Oliveri v. Thompson (1986)

But see, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that sanctions are appropriate under § 1927 only if “the attorney’s actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose”).

But see, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that sanctions are appropriate under § 1927 only if "the attorney's actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose").

But see, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that sanctions are appropriate under § 1927 only if “the attorney’s actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose”).

But see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274-75 (2d Cir.1986) (rule 11 does not impose a continuing obligation on the signing attorney). .

But see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d at 1274-75 (finding no continuing obligation under Rule 11).

But see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A]n award under § 1927 is proper when the attorney’s actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay.”).

See Robinson v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1127 (5th Cir.1987); but see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274-75 (2d Cir.1986) (Rule 11 does not impose a continuing obligation on the signator), cert. denied, County of Suffolk v. Graseck, 480 U.S. 918 , 107 S.Ct. 1373 , 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987).

But see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 , 107 S.Ct. 1373 , 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987); Thomas v. Capital Sec.

But see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom., Suffolk County v. Graseck, 480 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1373 , 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987).

Corp. v. Jacquard Lace Co., 55 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1995); see also Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1272 (“[B]ad faith may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Corp. v. Jacquard Lace Co., 55 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1272 ("[B]ad faith may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 48 Title 28, section 1927 of the United States Code, in turn, provides that a court may impose sanctions on any attorney who "so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously." Section 1927 au…

See generally Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d at 1274 (“While the drafters of the rule could easily have further extended its application by referring to the entire conduct of the proceedings, they failed to do so____”).

See generally Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d at 1274 ("While the drafters of the rule could easily have further extended its application by referring to the entire conduct of the proceedings, they failed to do so...."). 97 The district court did not make any findings that papers filed by the Trustees after August 1, 1983, failed to comply with the Rule.

See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1272 (“Bad faith may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Applying the new objective standard in Eastway, we rejected the notion that an attorney who signed an objectively unreasonable court paper could escape the imposition of sanctions by showing that he had a good faith subjective belief in its validity, see 762 F.2d at 253 (attorney’s good faith cannot serve as a “safe harbor”); and in Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir.1986) (“Oliveri”), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 , 107 S.Ct. 1373 , 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987), we reje…

Applying the new objective standard in Eastway, we rejected the notion that an attorney who signed an objectively unreasonable court paper could escape the imposition of sanctions by showing that he had a good faith subjective belief in its validity, see 762 F.2d at 253 (attorney's good faith cannot serve as a "safe harbor"); and in Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir.1986) ("Oliveri "), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 , 107 S.Ct. 1373 , 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987), we rej…

See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[I]t lies well within the district court’s discretion to temper the amount to be awarded against an offending [person or entity] by a balancing consideration of his [or its] ability to pay.”); see also Farmer v. Banco Popular of N. Am., 791 F.3d 1246, 1259 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[B]ecause the principal purpose of punitive sanctions is deterrence, the offender’s ability to pay must be considered.”); Johansen v. Combust…

Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 336 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the imposition of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is only authorized when “there is a clear showing of bad faith”) (quoting Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996)(overruled on other grounds)); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Imposition of a sanction under § 1927 requires a clear showing of bad faith.”) (citation and internal quotation …

Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273 (“an award made under the court’s inherent power may be made against an attorney, a party, or both.”).

On the issue of when to award attorneys’ fees, the Second Circuit found that “[a] different standard applies when a defendant prevails, for there attorneys' fees may be awarded only if the court finds that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Id. at 1272 (internal citations omitted).

Feb. 19, 1992) (“Rule 11 sanctions are not to be imposed on every litigant that files a motion that the Court deems premature, or ill-advised, or weak”); Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1275 (“[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success.”).

See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273 (“when the attorney’s actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose ....”); see also Forman, 128 F.R.D. at 599-600 (noting, in the § 1927 context, that bad faith may be inferred when “an attorney engages in conduct that is so objectively unreasonable that he necessarily must have been acting in bad faith”).

Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281 , 1288 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing how objective inquiry required under old Rule 11 did not necessitate finding bad faith); Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1275 (“there is no necessary subjective component to a proper Rule 11 analysis”); Eastway Constr.

See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1279 (“A plaintiff does not have to be prepared to meet a summary judgment motion as soon as the complaint is filed.”); Samuels v. Wilder, 906 F.2d 272, 274 (7th Cir.1990) (“Counsel must investigate, but need not have in hand before filing enough proof to establish the case.”).

This rule is that ‘[i]n the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser.’” Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit has held that “an award under § 1927 is proper when the attorney's actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay.” Id. (citation omitted); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Imposition of a sanction under § 1927 requires a ‘clear showing of bad faith.’”) (citation omitted); Colucci v. New York Times Co., 533 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (…

P. 11(c)(2). 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 , any attorney in a federal court who “so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” “Bad faith is the touchstone of an award under this statute.” United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 948 F.2d 133…

See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1272 (“An inherent power award may be imposed.either for commencing or for continuing an action in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”) (emphasis added).

