Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli (1986)

We have held that “[t]he time for appeal does not start running until this separate document is entered.” Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.1986); see RR Village Association, Inc. v. Denver Sewer Corp., 826 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (2d Cir.1987); see also Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir.1993).

We have held that "[t]he time for appeal does not start running until this separate document is entered." Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.1986); see RR Village Association, Inc. v. Denver Sewer Corp., 826 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (2d Cir.1987); see also Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir.1993).

See RR Village Ass’n, 826 F.2d at 1200-01 ; Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli 805 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir.1986).

See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384-85 , 98 S.Ct. 1117, 1120 , 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (per curiam); United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 219-22 , 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1563-65 , 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam); Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam); Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 611 (2d Cir.1980) (separate-document requirement is intended “to pinpoint, principally for the benefit of the appellant,…

And to promote even greater clarity, we have held that the “separate document must be labeled a ‘judgment.‘” Axel Johnson Inc., 6 F.3d at 84 ; see Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (“One clear way to [ensure parties’ have clear notice] is to call a judgment a judgment.”).

Hampton, 83 F.3d 31 , 34 (2d Cir. 1996); cf. Kanematsu–Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“One clear way [of assuring notice] is to call a judgment a judgment.”).

Hampton, 83 F.3d 31 , 34 (2d Cir. 1996); cf. Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“One clear way [of assuring notice] is to call a judgment a judgment.”).

We acknowledge that the 12 Second Circuit has held that Rule 58 is not satisfied by a separate document denominated “order,” rather than “judgment.” See Kanematsu-Gosho Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam).

R. 13(1) (petition to Supreme Court seeking writ of certiorari); Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.1986) (judgment); Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir.1979) (post-trial orders). 2 “Entry of judgment,” which is required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, is the act of recording in a docket maintained by the clerk of a court the fact that a judgment has been rendered.

Moreover, we have held that the words “or order” in Rule 4(a)(1) “were not ... intended to indicate- that a separate ‘order’ ... should be viewed as a ‘judgment’ satisfying the separate document requirement.” Kanema tsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1986); accord Cooper, 83 F.3d at 34 .

Moreover, we have held that the words "or order" in Rule 4(a)(1) "were not ... intended to indicate that a separate 'order' ... should be viewed as a 'judgment' satisfying the separate document requirement." Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1986); accord Cooper, 83 F.3d at 34 .

Consistent 13 with these procedural rules, “[o]ur cases require that the document granting 14 judgment be separate from any judicial memorandum or opinion,” and “the 15 separate document must be labeled a ‘judgment.’” Id.; see Kanematsu-Gosho, 16 Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he evident 17 purposes of the separate document requirement” are to “ensur[e] that the parties 5 1 have clear notice of the entry of final judgments, thus allowing th…

Hampton, 83 F.3d 31 , 34 (2d Cir.1996); see also Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam) (“One clear way [of assuring notice] is to call a judgment a judgment.”).

Compare Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that a document must be denominated a “judgment” in order to satisfy Rule 58), with United States v. Johnson, 254 F.3d 279 , 285 n.7 (D.C.

Compare Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam) (holding that a document must be denominated a "judgment” in order to satisfy Rule 58), with United States v. Johnson, 254 F.3d 279 , 285 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.2001) ("The fact that the page is labeled 'Order' rather than ‘Judgment’ is not relevant.”). 4 .

Because rule 58 requires that “[ejvery judgment shall be set forth on a separate document” and is effective only when so set forth and entered on the civil docket as provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a), see Fed.R.Civ.P. 58; Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a); see generally Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam), there is a preliminary question as to whether LILCO’s notice of appeal, filed on February 23, 1989, six and one half months before e…

Because rule 58 requires that "[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document" and is effective only when so set forth and entered on the civil docket as provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a), see Fed.R.Civ.P. 58; Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a); see generally Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam), there is a preliminary question as to whether LILCO's notice of appeal, filed on February 23, 1989, six and one half months before e…

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam) (rejecting rule that a “separate order ... could constitute the separate document required”).

See Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd., 805 F.2d at 48-49.