Harris v. Birmingham Board Of Education (1987)

The Board asked the federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the panel's decision, to render the panel's decision a nullity and to affirm the Board's termination of Hardy. 13 After Hardy and the Board filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed Hardy's Section 1983 claim, observing that "[t]he due process and notice given in this case were sufficient to comply with federal constitutional requirements." Although Hardy argued that the panel's …

After Hardy and the Board filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed Hardy’s Section 1983 claim, observing that “[t]he due process and notice given in this case were sufficient to comply with federal constitutional requirements.” Although Hardy argued that the panel’s decision to reinstate him created a new property right which was violated without due process of law by the Board, the district court rejected that contention, stating that the “pane…

Harris must show not just a violation of a state statute, but a constitutional violation in this section 1983 action. 817 F.2d at 1527.

Jolibois’s suspension and termination did not violate his procedural due process rights, because a violation of CBA proce *466 dures “does not necessarily equate to a due process violation under the federal constitution.” Harris, 817 F.2d at 1528, Moreover, the procedures employed by FIU did not actually violate the CBA’s required procedures because the notices listed the reasons for the proposed action and gave Jolibois ten days with which to respond.

Jolibois’s suspension and termination did not violate his procedural due process rights, because a violation of CBA procedures “does not necessarily equate 9 Case: 15-14059 Date Filed: 06/29/2016 Page: 10 of 11 to a due process violation under the federal constitution.” Harris, 817 F.2d at 1528.

If otherwise, federal courts would have the task of insuring strict compliance with state procedural regulations and statutes. 16 Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527-1528 (11th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).

Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527-1528 (11th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).

Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir.1987).

The court explained that “[although the state statutory notice requirement is stated in mandatory language, it is a purely procedural requirement and not a substantive predicate to termination which gives [the plaintiff] a protected liberty or property right in receiving a notice which itself detailed the reasons for termination.” Id. at 1527. 5 Because a promised procedure cannot, by itself, confer a property right, the court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to establish…

“If otherwise, federal courts would have the task of insuring strict compliance with state procedural regulations and statutes.” Harris, 817 F.2d at 1528.

The Eleventh Circuit did not agree and reasoned that, “Even if the notice in this case is insufficient to satisfy the state statute, the state statute does not define the process due under the federal Constitution,” 817 F.2d at 1527-28; rather, “even if the state statute has been violated, that does not prove a violation of a federal constitutional right.” Id.

First Assembly of God, 775 F.Supp. at 388 -89 (citing Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527-28 (11th Cir.1987)).

Ala. 1994), aff’d, 56 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 , 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he violation of a state statute outlining procedure does not necessarily equate to a due process violation under the federal constitution.

See Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 , 1527 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[E]ven if the state statute has been violated, that does not prove a violation of a federal constitutional right.”); Smith v. Georgia, 684 F.2d 729 , 732 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Not every violation of a state agency of its own rules rises to the level of a due process infringement.”).

E.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County School Board, 557 F.3d 1177, 1229 (11th Cir.2009); Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527-28 (11th Cir.1987).

See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-82 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 ; Peterson, 504 F.3d at 1336 ; Harris, 817 F.2d at 1527. 12 Summary judgment in favor of the 911 Defendants and Brown in their official capacities and Gwinnett County on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is required.

Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527 (11th Cir.1987).

Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527-1528 (11th Cir. 1987).

Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527 (11th Cir.1987); Kelly v. Smith, 764 F.2d 1412, 1415-16 (11th Cir.1985); Campbell v. Pierce County, Georgia, 741 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 , 105 S.Ct. 1754 , 84 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985).

See Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 , 1528 (11th Cir.1987) ("[W]e emphasize that the violation of a state statute outlining procedure does not necessarily equate to a due process violation under the federal constitution.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 ; see also Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 , 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1987).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 ; see also Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 , 1526-27 (11th Cir.1987).

See Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 , 1527 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Even if the notice in this case is insufficient to satisfy the state statute, the state statute does not define the process due under the federal Constitution.

See Harris, 817 F.2d at 1528 (noting that the absence of a constitutional due process claim does not deprive plaintiff of state law remedies to enforce procedural right conferred by state statute).

See, e.g., Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 , 1528 (11th Cir.1987) ("the violation of a state statute outlining procedure does not necessarily equate to a due process violation under the federal [Constitution"). 2 .

Adequacy of Process Accorded If a plaintiff establishes that a protected property interest exists, “the process due in abridging [that] right[ ] is governed by federal law.” Wofford, 864 F.2d at 118 ; see also Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527 (11th Cir.1987).

If a plaintiff establishes that a protected property interest exists, “the process due in abridging [that] right[ ] is governed by federal law.” Wofford, 864 F.2d at 118 ; see also Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527 (11th Cir.1987).

If a plaintiff establishes that a protected property interest exists, “the process due in abridging [that] right[] is governed by federal law.” Wofford, 864 F.2d at 118 ; see also Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525, 1527 (11th Cir. 1987).

See Dorsey, 858 F.2d at 341, Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir.1987).

See, e.g., Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir.1987) [no due process violation by board because it failed to follow State statute outlining procedural requirements with regard to preter-mination procedures]; Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.1986) [university’s failure to comport with the preter-mination procedures in its policy manual does not by itself violate due process].