38 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1361, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,615 (1985)

This Court itself has noted that “the parallel is indeed close.” Martinez v. United Automobile Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.1985).

Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

See Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir.1987); Martinez v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985); Cannon v. University of Health Sciences/Chicago School of Medicine, 710 F.2d 351, 363 (7th Cir.1983); see also Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Martin, 466 F.2d 593, 600 (7th Cir.1972) {per curiam) (where district court dismissed case for failure to join an indispensable party, this Court reversed and als…

But “[w]e can affirm on any ground that the record fairly supports and the appellee has not waived.” Martinez v. United Automobile, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985).

The Commission must issue the letter within 180 days after receiving the charge. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c), (e), (f)(1); Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

The Commission must issue the letter within 180 days after receiving the charge. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c), (e), (f)(1); Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1985).

Implement Workers of Am., 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

Martinez v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985). 9 .Richard suggests that we restrict our focus to facts surrounding the issue of the contract's validity because the Second Restatement commands courts to evaluate contacts "according to their relative importance with respect to a particular issue.” So restricting our focus, however, would result in attaching significance only to words spoken in the Orlando airport.

Crane v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir.1992); Frederick v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 911 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir.1990); Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985).

Implement Workers of Am., Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985) (declining to grant summary judgment to defendant in Title VII case after holding that the district court erroneously dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds).

Martinez v. United Auto., etc., Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985).

Implement *354 Workers of Am., Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985).

See Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 , 585 n. 24, 102 S.Ct. 2597 , 2607 n. 24, 73 L.Ed.2d 227 (1982) (appellate court may affirm district court judgment on any basis having support in the record), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 , 106 S.Ct. 3301 , 92 L.Ed.2d 715 (1986); Martinez v. United Auto., etc., Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985).

See Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook, 824 F.2d 567 , 568 n. 3 (7th Cir.1987); Martinez v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985).

We can with propriety affirm a district court's decision "on any ground that the record fairly supports and the appellee has not waived," Martinez v. United Automobile Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985); LaSalle National Bank v. General Mills Restaurant Group, Inc., 854 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir.1988), but the second condition is not satisfied here.

We can with propriety affirm a district court’s decision “on any ground that the record fairly supports and the appellee has not waived,” Martinez v. United Automobile Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985); LaSalle National Bank v. General Mills Restaurant Group, Inc., 854 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir.1988), but the second condition is not satisfied here.

See Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook, 824 F.2d 567 , 568 n. 3 (7th Cir.1987); Martinez v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985).

We can affirm a decision by a district court on an alternative ground that has not been waived, Martinez v. United Automobile Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985); LaSalle National Bank v. General Mills Restaurant Group, Inc., 854 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir.1988), and this ground has not been; it has been briefed and argued by both sides.

See Congregation of the Passion v. Touche, Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 219 , 223 (7th Cir.1988) (remarking on the discretion district courts possess in interpreting their own rules); see also Smith v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir.1987) (holding that Local Rule 46 does not apply to requests for attorneys’ fees under a social security statute when the entitlement to fees may not finally be determined until more than 90 days after judgment); cf. Martinez v. United Auto Workers, 772 F…

Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 , 58 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (Brandeis, J.); Martinez v. United Automobile Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.1985).

Sec. 2000e-5(c); Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 350-51 (7th Cir.1985), argues for treating Title VII's exhaustion requirements as jurisdictional.

But Title VII’s strong policy of encouraging conciliation, and of giving states that have anti-discrimination laws a chance to deal with discrimination before federal intervention, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 350-51 (7th Cir.1985), argues for treating Title VIPs exhaustion requirements as jurisdictional.

An individual can file with the state administrative body and the EEOC at the same time, but he “must file a charge with the state agency.” Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.1985) (emphasis added). [T]he purpose of giving a state that has an age discrimination law a chance to respond to any age discrimination claim is to encourage the states to eliminate age discrimination without federal judicial interven…

This argument is persuasive since to the extent that there are differences in the deferral mechanisms of the statutes, those variations suggest that the ADEA requires less deference to state administrative agencies. 7 See Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Workers of America, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.1985) (ADEA policy of deference to state authority is weaker than in Title VII).

This court itself has noted that the fact that the ADEA does not provide state agencies with any period of exclusive jurisdiction suggests that the “policy of deference to state authority ... is weaker than in Title VII.” Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.1985).

This argument is persuasive since to the extent that there are differences in the deferral mechanisms of the statutes, those variations suggest that the ADEA requires less deference to state administrative agencies. 7 See Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Workers of America, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1985) (ADEA policy of deference to state authority is weaker than in Title VII).

Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

Although we are reluctant, without having the benefit of the district court’s view on the matter, to uphold the dismissal of a complaint on the ground that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment, Martinez v. United Automobile Workers, Local No. 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985), we would do so if it were quite clear that the plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of its claim.

Under Title VII, the timely filing of an EEOC charge is a prerequisite to bringing suit. *245 Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985). 2 In sum, Sections 706(c) and 706(e), as applicable in this case, required that the plaintiff institute proceedings with the IDHR and file his EEOC charge within 300 days of his discharge.

Implement Workers of Am., 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1985)).

Implement Workers of Am., 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1985).

Implement Workers of Am., 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1985)).

Implement Workers of Am., Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[I]f you do not file a timely charge with the EEOC, you cannot bring a suit under Title VII.”).

Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir.2005) (citing Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985)).

Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agticultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985); see Maynard, 256 F.3d at 1262 (citing Section 706(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(e)(l)).

Title VII provides that if the alleged discrimination occurs in a state that has an agency that can provide a remedy against such discrimination, the victim cannot file a charge with the EEOC until sixty days after he begins a proceeding before the state agency, unless the proceeding ends before then. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

Implement Workers of America, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 , 100 S.Ct. 2486 , 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980).

Advanced Studies’s first argument in support of its motion to dismiss is that Miller failed to allege in his complaint that he filed a timely charge with the appropriate Illinois agency before filing his EEOC charge as required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). 1 See Martinez v. United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985) (discussing the state deferral requirements).

Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

See also Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.1985) ("The policy of deference to state authority ... is weaker [in the ADEA] than in Title VII.... ”), and Delgado, 815 F.2d at 646 (citing Martinez). 7 .

See Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985). 4 .

See, e.g., Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985) (court of appeals can affirm on any ground — even one not passed on by the district judge — that the record fairly supports and the appellee has not waived); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1130 (7th Cir.1983); Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 699 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir.1983).

See, e.g., Martinez v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985) (court of appeals can affirm on any ground that the record fairly supports and the appellee has not waived).

See Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1985).

See Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 350-52 (7th Cir.1985) (dictum) (Posner, J.); Proffit v. Keycom Electronic Publishing, 625 F.Supp. 400, 405-407 (N.D.Ill.1985) (dictum) (Shadur, J.); O’Young v. Hobart Corp., 579 F.Supp. 418, 421 (N.D.Ill.1983) (McGarr, C.J.); Lowell v. Glidden-Durkee, Div. of SCM Corp., 529 F.Supp. 17 (N.D.Ill.1981) (Getzendanner, J.).

See Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 1373, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.1985); see also Babrocky v. Jewel Food Cos., 773 F.2d 857, 862, 866 (7th Cir.1985) (discussing the “utmost liberality” with which EEOC charges are to be construed).