See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1279 (“A plaintiff does not have to be prepared to meet a summary judgment motion as soon as the complaint is filed.”); Samuels v. Wilder, 906 F.2d 272, 274 (7th Cir.1990) (“Counsel must investigate, but need not have in hand before filing enough proof to establish the case.”).

Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Like a snapshot, Rule 11 review focuses upon the instant when the picture is taken — when the signature is placed on the document.”); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Limiting the application of rule 11 to testing the attorney’s conduct at the time a paper is signed is virtually mandated by the plain language of the rule.”), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 , 94 L.

Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 129 , 94 S.Ct. 2157, 2165 , 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974) (a court can award attorney’s fees under its inherent power when a party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons ...”); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d at 1272 (“An inherent power award may be imposed either for commencing or continuing an action in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons”).

Rule 11 applies only to the signing of a ‘pleading, motion or other paper.’ ” (emphasis in original)); Oliveri, supra, 803 F.2d at 1274 (“Rule 11 applies only to the initial signing of a ‘pleading, motion or other paper’.”). 2.

Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up); see also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Like an award made pursuant to the court's inherent power, an award under § 1927 is proper when the attorney's actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay.”).

Sanctions are appropriate “when it appears that a competent attorney could not form the requisite reasonable belief as to the validity of what is asserted in the paper” but courts must “avoid hindsight and resolve all doubts in favor of the signer.” Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). 6 On April 14, 2025, Appellant also filed a document titled “MOTION FOR AN AUTOMATIC STAY OR INJUNCTION OF CT SUPERIOR COURT CASE: FST CV…

This statute serves to “to deter unnecessary delays in litigation.” Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting H.R.

Mar. 21, 2012) citing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir.1986)).

Jan. 20, 2022) (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986)).

See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Rule 11 therefore is intended to discourage pleadings that are ‘frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.’”) (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 , 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is ‘patently clear that a claim ha…

See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Rule 11 therefore is intended to discourage pleadings that are ‘frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.’”) (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is ‘patently clear that a claim has…

See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Rule 11 therefore is intended to discourage pleadings that are ‘frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.’”) (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is ‘patently clear that a claim has…

See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Rule 11 therefore is intended to discourage pleadings that are ‘frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.’”) (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is ‘patently clear that a claim has…

See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d.

Corp., 899 F.2d 1350 , 1359 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[W]e think a district court in the exercise of its sound discretion must identify and determine the legal basis of each sanction charge sought to be imposed, and whether its resolution requires further proceedings, including the need for an evidentiary hearing.”); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986) (“due process must be afforded. . . [but] [t]his does not mean, necessarily, that an evidentiary hearing must be …

Apr. 9, 1997) (“[b]efore awarding attorney’s fees, a court should take into account the financial circumstances of the party to be sanctioned.”); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986) (“at lies well within the district court's discretion to temper the amount to be awarded against an offending [party] by a balancing consideration of his ability to pay”); Lawrence, 2018 WL 3611963 , at *8 (denying the attorneys’ fees sanction because of the parties’ relative …

See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Rule 11 therefore is intended to discourage pleadings that are ‘frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.’”) (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is ‘patently clear that a claim has…

The Trustee is entitled to base the Amended Complaint on “statements of witnesses, reports of their investigators and hearsay reports and statements of others until such time, if ever, as they are satisfied that the statements and other evidence are not competent or are otherwise untrustworthy.” In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, On Dec. 21, 1988, 144 F.R.D. 613, 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986) (“A plaintiff does no…

See Olivieri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 , 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A]n award made under § 1927 must be supported by a finding of bad faith similar to that necessary to invoke the court's inherent power.”).

Legal Standard Sanctions imposed pursuant to § 105 and the Court’s inherent power, like sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 , require a “specific finding of bad faith.” Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[W]e hold today that an award made under § 1927 must be supported by a finding of bad faith similar to that necessary to invoke the court's inherent power.”).

Legal Standard Sanctions imposed pursuant to § 105 and the Court’s inherent power, like sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 , require a “specific finding of bad faith.” Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[W]e hold today that an award made under § 1927 must be supported by a finding of bad faith similar to that necessary to invoke the court's inherent power.”).

Courts reserve Rule 9011 sanctions for "exceptional circumstances" where a claim is "patently unmeritorious or frivolous." Dura , 886 F.2d at 556 (quoting Doering , 857 F.2d at 194 ); Oliveri v. Thompson , 803 F.2d 1265 , 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is 'patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success.") Motions for sanctions are objectively tested by the reasonableness of the filing in question under the circumstances.