United States v. John Rankin (2019)

“An indictment is ‘sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the charged offense, (2) gives the defendant adequate notice of the charges, and (3) protects the defendant against double jeopardy.’” United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 404-05 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).

See Williams v. Haviland, 467 F.3d 527, 535 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that “[a] constitutionally deficient indictment is subject to harmless-error review.”); Rankin, 929 F.3d at 404 (“[W]e will reverse a conviction due to the insufficiency of the indictment only if the defendant’s substantial rights are affected, meaning he can ‘show[] prejudice to his ability to defend himself at trial, to the general fairness of the trial, or to the indictment’s sufficiency to bar subsequen…

See United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 ).

United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2019).

See, e.g., United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Supreme Court has confirmed that sentencing courts may look to uncharged criminal conduct, indeed even acquitted conduct, to enhance a sentence within the statutorily authorized range.”); United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381 , 383–84 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2019).

As the district court found, Defendant does not allege that the indictment cannot be construed to charge a crime, nor would such an argument be persuasive in light of our precedent. 6 No. 20-5842, United States v. Grayer Additionally, “we will reverse a conviction due to the insufficiency of the indictment only if the defendant’s substantial rights are affected, meaning he can ‘show[] prejudice to his ability to defend himself at trial, to the general fairness of the trial, …

See, e.g., Dentler, 492 F.3d at 310 ; United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Stevenson, 832 F.3d 412, 426 (3d Cir. 2016).

United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2019).

“In the Sixth Circuit, the defendant must be aware that the IRS action was pending at the time of [her] obstructive conduct.” United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2019).5 Practically, the Omnibus Clause criminalizes conduct without requiring a specific outcome.

“A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if,” among other things, “the elements of the lesser offense are identical to part of the elements of the greater offense.” United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 817, 821-22 (6th Cir. 2005)).

See, e.g., United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399 , 404–05 (6th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Lanning, 633 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2019) (explaining that district courts “may consider relevant uncharged or even acquitted criminal conduct in sentencing” so long as the court finds that conduct is supported by the “preponderance of the evidence” (citation omitted)).

See United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399 , 404–05 (6th Cir. 2019).

See Rankin, 929 F.3d at 404 ; United States v. Cor-Bon Custom Bullet Co., 287 F.3d 576, 580 (6th Cir. 2002).

See United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. McShan, 757 Fed.