State v. Townsend (2002)

Because the Act does not define “private,” our Supreme Court has adopted the dictionary definition: “ ‘belonging to one’s self . . . secret . . : intended only for the persons involved (a conversation) . . . holding a confidential relationship to something ... a secret message: a private communication . . . secretly: not open or in public.’ ” Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 673 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep’t, 119 Wn.2d 178, 190 , 829…

Second, while Townsend held that ICQ (an instant messaging program) messages were private communications for purposes of the privacy act, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the privacy act had not been violated because the defendant impliedly consented to the recording. 147 Wn.2d at 674, 676, 678-79 .

In Roden, the court held that Roden's text messages to Lee, his drug dealer, were private because Lee's cell phone number was a personal contact of Roden's, Roden did not use a group texting function, and his messages concerned illicit subject matter.25 Similarly, in Townsend, the court held that Townsend's e-mail 19 Roden, 179 Wn.2d at 899-900 (alterations in original)(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 673 , 57 P.3d 255 (2002)). ' …

He is guilty ... if he intended to have sexual intercourse with her.’ ” Id. at 679 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Townsend, 105 Wn.

See also United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 851 (2022) (saying that “[w]hat exactly constitutes a substantial step is beyond the scope” of the case before it but finding it sufficient for present purposes to observe that the parties agreed “that a substantial step demands something more than ‘mere preparation’”). 56 State v. Flores, 344 Conn. 713, 759 (2022); Wittschen v. State, 259 Ga. 448, 449 (1989); State v. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 899 (2000); People v. Smith, 148 Il…

In Townsend, the court 8 No. 85037-7-I/9 concluded the defendant’s Internet messages to someone he thought was a 13 year old girl and his going to an arranged meeting at a motel room to have sex were sufficiently corroborative of his intent to have sexual intercourse with a child. 147 Wn.2d at 670-71, 680 .

“This statute is considered 7 one of the most restrictive in the nation.” State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 672 (2002). 8 Defendants do not dispute that the communications picked up by the Alexa devices were 9 “private” or that they were recorded and transmitted.

See Christensen, 153 Wn.2d at 194 (“Furthermore, since it is Christensen’s expectation of privacy with which we are concerned,. . . it cannot reasonably be said that Christensen’s expectation was similarly lowered.”); Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 674 (analyzing only defendant’s subjective intention and reasonable expectation that communications were private).

App. at 64 . ¶17 Similarly, in Townsend , our Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence for conviction of attempted second degree child rape where the defendant contacted a Spokane police detective, whom he believed to be a 13 year old girl, over the Internet; asked for sexual intercourse; arranged to meet in a hotel room; and traveled to that hotel room. 147 Wn.2d at 670-71, 679 .

The Sivins court characterized the defendant's Internet communications as evidence of his intent and his subsequent travel and motel rental as the substantial steps. 138 Wash.App. at 64 , 155 P.3d 982 . ¶ 17 Similarly, in Townsend, our Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence for conviction of attempted second degree child rape where the defendant contacted a Spokane police detective, whom he believed to be a 13 year old girl, over the Internet; asked for sexual…

Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 675 (party deemed to have consented to the recording of e-mail messages because he knew such messages would be automatically recorded on the recipient’s computer).

State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 672, 57 P.3d 255 (2002).

See Townsend , 147 Wash.2d at 672 -74 , 57 P.3d 255 .

See Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 679 (stating that conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of a crime if it “is ‘strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.’” (quoting Aumick, 126 Wn.2d at 427 )).

See Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 679 .

See Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 679 .

RCW 9.73.050; see also State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 675 ,57 'Because the Court of Appeals concluded that the recording was made in violation of the privacy act, it declined to answer whether the recording was intercepted.

Faford, 128 Wn.2d at 485 (citing State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 186 , 867 P.2d 593 (1994); State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 513-14 , 688 P.2d 151 (1984)); see also Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 678 . 6 State v. Jonathan Nicholas Roden, No. 87669-0 Sophisticated text messaging technology enables "[l]ayered interpersonal comnmnication[ s]" that reveal "intimate ... thoughts and emotions to those who are expected to guard them from publication." State v. Patino, No. P1-10-1155A, slip o…

Faford, 128 Wn.2d at 485 (citing State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 186 , 867 P.2d 593 (1994); State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506,513-14 , 688 P.2d 151 (1984)); see also Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 678 . ¶14 Sophisticated text messaging technology enables “ [1] ayered interpersonal communication[s]” that reveal “intimate ... thoughts and emotions to those who are expected to guard them from publication.” State v. Patino, No. P1-10-1155A, slip op. at 83, 70 (R.I.

See State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 679 , 57 P.3d 255 (2002); State v. Chhom, 128 Wn.2d 739, 743 , 911 P.2d 1014 (1996).

See State v. Townsend, 147 Wash.2d 666, 679 , 57 P.3d 255 (2002); State v. Chhom, 128 Wash.2d 739, 743 , 911 P.2d 1014 (1996).

A person is guilty of attempting to commit a crime if, "with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime." RCW 9A.28.020(1). "[T]he intent required for attempted rape of a child is the intent to accomplish the criminal result: to have sexual intercourse." State v. Chhom, 128 Wash.2d 739, 743 , 911 P.2d 1014 (1996); see also Townsend, 147 Wash.2d at 679 , 57 P.3d 255 .

See State v. Townsend, 147 Wash.2d 666, 679 , 57 P.3d 255 (2002) (defendant's Internet messages to someone he thought was a 13-year-old girl named "Amber," urging her to meet with him to have sex were corroborative of his intent to have sexual intercourse with the victim, even though it was factually impossible for the crime to be completed). ¶ 31 A conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could find all of the elements proved b…

See State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 679 , 57 P.3d 255 (2002) (defendant’s Internet messages to someone he thought was a 13-year-old girl named “Amber,” urging her to meet with him to have sex, were corroborative of his intent to have sexual intercourse with the victim, even though it was factually impossible for the crime to be completed). ¶31 A conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could find all of the elements proved bey…