Cluster 483823 (1987)

But see Douglas, 812 F.2d at 832 (denying writ because district court did not violate “clear and indisputable” legal duty).

While the government may not make an end run around its statutorily limited right to appeal, the remedy of mandamus is available in situations where, as here, there is a challenge to the district court’s power to impose the sentence it did, Douglas, 812 F.2d at 832; United States v. Hundley, 858 F.2d 58, 66 (2d Cir.1988), and the rigorous test for issuance of the writ is met.

Douglas, 812 F.2d at 831; see also Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 , 58 S.Ct. 164 , 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937) (“Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence.

Douglas, 812 F.2d at 831; see also Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (“Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence.

APP. 1994) (citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1987)).

Nevertheless, many pre-1984 courts addressing the issue of whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively resolved it on principles of lenity, invoking “the general rule of statutory construction” favoring a “milder penalty over a harsher one.” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 833 (3d Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1987).

The right to the duty must be “ ‘clear and indisputable.’” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 832 (3d Cir.1987) (quoting Kerr v. United States Dist.

Our review of the district court's interpretation of Sec. 841(b) is plenary, see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 832 (3d Cir.1987); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat.

Our review of the district court’s interpretation of § 841(b) is plenary, see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 832 (3d Cir.1987); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat.

See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822 , 826 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that Rule 31(c) allowed the judge to substitute a charge on the lesser included offense of attempted aggravated rape for the original charge of aggravated rape); United States v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting *693 that Rule 31(c) allows a district court to give a lesser-included offense instruction where certain requirements are met).

See generally, Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Douglass, 812 F.2d 822 , 827-28 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding that forcible sodomy was subsumed within the term “rape” and thus should be considered a crime of violence).

See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 3d Cir., 812 F.2d 822, 829-32 (1987) (concluding federal government could not appeal sentencing orders).