James Andrews v. Sirius Xm Radio, Inc. (2019)

See Andrews, 932 F.3d at 1260 (“[W]e conclude that where, as here, the initial source of 12 personal information is a record in the possession of an individual, rather than a state DMV, then 13 use or disclosure of that information does not violate the DPPA.”); Garey v. James S. Farrin, 14 P.C., 35 F.4th 917, 926 (4th Cir. 2022) (“The phrase ‘obtain, disclose or use personal 15 information, from a motor vehicle record’ is most naturally read to refer to a defendant who 16 ob…

See also Andrews, 932 F.3d at 1260 (“where, as here, the initial source of personal information is a record in the possession of an individual, rather than a state DMV, then use or disclosure of that information does not violate the DPPA.”).

“The statutory definitions of ‘damage’ and ‘loss’ . . . focus on 6 technological harms—such as the corruption of files—of the type unauthorized users cause to 7 computer systems and data.” Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1660 (2021); see also 8 Andrews, 932 F.3d at 1263 (“The statute’s ‘loss’ definition—with its references to damage 9 assessments, data restoration, and interruption of service—clearly limits its focus to harms caused 10 by computer intrusions, no…

“A driver’s license, though issued by the DMV, becomes the possession of an individual, not the DMV that issued it.” Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted) (construing DPPA).

“A driver’s license, though issued by the DMV, becomes the possession of an individual, not the DMV that issued it.” Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted) (construing DPPA).

In Andrews, the Ninth Circuit held that Sirius XM Radio did not 12 violate the DPPA by obtaining information from an individual’s driver’s license and a form provided 13 in connection with the purchase of vehicle because that information did not come from the DMV. 14 Andrews, 932 F.3d at 1260 (“[W]e conclude that where, as here, the initial source of personal 15 information is a record in the possession of an individual, rather than a state DMV, then use or 16 disclosure of …

The 15 CFAA maintains a “narrow conception of ‘loss,’” and its definition, “with its references 16 to damage assessments, data restoration, and interruption of service—clearly limits its 17 focus to harms caused by computer intrusions, not general injuries unrelated to the 18 hacking itself.” Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 19 20 6 TST incorrectly asserts that the $5,000 “loss” threshold applies only to claims brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 …

The Ninth Circuit has held 5 that the statute maintains a “narrow conception of ‘loss,’” and that its definition, “with its 6 references to damage assessments, data restoration, and interruption of service—clearly limits its 7 focus to harms caused by computer intrusions, not general injuries unrelated to the hacking itself.” 8 Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2019). “[A]ny theory of loss 9 must conform to the limited parameters of the CFAA’s…

See Pavone, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 966 (ruling on motion for summary judgment that “information obtained from a driver's license is information obtained from a motor vehicle record” (emphasis in original)); Dunkin, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1106 (denying motion to dismiss then granting summary judgment in favor of defendants); Andrews, 932 F.3d at 1254 (appeal of grant of summary judgment).

Jackson fails to state a claim under the DPPA. 17 To establish a potential violation of the DPPA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the 18 defendant: (1) knowingly took some affirmative action to obtain, disclose, or use personal 19 information (2) from a motor vehicle record (3) for an impermissible purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 ; 20 Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2019).

Separately and in addition to harm to computers, a civil claim under the CFAA requires 20 “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value.” 18 21 U.S.C. § 1030 (c)(4)(A)(i)(I); Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 22 2019).

Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the CFAA’s 15 reference “to damage assessments, data restoration, and interruption of service[,] clearly limits its 16 focus to harms caused by computer intrusions, not general injuries unrelated to the hacking itself.” 17 Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2019). 18 Several courts within this District have considered allegations of loss that are similar to 19 WalkMe’s allegations.

The CFAA maintains a narrow conception of “loss,” Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 24 932 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 2019), which includes “any reasonable cost” to “respond[ ] to an 25 offense” or to return a system “to its condition prior to the offense.” Section 1030(e)(11).

Inc. v. Kraft, 974 F.3d 756, 760 (6th Cir. 2020)); see also 5 Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019) (“CFAA is an anti-hacking 6 statute”) (internal quotation omitted). 7 The anti-hacking purpose of the CFAA fits Apple’s allegations to a T, and NSO has not 8 shown otherwise.

CFAA 8 “[T]he CFAA is an anti-hacking statute, not an expansive misappropriation statute.” 9 Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted).

As the Supreme Court has noted, the statutory definition of loss “focus[es] on technological harms” and is “ill fitted . . . to remediating ‘misuse’ of sensitive information.” Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 , 1660 (2021); cf. Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he CFAA is an anti-hacking statute, not an expansive misappropriation statute.”) (cleaned up).

(Avena I, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 408.) In 2019, the Ninth Circuit held that “the California Supreme Court was objectively unreasonable in concluding that Avena failed to show prejudice and denying Avena’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase.” (Avena II, supra, 932 F.3d at p. 1253.) Accordingly, it reversed the judgment 1The facts and procedural history are drawn from the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Avena’s direct appeal (People v. Aven…

The statute's "loss" definition thus "clearly limits its focus to harms caused by computer intrusions, not general injuries unrelated to the hacking itself." Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019).

The Court is unpersuaded by defendants’ arguments that the degree of discretion exercised by the Fund in selecting which recordings to research, allocating royalties to performers on those royalties, or setting a “de minimus” threshold under which it will not cut checks compels a contrary conclusion or otherwise suggests that reading the Copyright Act to confer a property right would “lead to an absurd result.” See Mot. at 21-22 (citing Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F…

Congress’s definition of “loss,” “with its references to damage assessments, data restoration, and interruption of service,” limited the “focus to harms caused by computer intrusions, not general injuries unrelated to the hacking itself.” Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019).

See, e.g., Andrews, 932 F.3d at 1259–60; Fontanez v. Skepple, 563 F. App’x 847, 849 (2d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (summary order); Siegler v. Best Buy Co. of Minn., Inc., 519 F. App’x 604, 605 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (per curiam).

See, e.g., Andrews, 932 F.3d at 1259–60; Fontanez v. Skepple, 563 F. App’x 847, 849 (2d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (summary order); Siegler v. Best Buy Co. of Minn., Inc., 519 F. App’x 604, 605 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (per curiam).

See Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding that there was no abuse of discretion where amendment would be futile). 2.

This Court in Garey found that “[s]uch concerns, while not necessarily exhaustive, suggest that a reading of the statute as applying only to direct DMV interactions is well-founded” and noted how various courts have subsequently “cabined the reach of the DPPA.” Id.; see, e.g., Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253 , 1259–60 (9th Cir. 2019).

See Andrews v. Sirius XM 3 Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding the CFAA’s definition of “loss” 4 is limited “to harms caused by computer intrusions” and does not include “general injuries 5 unrelated to the hacking itself.”).

See Andrews, 932 F.3d at 1262-63 .

See also Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019). 26 Accordingly, the CFAA claim is DISMISSED. 27 4.

See Opp. at 13-14. 26 Recently, the Ninth Circuit decided a CFAA case where Plaintiffs’ “theory of loss [was] 27 that he and his fellow class members were denied the profits they might have received from 1 commodifying the personal information that [the defendant] allegedly obtained through unlawful 2 means.” Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 2019).

Ind. Sept. 11, 2014) (citation omitted); see also Andrews v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253 , 1260 n.5 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Fontanez v. Skepple, 563 F. App’x 847, 848-49 (2d Cir. 2014); Siegler v. Best Buy Co. of Minn., 519 F. App’x 604, 605 (11th Cir. 2013)).