Mglej v. Garfield County (2020)

Although “minor non-violent offenses clearly weigh against the objective need to use much force against [an arrestee],” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2020), Edwards’s suspected crime was a felony, which generally tilts the first Graham factor against the arrestee, see Est. of Valverde ex rel.

Mglej, 974 F.3d at 1151.

To Mr. DiNapoli, these actions justified force, citing case law that permits the use of force when “a suspect is armed, repeatedly ignores police commands, or makes hostile motions towards the officer or others.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 22 (quoting Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2020)).

“We must look at whether the officers or others were in danger at the precise moment that they used force.” Emmett, 973 F.3d at 1136 (quotations and alterations omitted). “[A]n officer may use increased force when a suspect is armed, repeatedly ignores police commands, or makes hostile motions towards the officer or others.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted).

Cf. Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Mglej has failed to identify any relevant case law clearly establishing that Deputy Gardner violated the Fourth Amendment just by handcuffing [him]. . . .

Finally, “[w]hen considering ‘the facts and circumstances of each particular case,’ [the Court] specifically consider[s] three factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Graham: (1) ‘the severity of the crime at issue,’ (2) ‘whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,’ and (3) ‘whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. at 816 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ). “[I]n nearly every situation …

“Because probable cause is measured by an objective standard, ‘an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.’” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1161 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 54 n.2).

In opposition, Plaintiff cites to five cases to counter Defendants’ qualified 4 immunity defense: (1) Cooper v. City of Virginia Beach, VA., 817 F.Supp. 1310 (E.D. 5 Va. 1993 ), aff’d sub nom, Cooper v. City of Virginia Beach, 21 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 1994); 6 (2) Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2005); (3) Mglef v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151 7 (10th Cir. 2020); (4) Hughey v. Easlick, 3 F.4th 283 (6th Cir. 2021); and (5) Karn v. PTS 8 of Am., LLC, 590 F.3Supp.3d 780 (D.

Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1167 (10th Cir. 2020). 4 The Supreme Court has never held that circuit precedent may be a disposi- tive source of clearly established law, opting instead to assume without de- ciding that it might.

Stat. § 18-8-104 (1)(a) when plaintiff walked towards the officer in “an agitated manner, refused to comply with the officer’s orders to stop, continued walking towards [the officer] until he was mere feet away, and then taunted the officer”); see also Mglej, 974 F.3d at 1161 (“an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking”).

See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2008) (denying an officer’s assertion of qualified immunity because the arrest was clearly outside the scope of the New Mexico disorderly conduct statute relied upon by the officer to make the arrest); Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-1082 (U.S. Feb. 8, 2021) (upholding district court denial of qualified immunity because, “based on the plain language of the Utah st…

Manner of Handcuffing “[I]n nearly every situation where an arrest is authorized … handcuffing is appropriate.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 896 (10th Cir. 2009)).

Without excusing Hart’s alleged conduct, the case law from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals — which we consider persuasive authority — is clear: “An excessive force claim that includes a challenge to the manner or course of handcuffing requires the plaintiff to show both that the force used was more than reasonably necessary and some non-de minimis actual injury.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1167 (10th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).

Plaintiff’s allegations also stand in contrast to other cases where the court found “long-lasting nerve injury.” Mglej v. Garnder, 974 F.3d 1151, 1169 (10th Cir. 2020); Vondrak, 535 F.3d at 1209 .

Here, Officer Fratto does not identify the statute he thought was violated nor does he offer any analysis or facts explaining why his belief Nicholas violated the jaywalking statute was mistaken but still reasonable. statute’s language is unmistakably clear.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1165 (10th Cir. 2020).

Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1171 (10th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit has noted that “in nearly every situation where an arrest is authorized . . . handcuffing is appropriate.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 896 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (“confidently conclud[ing]” that a reasonable officer in the defendant officer’s position would have understood that handcuffing incident to a lawful arrest, “ab…

Advantageous Cmty. Servs., LLC v. King, 844 F. App'x 58 , 63 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020)).

Reeves v. Chafin, 547 F. Supp. 3d 1056 , 1079–80 (D.N.M. 2021) (citing Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1171 (10th Cir. 2020), and Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1146 ).

Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2020).

“The malice element of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim focuses on the defendant officer's knowledge or state of mind.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007).

Therefore, contrary to Logan’s argument, defendants are not precluded under Oklahoma law from relitigating the issue of probable cause with respect to Logan’s unlawful seizure and detention claims.3 “Because probable cause is measured by an objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1161 (10th Cir. 2020).

