Cluster 503491 (1988)

Cobb, 452 F.3d at 554 ; Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 944-45.

ManWeb cherry-picks this language, which originally appeared in this court’s opinion in Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 945, twisting the court's holding and ignoring the context in which that language appears.

No. 11-5522 id. at 946 (“[T]he proper approach to the issue of successor liability is not to erect a set of hoops to force plaintiffs to jump through but to ask whether such liability would strike a reasonable balance between the interest in fully sanctioning unlawful conduct and the interest in facilitating the market in corporate and other productive assets.”).

The overriding goal of successor liability, and of the de facto merger inquiry, is to balance “the interest in preventing tortfeasors from externalizing the costs of their misconduct” with “the interest in a fluid market in corporate assets.” Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 944 (7th Cir.1988).

Similarly, in EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.1988), Judge Posner, writing for a unanimous panel, affirmed a judgment holding three individual defendants jointly and severally liable, citing the agent clause in the statutory definition of “employer” and stating that a “district court can order contribution among parties actually named as defendants in the Title VII suit.” Id. at 939, 942.

The overriding goal of successor liability, and of the de facto merger inquiry, is to balance “the interest in preventing tortfeasors from externalizing the costs of their misconduct” with “the interest in a fluid market in corporate assets.” Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 944 (7th Cir. 1988). 28 The continuity of shareholders element is designed to identify situations where the shareholders of a seller corporation retain some ownership interest in their assets after cleansing those …

Franklin was thus effectively forced to choose between his job and his Fifth Amendment rights, and this was an impermissible violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. 3 The City’s argument that Atwell warnings were not required because At- *845 well was decided after Franklin’s disciplinary hearing gets it nowhere fast. “[A]s a general proposition, a federal court applies the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Chowaniec v. Arling…

Id. at 944-45.

Id. at 944-45.

The successor, if he knows of his potential liability, will demand compensation in the form of a lower price for the assets, and in this way the burden of liability will be shifted back to the owners of those assets, where it belongs. 842 F.2d at 945.

Id. at 942.

Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 , 103 S.Ct. 407, 413 , 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982) (noting that “[t]he principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student”); Chowaniec, 934 F.2d at 131-32 ; Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 941.

The economic rationale for successor liability goes as follows: “The successor, if he knows of his potential liability, will demand compensation in the form of a lower price for the assets, and in this way the burden of liability will be shifted back to the owners of those assets, where it belongs.” Artistic Furniture, 920 F.2d at 1327 (quoting Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 945).

In Vuciteeh the officers of a corporation retired knowing that employees had already registered complaints with EEOC, charging that a company policy violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (842 F.2d at 939).

Cf. Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 945 (successor group "knew or should have known” that charges of sex discrimination had not been resolved). 8 .

Thus, the fact that Patterson might have overruled some precedent upon which Brackshaw had a right to rely supports her proposition that this court should not apply Patterson retroactively. 5 Brackshaw contends that the second criterion of Chevron, whether retroactive application “will serve (or at least not dis-serve) the operation of the new principle of law,” Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 941, similarly tilts in her favor.

Court’s view, both the 'equitable roots of the “substantial continuity” test and the competing interests that must be balanced through its application, e.g., Vuci-tech, 842 F.2d at 945, suggest that succes-sorship liability should be an option of last resort, not simply an option for the convenience of the plaintiff.

Accord: Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 944-45.

On the other hand, no successor liability means that innocent third parties, like Gailenberg, will sometimes be harmed and left without a remedy for their injuries. “[T]he basic issue in every successorship case is how to strike a balance between on the one hand preventing wrongdoers from escaping liability and on the other hand facilitating the transfer of corporate assets to their most valuable uses.” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 945 (…

See Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 943-45.

See Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 943-45.

See Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 945.

See EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 944 (7th Cir.1988); see also Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249 , 259-60 (7th Cir.2001) (“ ‘When the successor company knows about its predecessor’s liability, knows the precise extent of that liability, and knows that the predecessor itself would not be able to pay a judgment obtained against it, the presumption should be in favor of successor liability....’” (quoting Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 945)).

Accord EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 945 (7th Cir.1988) (J.

See EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 945 (7th Cir.1988) (“[T]here is no question that the successor knows of any collective bargaining agreements that his predecessor has signed ...”).

