detecting criminal activity more generally.” See United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (interpreting Rodriguez).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018).

See Paige, 870 F.3d at 700 ; United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653 , 659–60 (4th Cir. 2004).4 In other words, for a search of a vehicle (or other 3 United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 186 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Johnson, 707 F.3d 655, 658 (6th Cir. 2013); Long v. United States, 847 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Beard, 708 F…

We must first determine if and when the stop was extended—i.e., the “Rodriguez moment[.]” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018).

The instant that a stop ceases to be for activities related to the traffic stop’s mission is known as the “Rodriguez moment.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018).

So, comparing the related and unrelated tasks, we can conclude that related tasks are the “or- dinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop,” while unrelated tasks are “other measures aimed at detecting criminal activity more gener- ally.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (quo- tation omitted) (interpreting Rodriguez).

An officer may initiate a traffic stop based on a “reasonable suspicion that a traffic 4 violation has occurred.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).

In short, related tasks are the “ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop”; unrelated tasks are “other measures aimed at detecting criminal activity more generally.” See United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (interpreting Rodriguez).

“Reasonable suspicion requires only a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity” based on “the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 187 (3d Cir. 2018) (criminal record); Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206-07 (3d Cir. 2003) (nervous behavior); United States v. Leal, 385 F. Supp. 2d 540, 548 (W.D.

Relying on our decision in United States v. Green, Loveings counters that the probative value of the marijuana odor is mitigated by the absence of marijuana uncovered during the subsequent search. 897 F.3d 173, 186 (3d Cir. 2018).

“Reasonable suspicion requires only a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity” and can be based on an officer’s training and experience that lead to “inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 448-49 (3d Cir.…

“First, we determine the moment when the stop was measurably extended, which we have called the ‘Rodriguez moment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018)).

On appeal, Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of illegal narcotics recovered during the frisk for weapons. 4 II.2 The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). “[R]easonable suspicion is based on the tota…

We refer to the moment when tasks related to the traffic stop are, or reasonably should have been, completed as the “Rodriguez moment.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018).

Reasonable suspicion requires more than a “hunch,” id. (citation omitted), but considerably less than a showing of criminality by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).

Because Cannon created a safety concern by going off-mission, the officers cannot rely upon that concern to justify detouring from the original purpose of the traffic stop.82 Moreover, even if Cannon had been suspicious before entering the truck, such suspicion would not justify kneeling on the front seat inside the truck with two unknown passengers.83 Ensuring field sobriety test, but, again, this presents a factual issue that is unnecessary for us or the District Court to …

See United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (“An unreasonable extension occurs when an officer, without 7 reasonable suspicion, diverts from a stop’s traffic-based purpose to investigate other crimes.”). 6 III.

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).

Thus, even recognizing that it must defer to the officer’s ability “to make infer- ences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to [him] that might well elude an untrained person,” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)), and that officers are allowed to make reasonable mistakes of fact, Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 , 61 (2014), the District Court found reasonable sus…

E.g., United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 187 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 2 Wayne R.

Thus, by the time Freeman extended the stop to investigate other crimes, he had more than enough evidence “to establish reasonable suspi- cion that [the passengers] w[ere] involved in drug trafficking.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (cit- ing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 ). 3.

Thus, by the time Freeman extended the stop to investigate other crimes, he had more than enough evidence “to establish reasonable suspi- cion that [the passengers] w[ere] involved in drug trafficking.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (cit- ing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 ). 3.

In an appeal challenging the denial of a motion to suppress, “the District Court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its legal determinations are subject to plenary review.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018). 3 investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).

See United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 187 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Though a criminal record . . . is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, it is a valid factor.”).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).

See Green , 897 F.3d at 182-83 ("We now ask whether, at our assumed " Rodriguez moment," [the officer] possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.").

However, traffic stops may be initiated based on a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. , 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing , 572 U.S. 393 (2014)).

However, traffic stops “may be initiated based on a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing 8 Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392 , 396- 97 (3d Cir. 2006) (adopting reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, as the applicable standard)).

However, police may initiate traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. , 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).

Campbell, 26 F.4th at 882 (citing United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018)).

Reasonable suspicion is a “‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity’ based on ‘the totality of the circumstances.’” United States v. Torres, 961 F.3d 618, 623 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2018)).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396-97 (3d Cir. 2006) (adopting reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, as the applicable standard)).

Totality of the Circumstances Having considered each of the alleged failings separately, the Court now analyzes them together.159 Ordinarily, courts should defer to the judgment of police officers who must confront an individual, such as Osaze, who is potentially armed and dangerous.160 However, the Officers’ actions must withstand a higher level of scrutiny as Osaze had not actually committed a crime and they outnumbered him 158 See Noble Expert Report supra n.156. 159 See …

“Traffic stops are classified as a type of Terry3 stop, and may be initiated based on a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2018).

In other words, unrelated tasks are those “aimed at detecting criminal activity more generally.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (interpreting Rodrigue^.

Any person so questioned who fails to give identification or explain the person’s actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further 5 Arizona, 555 U.S. at 333 . 6 United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 180 (3d.

Green, 897 F.3d 173, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing State v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 82, 91 (2d Cir, 2017); U.S. v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2015). 43 Td, at 180. 4 Id. 45 Td. at 181 (citing U.S. v. Collazo, 818 F.3d 247, 257-58 (6th Cir. 2016); U.S. v. Walton, 827 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2016). 46 Green, 897 F.3d at 182 (citing U.S. v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2017)). 17 safety precautions necessary to facilitate an investigation into other crimes may measu…

See id. at 269, 271-72 . “[B]ecause the motion to suppress was denied, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the Government and draw reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States v. Ross, 151 F.4th 487 , 494 (3d Cir. 2025) (quotation marks omitted).

See United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that we must evaluate reasonable suspicion from the earliest moment it might be necessary).

See United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); see also United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396-97 (3d Cir. 2006) (adopting reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, as the applicable standard).

See Serrano-Bey, 2024 WL 665184 , at *6 (citing United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018)).