Gardner, 974 F.3d at 1166. “[I]n nearly every situation where an arrest is authorized . . . handcuffing is appropriate.” E.g., Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation omitted).

Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020). 11 While Ms. Petersen alleges in her Complaint that she suffered emotional distress, see [Doc. 1 at 31], she does not argue this theory of injury on summary judgment.

Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1165 (10th Cir. 2020).

See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2008) (denying an officer’s assertion of qualified immunity because the arrest was clearly outside the scope of the New Mexico disorderly conduct statute relied upon by the officer to make the arrest); Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2020) (upholding district court denial of qualified immunity because, “based on the plain language of the Utah statutes, Deputy Gardner could not have reasonably believed t…

In the context of malicious prosecution claims, “malice” may be inferred if a defendant causes prosecution of an action “without arguable probable cause.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1171 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. denied (2021) (quotation omitted).

“The malice element of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim focuses on the defendant officer’s knowledge or state of mind.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007).

Thus, the 17 question is not whether plaintiff actually obstructed justice, but whether there was probable cause for the officers to think that she had, even if they were ultimately incorrect.11 Moreover, because probable cause is measured by an objective standard, “an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1161 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wesby…

Id. at 1158-59, 1171.

“To the extent Plaintiff has pled a separate Fourteenth Amendment claim,” such a claim cannot survive “because there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.” PFRD at 25-26 (emphasis in original)(citing Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2011)). 5. “[E]ven assuming Defendant Vasquez had violated Plaintiff’s First or Fourth Amendment rights . . . he would still be entitled to qualified immunity,” because (a) “‘any First Amendment right that [Plaintiff] had to recor…

I find that it was. “[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion . . . to effect it.” Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ).

See generally Hally v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2018); Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2020).

See Bell v. Neukirch, 979 F.3d 594, 607 (8th Cir. 2020); Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2020) (same); Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020) (same).

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2020) (relying on the plain language of state statutes to conclude that the absence of probable cause for an arrest had been clearly established). c.

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020) (listing the absence of probable cause as an element of malicious prosecution); Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding the Fourth Amendment is violated by the knowing or reckless inclusion of false statements in an arrest warrant affidavit, or the knowing or reckless omission of information that would vitiate probable cause).

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020).

See Mglej, 974 F.3d at 1166 ; Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1015 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs “ha[d] not carried their burden of identifying cases that constitute clearly established law on these facts”). 5 With respect to the first element, Defendant challenges whether the right was clearly established [#15 at 6-8; #23 at 5-6], but, beyond that, does not argue that Plaintiff was not engaged in constitutionall…

Rogers, 249 F.3d at 293 ; see also, e.g., Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2020) (concluding that officer could not have reasonably believed that he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff “based on the plain language” of the criminal statute).

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 9–10; see also Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting that with regard to claims under the Fourth Amendment, “[i]t is possible for someone to be handcuffed for so long that handcuffing constitutes a…

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 896 (10th Cir. 2009)) (“[I]n nearly every situation where an arrest is authorized ... handcuffing is appropriate.”).

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1165 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that an excessive force claim is separate from a claim for unlawful arrest).

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2020); Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 2009); Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2008).

These cases state that “the right to be free from unduly tight handcuffing” is “clearly established.” Vondrak, 535 F.3d at 1209 (cleaned up); see also Mglej, 974 F.3d at 1170 (similar).

Thus, his section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution must be based upon a Fourth Amendment violation and cannot be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.79 77 Becker, 494 F.3d at 918-19 . 78 Id. (citations and emphasis omitted); see also Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151 , 1159 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2020) (stating that where criminal charges were dropped before trial, a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution must be based on the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendme…

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151 , 1171 n. 14 (10th Cir. 2020). 10

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding an actual, non-de minimis injury in case of “lasting physical injury . . . and [] extreme prolonged pain”); Ali, 763 F. App’x at 651 (finding that “excruciating pain” caused by two instances of deliberately and unnecessarily manipulating the plaintiff’s arms and shoulders was sufficient to state a claim); Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007) (determining that evidence of “red marks that w…

See Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding an actual, non-de minimis injury in case of “lasting physical injury . . . and [] extreme prolonged pain”); Ali v. Duboise, 763 F. App’x 645 , 651 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding that 2 The Court questions whether arthritis (a degenerative condition) can constitute an “injury” that can be exacerbated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. “excruciating pain” caused by two instances of deliberately and unnecessarily…