Connor v. First Student, Inc. (2018)

That same year, Congress passed the [FCRA]. [Citation.] FCRA defined a ‘consumer report’ to include an individual’s ‘credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.’ [Citation.] FCRA distinguished between consumer reports that contained information obtained by personal interviews, and consumer reports that were gathered by other means.” (Connor v. First Student, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1032 …

That same year, Congress passed [the FCRA],” which “defined a ‘consumer report’ to include an individual’s ‘credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living’ ” and “distinguished between consumer reports that contained information obtained by personal interviews and consumer reports that were gathered by other means.” (First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1032 (First Student); see 15 U.S.C. …

(First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1032 (First Student Cases).) That same year, Congress passed the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (the FCRA), a federal law that regulates the collection, dissemination, and use of consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information.

(See First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1034 (First Student Cases).) 11 As relevant here, an “investigative consumer reporting agency” is defined for purposes of ICRAA as “any person who, for monetary fees or dues, engages . . . in the practice of collecting, assembling, evaluating, compiling, reporting, transmitting, transferring, or communicating information concerning consumers for the purposes of furnishing investigative consumer reports to third parties.” (Civ.

Registry, Inc., 157 Cal. App. 4th 628 , 9 637 (2007) disproved on other grounds by Connor v. First Student, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 1026 , 1037–38 10 (2018)); Cal. Civ.

(See First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1035 [“ ‘We construe statutory language in the context of the statutory framework, seeking to discern the statute’s underlying purpose and to harmonize its different components’ ”].) Read together, the provisions require a school district to restore a teacher to permanent status and to place that teacher on the salary schedule in a manner uniform to all other teachers in the school district.

(First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1035 [“We construe statutory language in the context of the statutory framework, seeking to discern the statute’s underlying purpose and to harmonize its different components”].) Defining health care decisions as including decisions about dispute resolution that are not necessary for health care might create unnecessary tension between the two regimes for powers of attorney and between agents designated under them.

Whether one or 20 federal courts opted to follow Ortiz and Trujillo, it was clear from the Court of Appeal’s Connor decision that 1,200 plaintiffs in coordinated state court cases were pressing their ICRAA claims despite the holdings in Ortiz and Trujillo (see First Student, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1030, fn. 2 ), thus reflecting that the issue was a matter of continuing litigation in California courts.

Registry, Inc., 157 23 Cal. App. 4th 628 , 638-39 (2007), disapproved of on other grounds by Connor v. First 24 Student, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 1026 (2018) (“Because Trujillo and Gradie suffered no actual 25 damage, plaintiffs’ CCRAA cause of action fails as a matter of law.”). 26 Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any amounts for actual damages, leaving Defendant and 27 the Court with no basis for calculation for compensatory damages, lost wages, and/or pain 28 and suffering.

Registry, Inc., 157 Cal. App. 4th 628 , 637 9 (2007) disproved on other grounds by Connor v. First Student, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 1026 , 1037–38 10 (2018); see also Duarte v. J.P.

(See People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622 [if the plain, commonsense meaning of a statute’s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls]; People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231 [“[w]e must follow the statute’s plain meaning, if such appears, unless doing so would lead to absurd results the Legislature could not have intended”]; see also First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1035 [“‘“‘[i]f the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need …

Code § 1786 (b)); see Connor v. First Student, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 1026 , 4 1032 (2018).

(Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 540 ; see In re Marriage of Walrath (1998) 17 Cal.4th 907, 917 (Walrath).) “[O]ur ‘ “ ‘fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ ” [Citation.]’ . . . ‘We construe statutory language in the context of the statutory framework, seeking to discern the statute’s underlying purpose and to harmonize its different components.’ ” (First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026 , 1034–1035;…

See Connor v. First Student, Inc., 5 Cal.5th 1026 (2018).

There is no comparable exception to SB 1437’s elimination of murder liability for an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 20 “‘“‘[W]e begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’”’” (Gonzalez, at p. 1141.) “We must follow the statute’s plain meaning, if such appears, unless doing so would lead to absurd results the Legislature could not have intended.” (People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231 ; …