Kia Davidson v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (2020)

Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2020).

But “the mere existence” of a company policy—with little evidence that it was implemented or enforced uniformly—does “not constitute significant proof that a class of employees were subject to an unlawful practice.” See Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 353 ) (cleaned up).

And while “the mere existence of a facially defective written policy—without any evidence that it was implemented in an unlawful manner—does not constitute ‘[s]ignificant proof’ that a class of employees were [sic] subject to an unlawful practice,” Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted), Owino relied on the written policies as well as the testimony of former ICE detainees and CoreCivic’s own manager.

See Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The question whether a district court abuses its discretion by setting deadlines or limiting pre-certification discovery is inherently fact intensive and must be decided based on the facts of each case.”).

Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiffs seeking class certification must “affirmatively 24 demonstrate . . . that there are in fact . . . common questions of law or fact.” Davidson v. O’Reilly 25 Auto Enterprises, LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 ). 26 “[T]he mere existence of a facially defective written policy -- without any evidence that it was 27 implemented in an unlawful manner -- does not constitute ‘[s]ignificant proof,’ [Dukes, 564 U.S.] 1 at 354, that a cl…

Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2020) 22 (citations omitted). 23 The Court is not convinced that the Defendant’s alternative scheduling order is 24 appropriate as it pertains to the discovery and motion for filing class certification 25 deadlines.

A, 26 Ward Expert Report). 27 In the absence of evidence that Amazon uniformly enforced any policy requiring 28 permission to leave the facility during rest breaks, there does not appear to be a question that 1 requires common resolution by the Court. “[T]he mere existence of a facially defective written 2 policy—without any evidence that it was implemented in an unlawful manner—does not 3 constitute significant proof ... that a class of employees was subject to an unlawful …

In Davidson v. O’Reilly 16 Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 967 (2020), the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal 17 to certify a “rest break class” because the plaintiff “failed to show that employees suffered the 18 common injury of being deprived of rest-period premiums to which they were legally entitled.” 19 Although the named plaintiff alleged that her employer’s written rest break policy was lawfully 20 deficient, “she did not show that the policy was appl…

See Davidson v. O-Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 968 (9th 7 Cir. 2020) (“[W]e conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 8 Davidson’s motion for class certification because Davidson did not establish commonality.”); 9 Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., 799 Fed.Appx. 459 , 461 (9th Cir. 2019) (a “proposed class must 10 satisfy all of the Rule 23(a) requirements”). 11 2.

A, 22 Ward Expert Report). 23 In the absence of evidence that Amazon uniformly enforced any policy requiring 24 permission to leave the facility during rest breaks, there does not appear to be a question that 25 requires common resolution by the Court. “[T]he mere existence of a facially defective written 26 policy—without any evidence that it was implemented in an unlawful manner—does not 27 constitute significant proof ... that a class of employees was subject to an unlawf…

Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 2020) (denying 8 certification where the plaintiff did not “implicate any illegal practice”).

We “may affirm on any ground supported in the record.” Election Integrity Project Cal., Inc. v. Weber, 113 F.4th 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2020) (same for the denial of class certification).

See Davidson v. Oreilly 11 Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir. 2020).

See Davidson v. O’Reilly 24 Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955 , 964-65 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding district court did not abuse its 25 discretion when it denied class certification but gave plaintiff the opportunity to cure the 26 deficiency through supplemental evidence); id. at 964 n.7 (“[P]arties may move a district court to 27 alter or amend an order granting or denying class certification at any time ‘before final judgment,’ 1 First Am.

See Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, 968 F.3d 955 , 974, n.5 (9th Cir. 2020); Mahoney v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 873, 877, n.2 (9th Cir. 2017); 28 | ||plaintiffs failure to appear for trial. /d.

See Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “a district court may abuse its discretion if it unreasonably applies rules in a way that deprives a party of an opportunity to present class allegations or a motion for class certification”); see also Wisdom v. Easton Diamond Sports, LLC, 824 F. App’x 537 , 538 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by striking class allegations “on the pleadings, o…

See Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., 968 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court may abuse its discretion if it unreasonably applies rules in a way that deprives a party of an opportunity to present class allegations or a motion for class certification, or denies a party reasonable opportunity to obtain a ruling on the merits of a motion for class certification.” (citation omitted)); see also Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 20…

Therefore, this proposed class lacks the commonality necessary to “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 ; see also Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2020) (denying class certification because “Davidson failed to show that employees suffered the common injury of being deprived of rest- 7 The Court rejects the portions of the expert report submitted by Dr. Joki which …

See, e.g., Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955 , 963 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. II.

See also 26 Davidson v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, 968 F.3d 955 , 960 n.3 (9th Cir. 2020) 27 (“Although Davidson initially propounded discovery requests on June 30, 2017, her 28 requests were premature because the parties had not yet met and conferred as required by 1 Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).

See Davidson v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, 968 F.3d 955 , 963 20 (9th Cir. 2020) (“District courts may also exercise their discretion by enforcing filing deadlines; 21 they have the power to establish reasonable times for the filing of documents and to evaluate the 22 legitimacy of an excuse for failing to file on time.” (internal quotation marks and citation 23 omitted)). 24 However, it is also clear from these repeated filings that Plaintiff was under severe 25 restri…