Dominick Perniciaro, III v. Hampton Lea (2018)

But see Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (allowing private psychiatrists to assert the qualified-immunity defense).

But see Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018).

As a private actor, Oliver may be liable for acting under color of state law under § 1983, but “it does not necessarily follow that [she] may assert qualified immunity.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Brewer v. Hayne, 860 F.3d 819, 823 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A defendant may act under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983 without receiving the related protections of qualified immunity.”).

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 23 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 24 Id. at 315 . 25 Id. at 322 . 10 Case: 22-10517 Document: 115-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/23/2024 No. 22-10517 under which “liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” 26 However, we have note…

II “Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability” for alleged constitutional violations “if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 6 Case: 24-60244 Document: 50-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/08/2025 No. 24-60244 would have known.’” 2 “Qualified immunity shields from civil liability ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 3 “To determine whether qualifi…

P. 56(a). 5 Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). 6 Id. (“The plaintiff bears the burden of negating qualified immunity, but all inferences are drawn in his favor.” (citation omitted)). 7 Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 735 (2011)); see also Brown, 623 F.3d at 253 . 8 Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 981 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015)). 5 Ca…

That is, “we [ordinarily] do not have jurisdiction to review a denial of a summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ,” which establishes this court’s jurisdiction from a district court’s “final decision.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 1999)); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .

“Law is ‘clearly established’ for these purposes only if ‘the contours of the right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated that right.’” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

“However, the denial of qualified immunity on a motion for summary judg- ment is immediately appealable if it is based on a conclusion of law.” Perni- ciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)).

Indeed, “[a]n official that violates a constitutional right is still entitled to qualified immunity if his or her actions were objectively reasonable.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018).

Id. at 649 n.4 (emphases omitted); see also Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 259 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[W]ithout an underlying constitutional violation—of which we have found none—there can be no supervisory liability.”); Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 , 425–26 (5th Cir. 2006) (similar, and explaining that the same standards apply in both supervisory-liability and municipal-liability cases).

“Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction to review a denial of a summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .” 15 However, we may review a denial of qualified immunity under the collateral order doctrine, 16 with review limited to “the materiality of factual disputes the district court determined were genuine.” 17 Stated differently, although we lack jurisdiction to consider “whether there is enough evidence in the rec…

“Ordinarily, [this court does] not have jurisdiction to review a denial of a summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction to review a denial of a summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Ordinarily, [this court does] not have jurisdiction to review a denial of a summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“For an episodic act claim relying on an alleged denial or delay of medical care, [a prisoner] can show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that an official ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 258 (5th Cir. 2018)); …

Whether a private actor may assert qualified immunity depends on two things: “(1) principles of tort immunities and defenses applicable at common law around the time of § 1983’s enactment in 1871 and (2) the purposes served by granting immunity.”11 As to the second factor, [t]he Supreme Court has identified three purposes served by qualified immunity: (1) preventing unwarranted timidity in the exercise of official duties; (2) ensuring that highly skilled and qualified candid…

A constitutional right is clearly established “only if ‘the contours of the right were sufficiently clear that a rea- sonable official would understand that what he was doing violated that right.’” Perniciaro, 901 F.3d at 255 (brackets omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

Sanchez v. Oliver, 995 F.3d 461, 466 (5th Cir, 2021); Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018).

A. Whether HPFLA Is Entitled to Raise Qualified Immunity “Private actors may, under some circumstances, be liable under § 1983, but it does not necessarily follow that they may assert qualified immunity.”18 Notwithstanding that neither party addresses the issue, the Court cannot ignore that “[t]he law is not established in this circuit, however, as to whether private entities . . . are entitled to the protections of qualified immunity.”19 While it is clear that, under certai…

Even so, “it does not necessarily follow that [he] may assert qualified immunity.” Id. (quoting Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018)).

It is settled that “[p]rivate actors may, under some circumstances, be liable under § 1983[.]” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018)(citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988)(“We now make explicit what was implicit in our holding in Estelle: ... a physician employed by [the state] to provide medical services to state prison inmates, act[s] under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when undertaking his duties in treating [a state inmate’s] injury.

“Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of negating it by showing that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was ‘clearly established at the time of challenged conduct.” Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667 , 674 (Sth Cir, 2025) (citing Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (Sth Cir. 2018)) (other citations omitted).

