Cluster 462461 (1985)

F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F. 2d 826, 829 (CADC 1987); Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F. 2d 974, 977 (CA4 1985); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 727 F. 2d 629, 630 (CA7 1984); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 273 F. 2d 613 , 613–614 (CA1 1959) (per curiam); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 235 F. 2d 209, 211 (CA2 1956) (per curiam). 8 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI JACKSON, J., dissenting III Because neither the statute nor any background law states th…

F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F. 2d 826, 829 (CADC 1987); Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F. 2d 974, 977 (CA4 1985); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 727 F. 2d 629, 630 (CA7 1984); Lum- mus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refning Co., 273 F. 2d 613 , 613–614 (CA1 1959) (per curiam); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 235 F. 2d 209, 211 (CA2 1956) (per curiam). 754 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI Jackson, J., dissenting stay rule) existed as a background matter when Congress enact…

Unlike some waiver doctrines, “the circumstances giving rise to a statutory default are limited and, in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, are not to be lightly inferred,” Maxum, 779 F.2d at 981, and the party opposing arbitration bears a heavy burden to prove default, Am.

Regarding the alleged prejudice suffered by ARC because of CTI’s pursuit of discovery after the district court denied its motion to stay pending arbitration, we observe that a “party seeking arbitration does not lose its contractual right by prudently pursuing discovery in the face of a court-ordered deadline.” Id. at 982 (“declin[ing] to create a rule that would require a party seeking arbitration to avoid a finding of default by ignoring court ordered discovery deadlines a…

Regarding the alleged prejudice suffered by ARC because of CTI's pursuit of discovery after the district court denied its motion to stay pending arbitration, we observe that a "party seeking arbitration does not lose its contractual right by prudently pursuing discovery in the face of a court-ordered deadline." Id. at 982 ("declin[ing] to create a rule that would require a party seeking arbitration to avoid a finding of default by ignoring court ordered discovery deadlines a…

See, e.g., Maxum, 779 F.2d at 982 (“[Mjere delay, without more, will not suffice to constitute waiver.”); In re Mercury Constr.

See, e.g., Maxum, 779 F.2d at 982 ("[M]ere delay, without more, will not suffice to constitute waiver."); In re Mercury Constr.

A. Until recently in this Circuit, a party waived its right to arbitrate “by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985).

Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (second alteration in original)); Morewitz v. W. of Eng.

Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (second alteration in original)); Morewitz v. W. of Eng.

Until recently, a party in this circuit waived its arbitration right “by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985).

Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 702 (4th Cir. 2012).

DI draws our attention to Maxum Found., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 983 (4th Cir. 1985), and, in particular, to that court’s observation that “the party seeking arbitration does not lose its contractual right by prudently pursuing discovery in the face of a court-ordered deadline.” DI appears to overlook the context in which the court made the cited statement.

But a party will default its right to arbitration if it “so substantially utiliz[es] the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” Maxum Founds., 779 F.2d at 981.

Cf. Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It is well settled that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, an agreement to arbitrate may be validly incorporated into a subcontract by reference to an arbitration provision in a general contract."). 12 The disputes between the Bank and Kvaerner and Jones arise out of and relate to the Construction Agreement.

See Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bidg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200 , 205 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding no prejudice in a four-month delay); Maxum Founds., Inc., 779 F.2d at 982 (finding no prejudice in a three-month delay). 2.

Id. at 981.

A party waives its right to compel arbitration when it “so substantially utilizes the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)).

Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985).

In light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, the general rule is that “a party will default its right to arbitration if it ‘so substantially utilizes] the litigation machinery that to subse *586 quently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.’ ” Forrester v. Penn Lyon Homes, Inc., 553 F.3d 340, 343 (4th Cir.2009) (quoting Maxum Founds., 779 F.2d at 981).

“Neither delay nor the filing of pleadings by the party seeking a stay will suffice, without more, to establish waiver of arbitration.” Fraser, 817 F.2d at 252; see also Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 703 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that a six-and-a-half month delay, without more, was insufficient to demonstrate that the opposing party suffered actual prejudice) (citing Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200 , 205 (4t…

Rota- McLarty, 700 F.3d at 703 (citing Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200 , 205 (4th Cir. 2004); Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 982 (4th Cir. 1985); Forrester v. Penn Lyon Homes, Inc., 553 F.3d 340 , 343–44 (4th Cir. 2009); and Fraser v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 380 F.3d 200 , 205 (4th Cir. 2004)).

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 417 (2022).2 The question is whether the party 2 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan, a party seeking to compel arbitration in this circuit waived the right to arbitrate if that party “so substantially utiliz[ed] the litigation machinery that to permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the arbitration.” See Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985).

See, e.g., Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (“A litigant may waive its right to invoke the Federal Arbitration Act by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.”).

