Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner (1981)

Consolidated Freightways v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 708 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1983) (loading docks, overhead doors, and lights are intended to be permanent and thus do not qualify as § 38 property); Southland Corp. v. United States, 222 Ct.Cl. 22, 611 F.2d 348 (1979) (outdoor advertising signs are § 38 property to extent removable); Kramertown Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 488 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1974) (air conditioning/heating units, removable o…

Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 406 (1981) (“Without extensive consideration, it is clear to us that, under the standards enunciated in the Whiteco case, the sign heads and light fixtures are not affixed to anything in an inherently permanent way.”); Musco Sports Lighting, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.

Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 397 (1981), on appeal (7th Cir., Mar. 1, 1982); Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 1982), affg. 74 T.C. 1481, 1510 (1980); Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1477 (1980), on appeal (10th Cir., May 5, 1981).

Enters. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 1, 23 (1993); (5) the treatment of costs as a repair expense or as depreciable, FPL Group, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 554 (2000); (6) a change in depreciation method resulting from a change from section 1250 property to section 1245 property, Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 410 (1981); and (7) overburden removal costs under section 616(a), Sunoco, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, T.C.

Enters. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 1, 23 (1993); (5) the treatment of costs as a repair expense or as depreciable, FPL Group, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 554 (2000); (6) a change in depreciation method resulting from a change from section 1250 property to section 1245 property, Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 410 (1981); and (7) overburden removal costs under section 616(a), Sunoco, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, T.C.

However, section 1.48-l(c), Income Tax Regs., 19 defines tangible personal property as "any tangible property except land and improvements thereto, such as buildings or other inherently permanent structures (including items which are structural components of such buildings or structures).” See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 405 (1981).

For examples of situations where certain modifications in the accrual of items under the all-events test were held to constitute not “changes” in methods of accounting for such items but mere “corrections” in the application to such items of the all-events test of the accrual method of accounting (for which corrections respondent’s permission was not required) see Northern States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 883-885 (8th Cir. 1998); Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. United …

In Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 405 (1981) (involving the eligibility for ITC of new service station signs and lights), we stated that, for purposes of section 48(a)(1), "all tangible property constitutes 'tangible personal property' unless it is excluded because it is land or an 'inherently permanent structure.'" See also sec. 1.48-1(c), Income Tax Regs.

In Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 405 (1981) (involving the eligibility for ITC of new service station signs and lights), we stated that, for purposes of section 48(a)(1), “all tangible property constitutes ‘tangible personal property’ unless it is excluded because it is land or an ‘inherently permanent structure.’” See also sec. 1.48-l(c), Income Tax Regs.

The idc provisions of the regulations have been interpreted and applied in accordance with the direction that “Congress favors a liberal interpretation of the regulation.” Exxon Corp. v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 258 , 547 F.2d 548, 555 (1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 324, 342-343 (1986); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 386-387 (1981); Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.

We summarized some of the rationale which connected risk-taking with IDC in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 397 (1981), as follows: The argumentative justification for liberality in taxation of oil and gas is that such liberality encourages and emboldens the fiscally timid to exploit the hidden resource.

We summarized some of the rationale which connected risk-taking with IDC in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 397 (1981), as follows: The argumentative justification for liberality in taxation of oil and gas is that such liberality encourages and emboldens the fiscally timid to exploit the hidden resource.

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 324, 340 (1986); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 382 (1981); Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 1A T.C. 1481, 1507 (1980), affd. 677 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1982); Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1474 (1980), affd. per curiam 694 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1982); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 344-345 (1977).

Standard Oil Company (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349 407-409 (1981) ; Kimmelman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 294 , 308 (1979) . 10 The questions considered in Whiteco and the answers mandated by the facts herein are as follows: (1) Is the property capable of being moved, and has it in fact been moved?

Our holding is consistent with the avowed purpose of the option to deduct IDCs, i.e., to cover risk, as we stated in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 400 (1981), because petitioners had virtually nothing at risk for the financed portion of the IDCs.

For examples of situations where certain modifications in the accrual of items under the all-events test were held to constitute not “changes” in methods of accounting for such items but mere “corrections” in the application to such items of the all-events test of the accrual method of accounting (for which corrections respondent’s permission was not required), see Northern States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 883-885 (8th Cir. 1998); Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. United…

Enters. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 1 (1993) (a change from "working gas" (inventory) to "cushion gas" (capital asset) is a change in method of accounting); *79 Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. at 410 (a change in depreciation method resulting from a change from section 1250 property to section 1245 property is a change in method of accounting).

Accord Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 407-08 (1981); Kimmelman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 294, 308 (1979).

Accord Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 407-08 (1981); Kimmelman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 294, 308 (1979).

See Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349 , 372-373 , 409 (1981) (excluded travel time when determining whether service station *150 signs and lighting facilities were readily removable); Scott Paper Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 172 (focused on how much time was required to "move" the components rather than how long it would take to make them "operational" at the new site if 2 months of preparatory work had not been performed ahead of time); Fox Photo, Inc. v…

See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner , 77 T.C. 349 , 405 (1981) ; Estate of Morgan v. Commissioner , 52 T.C. at 483-484 .

See also Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349 , 407-409 (1981) ; Kimmelman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 294 , 308 (1979) .

See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349 , 410-411 (1981) ; *195 Casey v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 357 , 384-387 (1962) .