United States v. Eric Munchel (2021)

Id. at 1283 (describing the threat of corrupting a union as one such danger contemplated by Congress).

Cir. 2021); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1282 (D.C.

Cf. Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1282-84 (remanding pretrial detention orders where the district United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________ No. 21-3034 September Term, 2020 court did not demonstrate it adequately considered whether the defendants present an articulable threat to the community in light of the absence of record evidence that defendants committed violence or were involved in planning or coordinating the events of January 6).

See id. at 1283 (“Detention determinations must be made individually and, in the final analysis, must be based on the evidence which is before the court regarding the particular defendant.

See United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1283 (D.C.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)(1); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1282 (D.C.

Cir. 2021) 6 (quoting United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1282 (D.C.

See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 843 F.2d 256 , 257–58 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying the Bail Reform Act to vacate a release order based on evi- dence of a drug trafficking conspiracy that presents a danger to the community); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1283 (D.C.

Cir. 2021); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1282 (D.C.

Standard of Review ‘“In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”’ United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

Circuit and other courts in this District have drawn a distinction between “those who actually 12 assaulted police officers” and those who merely “cheered on the violence or entered the Capitol after others cleared the way.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1284 (citation omitted); see also Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662 , at *8 (“The conduct of a defendant who injured, attempted to injure, or threatened to injure others . . . is more troubling than the conduct of a defendant who, though unl…

See, e.g., Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1284 (“[T]hose who actually assaulted police officers . . . are in a different category of dangerousness than those who cheered on the violence[.]”).

Cir. 2021); 18 U.S.C. § 3412 (f) (articulating clear and convincing evidence standard for dangerousness determination). “[I]n determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person . . . and the safety of . . . the community”, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g); courts consider four factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the person, (3) the history and characteristi…

See id. at 1283 (“Whether the defendant poses a threat of dealing drugs, for instance, may depend on the defendant’s past experience dealing[.]”).

Cir. 2021); 18 U.S.C. § 3412 (f) (articulating clear and convincing evidence standard for dangerousness determination). “[I]n determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably 9 assure the appearance of the person . . . and the safety of . . . the community”, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g); courts consider four factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the person, (3) the history and characteris…

Cir. 2021); 18 U.S.C. § 3412 (f) (articulating clear and convincing evidence standard for dangerousness determination). “[I]n determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably 9 assure the appearance of the person . . . and the safety of . . . the community”, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g); courts consider four factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the person, (3) the history and characteris…

“To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the [G]overnment must prove by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably 3 assure the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

“In common parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

The charged offense not only “involves . . . a controlled substance,” 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g)(1)—it is also a Class A felony, carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, and, as noted above, is subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of pre-trial detention, see Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1286 (Katsas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that these three considerations are relevant under this factor).

“In common parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

Circuit “ha[s] not squarely decided the issue.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

This is especially true in the context of government motions to stay release orders given that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

Cir. 1996), and must meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence, United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

Circuit has made clear that detention is not appropriate in all cases involving “Capitol Riot” defendants, see Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1284 (“In our view, those who actually assaulted police officers and broke through windows, doors, and barricades, and those who aided, conspired with, planned, or coordinated such actions, are in a different category of dangerousness than those who cheered on the violence or entered the Capitol after others cleared the way.”).

Circuit has also held that, for pretrial detention based on dangerousness, the government must “prove[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

Circuit remanded for additional consideration of whether defendants "present[ed] an identified and articulable threat to the community." United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1282 (D.C.

“In common parlance, the relevant 13 inquiry is whether the defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

“In common parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

As to the “severity of the crime,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 , White actively participated in “the violent breach of the Capitol on January 6,” posing “a grave danger to our democracy.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1284 (D.C.

In this compromised state, it is difficult to imagine—as is required by United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

The Nature and Seriousness of the Danger to the Community “To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the government must prove by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

See United States v. Munchel , 991 F.3d 1273 , 1281 n.5 (D.C.

See United States v. Munchel , 991 F.3d 1273 , 1281 n.5 (D.C.

“In common parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

BACKGROUND A. Pretrial Detention “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

Legal Standard “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279 (D.C.

Cir. 1996), and by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is a danger to the community, United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (D.C.

As the Circuit explained regarding pretrial detention, January 6 rioters “who actually assaulted police officers and broke through windows, doors, and barricades . . . are in a different category of dangerousness than those who cheered on the violence or entered the Capitol after others cleared the way.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1284 (D.C.

“To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the government must prove by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (D.C.

“To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the government must prove by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (D.C.

“To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the government must prove by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (D.C.

See Insurrection, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (last accessed Feb. 12, 2023); Insurrection, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 300 (D.C.

Circuit “ha[s] not squarely decided the issue.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

As the Circuit held in United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

Based on the current record, the Court concludes that clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that no condition or combination of conditions will “reasonably assure” the 2 See also Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1281 (concluding that defendants charged under §§ 1752(a)(1) and (a)(2) for offenses involving a “deadly or dangerous weapon” are eligible for pretrial detention under § 3142(f)(1)(E)). 7 “safety of any other person and the community” or flight in advance of trial, § …

For pretrial detention on the basis of the defendant’s dangerousness, the government must “prove[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

Circuit has also held that, for pretrial detention based on dangerousness, the government must “prove[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C.

The Bail Reform Act inquiry, however, is “highly dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1284 (D.C.