Harry J. Williams v. United States Department of Transportation and United States Coast Guard (1986)

For example, in Williams v. United States Department of Transportation, 781 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir. 1986), we rejected the due process claim of a pilot that the Coast Guard, in seeking to im- pose civil penalties on him for negligence, should have provided him with “heightened due process protections because his state pi- lot’s license was at stake.” We said that “[t]his claim [was] specula- tive at best [in part because] . . . any allegation regarding potential future co…

See, e.g., Basco, 514 F.3d at 1182 (“[H]earsay may constitute substantial evidence in administrative proceedings as long as factors that assure the underlying reliability and probative value of the evidence are present.” (quoting U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Webb, 595 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1979) (additional internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573 , 1578 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Hearsay is admissible in administrative hearings and ma…

Substantial evidence is “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 , 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026 , 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966); Williams v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir.1986).

Williams v. United States Department of Transportation, et al., 781 F.2d 1573, 1578 (11th Cir. 1986); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”). 2.

Williams v. United States Department of Transportation, 781 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1986) (Act preempts state boat and safety equipment standards); Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F.Supp. 1579, 1581 (M.D.Ga.1991) (citing among others Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 , 98 S.Ct. 988, 1004-05 , 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978)).

See Williams v. United States Dep't of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573 , 1578 n. 8 (11th Cir.1986); H.P.

See Williams v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573 , 1578 n. 8 (11th Cir.1986); H.P.

See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 , 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427 , 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (hearsay may be admissible in administrative proceedings); accord Williams v. United States Dept. of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573 , 1578 n. 7 (11th Cir.1986).

See Williams v. United States Department of Transportation, 781 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir.1986), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(E). 3 As the Seventh Circuit recently emphasized, this standard accords significant weight to the agency’s conclusions: Judicial review of agency action is quite limited.

Dr. Hannan argues that “not one witness called by the State had any knowledge of the facts to which they were testifying.” This does not equate to an administrative decision based solely on hearsay—the Hearing Officer’s 7 See Qijano v. Ascroft, 2004 WL 2823312 , at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2004); see also, Williams v. United States Dept. of Transportation, 781 F.2d 1573 , 1578 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986); Burgin v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 4249729 , at *5 (W.D.

See, e.g., W illiams v. U nited S tates D e p ’t o f Transp., 781 F.2d 1573 , 1578 n.6 (11th Cir. 1986); C ollins v. Com m odity Futures Trading C om m ’n, 737 F. Supp. 1467, 1482-83 (N.D. 111. 1990).