Cluster 478414 (1986)

But see City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 , 1027 n. 6 (9th Cir.1986) (commenting that navigational servitude is not public land within meaning of ANILCA).

But see City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 , 1027 n. 6 (9th Cir.1986) (commenting that navigational servitude is not public land within meaning of ANILCA). 22 Although we affirm this finding of the district court on the record, two later developments illustrate the correctness of the ruling.

Id. at 1019.

When the purpose is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider the alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved. 43 Id. at 1021 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 44 As Friends correctly argues, the discretion we have afforded agencies to define the purposes of a project is not unlimited.

Id. at 1028.

As an initial matter, the Park Service contends that because Sausalito did not raise its concern about funding during public comments and in its many exchanges with the Park Service, it has not satisfied our requirement that those who challenge an EIS “bear a responsibility to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the [parties’] position and contentions.” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986) (internal q…

Sausalito contends that if congressional funding had been obtained, the conference center would not have been an essential part of the Plan, and the alternatives Sausalito favors would have been feasible. 76 As an initial matter, the Park Service contends that because Sausalito did not raise its concern about funding during public comments and in its many exchanges with the Park Service, it has not satisfied our requirement that those who challenge an EIS "bear a responsibil…

See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 , 1027 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he United States does not hold title to the navigational servitude . . . ."); see also Amoco Prod.

Furthermore, even if an alternative requires “legislative action”, this fact “does not automatically justify excluding it from an EIS.” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 1986) (alternatives “must be ascertainable and reasonably within reach”).

We also noted that “plaintiffs have not offered a ‘specific, detailed counterproposal that had a chance of success.’ ” Id. (quoting City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986)).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022-23 (9th Cir.1986).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1986). [10] Further, whether Congress conveyed land to Leisnoi under the allegedly mistaken assumption that Leisnoi was an eligible village is irrelevant.

Accordingly, the statements of purpose and need drafted to guide the environmental review process concerning the proposed Category III expansion are not unreasonably narrow. 15 See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 , 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987) (court not at liberty to restate the purpose in terms of a broad social interest).

In addition, in arguing for the MS&B alternative, the plaintiffs have not offered a “specific, detailed coun-terproposal that had a chance of success.” See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986); Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir.1975) (holding that EIS did not have to consider alternative sites where plaintiffs failed to allege specific evidentiary facts showing that the alternative sites were reasonable and viable).

In addition, in arguing for the MS&B alternative, the plaintiffs have not offered a "specific, detailed counterproposal that had a chance of success." See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986); Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir.1975) (holding that EIS did not have to consider alternative sites where plaintiffs failed to allege specific evidentiary facts showing that the alternative sites were reasonable and viable). 84 In Druid…

The “touchstone for our inquiry is whether an EIS’s selection and discussion of alternatives fosters informed decision-making and informed public participation.” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1986) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). 5 San Diego argues that the EIS fails to evaluate and disclose the consequences of groundwater contamination.

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (9th Cir.1986). 23 Here, Laguna contends the EIS ignored a smaller, four-lane alternative that included special pricing mechanisms to reduce traffic congestion, an alternative which was proposed during the comment period by its expert, Dr. Gordon Fielding.

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (9th Cir.1986).

The SEIS failed to consider not only this alternative but also the alternative of modifying the contract by congressional enactment. "[T]he fact that an alternative requires legislative action does not automatically justify excluding it from an EIS." City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 , 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987). 19 Plaintiffs also contend that the 1989 SEIS is deficient because it fails to consider cumulative …

The SEIS failed to consider not only this alternative but also the alternative of modifying the contract by congressional enactment. “[T]he fact that an alternative requires legislative action does not automatically justify excluding it from an EIS.” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 , 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987).

See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 , 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1219 , 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (NEPA’s “mandate ... is essentially procedural”); Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 319 , 95 S.Ct. 2336, 2355 , 45 L.Ed.2d 191 (1975) (agency’s obligation under NEPA is “procedural”); Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir.1986); City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1986), cert. …

NEPA is an “essentially procedural” statute, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 , 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1219 , 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978), and “[w]e enforce NEPA under our authority to ‘hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... without observance of procedure required by law.’ ” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 692…

NEPA is an “essentially procedural” statute, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. *1071 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 , 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1219 , 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1977), and “[w]e enforce NEPA under our authority to ‘hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... without observance of procedure required by law.’ ” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 67…

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed. 2d 148 (1987).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987).

Id. at 1021 (internal citations omitted).

A court should uphold “an agency’s definition of objectives so long as the objectives that the agency chooses are reasonable, and we uphold its discussion of alternatives so long as the alternatives are reasonable and the agency discusses them in reasonable detail.” Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 195 (finding that consideration of two alternatives was reasonable); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir.1998) (“The ‘touchstone for [the co…

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986).

In asserting that the Corps is not a federal agency with “primary jurisdiction” over any public lands in Alaska, Federal Defendants point to statutory language indicating that ANILCA applies to federal land management agencies such as those agencies within the Department of Interior (the National Park Service or the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), for example) or the Department of Agriculture (the Forest Service).44 Federal Defendants maintain that “[t]he Corps is not a f…

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986); Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir.1975).

To succeed on its claims, a plaintiff must offer “specific evidentiary facts” demonstrating that the unconsidered alternatives were “reasonable and viable.” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir.1975) (noting also that alternatives “must be ascertainable and reasonably within reach”)).

“When the purpose is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider the alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved.” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986).

The Ninth Circuit has stated “those who challenge an EIS ‘bear a responsibility to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the [parties’] position and contentions.’ [Citations.]” A party has participated in a sufficiently meaningful way when it has alerted the agency to its position and claims.” City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186 , 1208 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986)…

Resources Limited, 35 F.3d at 1307; City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (9th Cir.1986).

As the Ninth Circuit has previously stated, “[w]hen the purpose is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider the alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved.” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986).

Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517 , 524 (9th Cir.1994) (citing City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (9th Cir.1986)) (cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 , 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987)).

For example, in City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986), the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and found that the EIS’ stated purpose of providing a “safe, effective means of transfer *940 ring timber” from a particular tract of land to market was not improperly narrow and rejected the contention that the purpose should have been stated more broadly as “commercial timber harvesting.” Id. at 1021 .

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986).

“When the purpose is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider the alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved.” City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (9th Cir.1986).

Absent exceptional circumstances, such belatedly raised issues may not form a basis for reversal of an agency decision.”); City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.1986) (EIS did not have to address an alternative desired by Plaintiffs where Plaintiffs failed to fulfill their responsibility to structure their participation so that it was meaningful and alerted the agency to their position and contentions).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986) (explaining that “[w]hen the purpose is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider the alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved”).

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 , 112 S.Ct. 616 , 116 L.Ed.2d 638 (1991), citing City of Angoon v. *18 Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (9th Cir.1986) (“When the purpose is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider the alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved.”).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 , 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987).

Such broader statements were approved in analogous situations under other statutes in Louisiana Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir.1985); City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 870 , 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987) and Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir.1974).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 , 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987); Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir.1987).

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 , 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987); Oregon Environmental Council, 817 F.2d at 492 . 1 “The Council on Environmental Quality’s (‘CEQ’) regulations govern the form, content, and preparation of an EIS.” Oregon Environmental Council, 817 F.2d at 492 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1986)).

Courts enforce NEPA under their authority to hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions which were made without following legally prescribed procedures [City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 197 , 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987), quoting Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 692-93 (9th Cir.1974) (en banc); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(D)].

See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 , 1021–22 (9th Cir. 1986). 3.