Although Walmart did not move to compel arbitration until six months after the complaint was filed (and five months after moving to dismiss/answering that complaint), “[n]either delay nor the filing of pleadings by the party seeking a stay will suffice, without more, to establish waiver of arbitration.” Fraser, 817 F.2d at 252; see also Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 703 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that a six-and-a-half month delay, without more, wa…

F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F. 2d 826, 829 (CADC 1987); Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F. 2d 974, 977 (CA4 1985); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 727 F. 2d 629, 630 (CA7 1984); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 273 F. 2d 613 , 613–614 (CA1 1959) (per curiam); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 235 F. 2d 209, 211 (CA2 1956) (per curiam). 8 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI JACKSON, J., dissenting III Because neither the statute nor any background law states th…

Neither delay nor the filing of pleadings by the party seeking a stay will suffice, without more, to establish waiver of arbitration.”); Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that “[a] litigant may waive its right to invoke the Federal Arbitration Act by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay” and analyzing waiver by assessing whether …

Dec. 15, 2011) (“The FAA has an expansive reach, similar to that of the Commerce Clause, such that an arbitration clause merely ‘affecting’ interstate commerce would be covered by the statute.” (quoting THI of S.C. at Columbia, LLC v. stay.” Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985).

A party may waive its right to demand arbitration if the party “so substantially utiliz[es] the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir 1985), But even where the party invoking arbitration has utilized the litigation machinery. to some degree, “[t]he □ dispositive question…

“A litigant may waive its right to invoke the Federal Arbitration Act by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985). ‘Neither delay nor the filing of pleadings by the party seeking [a stay to arbitrate] will suffice, without more, to establish waiver of arbitration.” Fraser v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith…

Under the FAA, “[a] litigant may waive its right to [arbitration] by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985); see also 9 U.S.C. § 3 (providing that a party with an arbitrable claim may apply for a stay of the trial of that action if “the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitrat…

Thus, when the Court speaks of “waiver” here, it refers to the principles of “default” that originate under the FAA and that the Fourth Circuit enunciated in MicroStrategy. 268 F.3d at 249 (“Although this principle of ‘default’ is akin to waiver, the circumstances giving rise to statutory default are limited and, in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, are not to be lightly inferred.”) (quoting Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. …

“Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may demand a stay of federal judicial proceedings pending exercise of a contractual right to have the subject matter of the federal action decided by arbitration, unless the party seeking arbitration is ‘in default’ of that right.” Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3 ).

McGaughan Co., Inc., 907 F.2d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1990)); Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1985) (also incorporating the general conditions of the main contract into the subcontract).

As a result, for purposes of this appeal, we accept the circuit court’s conclusion that Virginia law governs the dispute. 2 In Ahern, the court stated that “[a] litigant may waive its right to arbitrate by utilizing the litigation machinery in a way that will cause prejudice to the party opposing arbitration if it is later permitted.” 55 Va. Cir. at 24 (emphasis added) (citing Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)).

A party waives its right to arbitrate only when it “so substantially utiliz[es] the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the [arbitration].” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Maxum Found., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)).

That is because, “[u]nlike some waiver doctrines, ‘the circumstances giving rise to a statutory default are limited and, in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, are not to be lightly inferred.’” See id. (quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)). “[E]ven in cases where the party seeking arbitration has invoked the ‘litigation machinery’ to some degree,” statutory default will not be found unless “the party objecting to arbitr…

That is because, “[u]nlike some waiver doctrines, ‘the circumstances giving rise to a statutory default are limited and, in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, are not to be lightly inferred.’” See id. (quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)). “[E]ven in cases where the party seeking arbitration has invoked the ‘litigation machinery’ to some degree,” statutory default will not be found unless “the party objecting to arbitr…

A litigant “may waive its right to invoke the Federal Arbitration Act by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

That is because, “[u]nlike some waiver doctrines, ‘the circumstances giving rise to a statutory default are limited and, in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, are not to be lightly inferred.’” See id. (quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)).

Ed. 2d 765 (1983), it argues that “a litigant may waive its right to invoke the Federal Arbitration Act by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay,” citing Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985).

“A party is in default only if it has ‘so substantially utiliz[ed] the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.’” Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 787 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)). “[E]ven in cases where the party seeking arbitration has invoked the ‘litigation machinery’ to some degree, ‘the dispositive question is whether the par…

“Under the [FAA], a party may demand a stay of federal judicial proceedings pending exercise of a contractual right to have the subject matter of the federal action decided by arbitration, unless the party seeking arbitration is ‘in default’ of that right.” Microstrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)).

(See Def.’s Br. to Stay [Docket Item 14- 1]; Pl.’s Opp’n to Stay [Docket Item 15].) Section 3 of the FAA refers to “default,” which other courts have held is akin to “waiver.” Maxum Fdns., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985).

Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985); ATSA of California, Inc. v. Continental Ins. - 11 - IPAYMENT V.

Although the mere fact that the parties are from different states does not necessarily compel application of the FAA, see Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974 , 978 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he mere circumstance of diversity of citizenship between [the parties] is not sufficient to command the application of the [FAA].”), the transaction involved interstate commerce in other ways.

Defendant cites Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) for the proposition that: “Although this principle of ‘default’ is akin to waiver, the circumstances giving rise to a statutory default are limited and, in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, are not to be lightly inferred.” Id.

Maxum, 779 F.2d at 981.

Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985); see also E.

“Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may demand a stay of federal judicial proceedings pending exercise of a contractual right to have the subject matter of the federal action decided by arbitration, unless the party seeking arbitration is ‘in default’ of that right.” Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing 3 U.S.C. § 6 ; other citations omitted).