Tamika Johnson v. City of Philadelphia (2020)

Concerns about the origin of the state-created-danger doctrine have prompted three judges on this Court to call for revisiting it through en banc reconsideration.4 That makes 4 See Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 404 (3d Cir. 2020) (Matey, J., concurring) (“[O]ur full Court should revisit the state-created danger doctrine.”); id. at 405 (Porter, J., concurring) (“[O]ur full Court should revisit the state-created danger doctrine.”); Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d…

See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (concerning a person who shares a special relationship with a state agency); Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 2020) (concerning a person who is subjected to an increased risk of harm by private citizens because of a 4 Additionally, a private citizen has no “judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).

No. 26 at 30-34, a pattern of actual 3 violations is required—not a speculative risk of a violation,1 see Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 - 63; see also Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Accidents occur . . . [b]ut the Monell inquiry asks whether a municipality was deliberately indifferent to the risk of a constitutional violation.”).

See 563 U.S. at 62; see also Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394 , 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Accidents occur, of course.

However, the exception should still be “narrowly construed” such that liability only arises when an agency “has ‘total control over the premises.’” See Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 404 (3d Cir. 2020) (first quoting Brewington, 199 A.3d at 356 ; and then quoting Sweeney v. Merrymead Farm, Inc., 799 A.2d 972, 977 (Pa. Commw.

See Johnson, 975 F.3d at 401 (“[The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has] repeatedly held that an alleged failure to do something, standing alone, cannot be the basis for a state-created danger claim.”).

In discussing two cases13 that held the government must care for incarcerated or institutionalized individuals,14 the Supreme Court reasoned that “[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that [the four-year old boy] faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.” Id. at 201 (emphasis added); see also Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 2020) (“From those simp…

Additionally, a plaintiff may state a claim for municipal liability by alleging a municipality failed to train its employees and that “failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom [the municipality's] employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see Nahas v. Norman, No. 2:24-CV-01252, 2025 WL 2021919 , at *4 (W.D.

Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 2018). “[F]ailure to do something, standing alone, cannot be the basis for a state-created danger claim.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original).

Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining the levels of culpability—intent to cause harm, conscious disregard of a great risk of serious harm, and deliberate indifference).

If the alleged policy or custom at issue is a failure to train or supervise, the plaintiff must show that this failure “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the . . . employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation omitted).

If the alleged policy or custom at issue is a failure to train or supervise, as Brooks alleges here, the plaintiff must show that this failure “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the . . . employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he failure to train an employee must be a choice on the part of the supervisor or supervising entity knowing that the tr…

Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 2020).9 Plaintiffs argue the pursuit was a state-created danger for which both individual officer and Borough Defendants are liable.

See Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 404 (3d Cir. 2020) (“In Pennsylvania, municipalities are generally immune from tort liability.”) (internal citations omitted) (cleaned up); 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541 (“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee or any other person.”).

Next, Miller asserts claims under the First Amendment, alleging that the county officials violated her right of access to the courts and retaliated against her for filing motions, complaints, and reports of 51 , 813 F. App’x 799 , 802 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting , 719 F.3d at 179). 52 , 975 F.3d 394, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing , 501 F.3d 134 , 146–47 (3d Cir. 2007) (police officers’ failure to intervene in domestic-violence situation did not satisfy element four)). 14 abuse.

“Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation modified) (citation omitted).

Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020).

Notably, “a municipality is not liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees just because of their employment, under a respondeat superior theory.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ).

Notably, “a municipality is not liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees just because of their employment, under a respondeat superior theory.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ).

Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 2020). | To plead a constitutional violation using the state-created danger doctrine, a plaintiff must establish the following four elements: 1) foreseeable and fairly | direct harm; 2) action marked by a degree of culpability that shocks the | ix | conscience; 3) a relationship with the state making the plaintiff a foreseeable | victim, rather than a member of the public in general; and 4) an affirmative use of | s…

The Supreme Court in Monell held “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (footnote omitted). 14 McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636 , 657–58 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. C…

City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (Gd Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

A municipality may be liable under §1983 if a “violation of rights was caused by the municipality’s policy or custom.” Johnson, 975 F.3d at 403 (citation omitted).