Morris, Deputy Jenkins, and Detective Bankston, Plaintiff likewise fails to allege a constitutional violation against 129 Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987). 130 Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Prot. & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008)). 131 Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 259 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[W]ithout an underlying constitutional violation-of which we have found none-there can be no supervis…

A constitutional right is clearly established “only if ‘the contours of the right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated that right.’” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

ZY, — Analysis and Discussion Defendant Crook invokes qualified immunity to shield himself from the individual capacity claims. “[O]nce a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of negating it by showing that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was ‘clearly established at the time of challenged conduct.’” Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667 , 674 (Sth Cir. 2025) (citing Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (…

“Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of negating it by showing that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was ‘clearly established at the time of challenged conduct.’” Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667 , 674 (Sth Cir. 2025) (citing Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (Sth Cir. 2018)) (other citations omitted).

“Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of negating it by showing that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was ‘clearly established at the time of challenged conduct.’” Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667 , 674 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (Sth Cir. 2018)) (other citations omitted).

A constitutional right is clearly established “only if ‘the contours of the right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing vio- lated that right.’” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

“Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of negating it by showing that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was ‘clearly established at the time of challenged conduct.’” Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667 , 674 (Sth Cir. 2025) (citing Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018)) (other citations omitted).

“For an episodic act claim relying on an alleged denial or delay of medical care, [a pretrial detainee] can show deliberate indifference [to a serious medical need] by demonstrating that an official ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’ ” Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Perniciaro v. Lea…

In addition, “without an underlying constitutional violation . . .there can be no supervisory liability.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 259 (5th Cir. 2018).

At the same time, however, Plaintiff “can show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that an official ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 258 (5th Cir. 2018)).

All five circuit courts to decide the issue have held that qualified immunity from damages may be as- serted in a RFRA action against federal officials.162 And even the 155 Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 493 . 156 Doc. 49 at 12. 157 Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 384 (2012). 158 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 507–08 (1978). 159 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 404 (1997); e.g., Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018) (applying that two-part inquiry). 160 See, e.…

Knowledge, in this context, requires that an official is both aware of facts from which an inference of harm could be drawn and actually draws that inference.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 257 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Adames, 331 F.3d at 512 ) (additional citation omitted).

Sanchez v. Oliver, 995 F.3d 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018), and Brewer v. Hayne, 860 F.3d 819, 823 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A defendant may act under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983 without receiving the related protections of qualified immunity.”)).

A plaintiff might also demonstrate deliberate indifference where a medical professional “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, [or] intentionally treated him incorrectly.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 258 (5th Cir. 2018).

Indeed, “[a]n official with subjective knowledge of a risk may still be free from liability if he or she ‘responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.’”Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 257 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 ).

Sanchez v. Oliver, 995 F.3d 461, 466 (5th Cir, 2021); Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018}.

For an episodic-act-or- omission claim “relying on an alleged denial or delay of medical care,” the plaintiffs may prove “deliberate indifference by demonstrating that an official ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302 309 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 258 (5th …

As with his failure-to-protect claim, Watts must “establish that [jail] official(s) acted with subjective deliberate indifference.” Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 526 ).4 For an episodic act claim relying on an alleged denial or delay of medical care, [Watts] can show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that an official “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or e…

But that is not enough. “[G]eneral propositions of law defined at ‘high levels of generality’ are insufficient to define clearly established law for purposes of defeating qualified immunity.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 256 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742) (alteration omitted).

The court again declined to extend qualified immunity stating that there was “no good reason to disturb our holding in McCullum.” Lee v. Willey, 543 F. App’x 503, 507 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). whether “the defendants’ public counterparts would be able to assert qualified immunity.” 901 F.3d 241, 252 (5th Cir. 2018).

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1988); Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018).

“Knowledge, in this context, requires that an official is both aware of facts from which an inference of harm could be drawn and actually draws that inference.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 257 (5th Cir. 2018).

At bottom, a plaintiff must show that no reasonable officer could have believed his actions were proper.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 . “[S]tate officials have a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide involuntarily detained persons with ‘basic human needs, including medical care.’” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996)).

See, e.g., Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 259 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]here is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability under § 1983.”).

In Johnson v. Treen,64 the Fifth Circuit explained that 58 Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 741 (2011). 59 Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018). 60 Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. 61 Id. (citing Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir.1969) (internal citations and footnote omitted).