But the Third Circuit has “repeatedly held that an alleged failure to do something, standing alone, cannot be the basis for a state-created danger claim.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original); Luu v. Esterly, 367 F. Supp. 3d 335, 348 (E.D.

When the alleged “custom at issue is a failure to train or supervise, the plaintiff must show that this failure ‘amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom [the municipality’s] employees will come into contact.’” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that to allege a plausible claim based on a “state created danger” theory a plaintiff must allege “first, foreseeable and fairly direct harm; second, action marked by ‘a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience’; third, a relationship with the state making the plaintiff a foreseeable victim, rather than a member of the public in general; and fourth, an affirmative use of state authority in a w…

See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (providing that the negligent acts of state officials causing unintentional loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. 248, 261 (2020) (stating that “a merely negligent act does not ‘deprive’ a person of property” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 )); Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3…

If the alleged policy or custom at issue is a failure to train or supervise, the plaintiff must show that this failure “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the . . . employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation omitted).

Where a plaintiff alleges a failure-to-train claim, he must show that this failure “amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom [the municipality’s] employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020).

To meet that requirement, the Plaintiffs must show that the defendant took action which “resulted in a departure from the status quo.”55 It not sufficient to allege a “failure to do something.”56 Plaintiffs argue that Yeager and Yarnell “acted affirmatively by taking custody of [Bell] and transporting him to an environment that rendered him more vulnerable to suicide.”57 That framing ignores Plaintiffs’ 52 See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663 , 669 (3d Cir. 1988) (“…

To assert a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must show that this failure “amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom [the governmental entity’s] employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (stating that the “failure to train [must] “reflect[] a deliberate or conscious choice”).

“Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (providing that the negligent acts of state officials causing unintentional loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (stating that “a merely negligent act does not ‘deprive’ a person of property” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 )); Johnson v. City of Philadelphia…

The Third Circuit rejects “attempts to redefine clearly passive inaction as affirmative acts.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 178 (3d Cir. 2013). “[A]n alleged failure to do something, standing alone, cannot be the basis for a state-created danger claim.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citing Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2007) (police officers’ failure to intervene in domestic-viol…

Where, as here, the plaintiff asserts a failure-to-train claim, he must show that this failure “amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom [the municipality’s] employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020).

“Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

“Otherwise, the plaintiff needs to show that failure to provide the identified training would likely…result in the violation of constitutional rights—i.e., to show that the need for more or different training [was] so obvious.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 , 63 n.7 (2011) (noting that “contemporaneous or subsequent conduct” cannot provide the pattern putting a municipality on notice).

A municipality cannot be held liable “for the unconstitutional acts of its employees just because of their employment, under a respondeat superior theory.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ).

In analyzing the plaintiff-bystander’s suit against the pursuing police officers, this Court explained that “[u]nder binding precedent, high-speed police chases are hyper-pressurized environments requiring a snap judgment.” Id. at *3 (quoting Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted)).

“Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

“As currently formulated” by the Third Circuit, the state-created danger theory of liability “requires a plaintiff to plead four elements: first, foreseeable and fairly direct harm; second, action marked by ‘a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience’; third, a relationship with the state making the plaintiff a foreseeable victim, rather than a member of the public in general; and fourth, an affirmative use of state authority in a way that created a danger, or made o…

“This consists of a showing as to whether (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” “Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice …

“Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

“Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (stating local governments are “persons” under section 1983 and can be sued for monetary damages); Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir 2019). 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020); Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 . 30 Kane v. Chester Cnty.

“Ordinarily, this requires a plaintiff to identify a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees that puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

So their § 1983 claims against Troy Borough are dismissed. 95 Id. 96 Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394 , 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We will therefore affirm the dismissal of her Monell claim.”) 97 Thomas, 749 F.3d at 226 . 98 Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017 , 1030 (3d Cir. 1991). 99 Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 . 100 Doc. 8 at ¶ 42. 101 See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“After Iqbal, it is clear that III.

See Monell, 463 U.S. at 694; see also Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[A]s is well established, a municipality is not liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees just because of their employment, under a respondeat superior theory.”).