See id. at 808 and n. 17; Powell, 366 F.2d at 638 ; see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 942-43 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing application of laches against the EEOC in Title YII enforcement action).

The Supreme Court has recognized that “striking a balance between the conflicting legitimate interests of the bona fide successor, the public, and the affected employee[s]” to effectuate national labor policy “is often a difficult and delicate responsibility.” Golden State, 414 U.S. at 181 , 94 S.Ct. 414 (citations and quotations omitted); see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 944 (7th Cir.1988) (noting that successor liability is “dreadfully tangled, reflecting the diff…

See id. (noting that, as in EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 945 (7th Cir.1988), the manner of the purchase might be relevant to whether “substantial continuity” existed).

See id. (noting that, as in EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 945 (7th Cir. 1988), the manner of the purchase might be relevant to whether “substantial continuity” existed).

See, e.g., EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 945 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the manner of the purchase in the context of whether “substantial continuity” existed). 3.

See, e.g., EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 945 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the manner of the purchase in the context of whether “substantial continuity” existed). 3.

Franklin was thus effectively forced to choose between his job and his Fifth Amendment rights, and this was an impermissible violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process.3 The City’s argument that Atwell warnings were not re- quired because Atwell was decided after Franklin’s disciplin- ary hearing gets it nowhere fast. “[A]s a general proposition, a federal court applies the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Chowaniec v. Arlington …

See e.g., EEOC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Laches is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent unfairness to a defendant due to a plaintiff’s delay in filing suit in the absence of an appropriate statute of limitations.”) (emphasis supplied); see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 942 (7th Cir. 1988); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1978).

See e.g., EEOC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (11th Cir.1982) (“Laches is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent unfairness to a defendant due to a plaintiffs delay in filing suit in the absence of an appropriate statute of limitations.”) (emphasis supplied); see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 942 (7th Cir.1988); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir.1979); EEOC v. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir.1978).

EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir.1980); EEOC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 668 F.2d 1199 (11th Cir.1982); EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055 , 1060-61 (6th Cir.1982); EEOC v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 765 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.1985); see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 942-43 (7th Cir.1988); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 716 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1983); Annot., "Laches or Other Assertion of Untimeliness as Defense to Action Under Title VII ...

EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir.1980); EEOC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 668 F.2d 1199 (11th Cir.1982); EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055 , 1060-61 (6th Cir.1982); EEOC v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 765 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.1985); see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 942-43 (7th Cir.1988); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 716 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1983); Annot., “Laches or Other Assertion of Untimeliness as Defense to Action Under Title VII ...

See also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 941-42 (7th Cir.1988); Ferrell v. Pierce, 785 F.2d 1372, 1386 (7th Cir.1986) (per curiam).

See EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 944 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that “persons not named in EEOC charges can sometimes be sued in private actions, so perhaps the [defendants] should have known at the time that [they were] negotiating with the EEOC over [their company’s] liability that they might be sued, either by the employees they had discriminated against or by the EEOC on behalf of those employees.” (citing Eggleston, 657 F.2d at 905–06)).

Tsareff, 794 F.3d at 847 ; see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 945 (7th Cir. 1988) (imposing successor liability where successor, through its agent, knew or should have known about employment discrimination suits filed against predecessor).

See Wiggins v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 583 F.2d 882 , 886 (6th Cir.1978) (holding that a successor would have come within MacMillan if EEOC charges had been filed against the predecessor or the successor had actual knowledge of the charges); see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 945 (7th Cir.1988) (holding successor liable because, inter alia, it had at least constructive knowledge of discrimination charges); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.

See, EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 941 (7th Cir.1988).

See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.1988); Harris v. Stallman Trucking Co., 951 F.Supp. 134 (N.D.Ill.1997); Bright v. Roadway Servs., Inc., 846 F.Supp. 693 (N.D.Il.1994); Allen v. City of Chicago, 828 F.Supp. 543 (N.D.Ill.1993); Walaszek v. Reinke Wholesale Supply Co., No. 95 C 4218, 1996 WL 547210 (N.D.Ill.); Eskridge v. Coates, No. S90-416(RLM), 1991 WL 135017 (N.D.Ind.). 2 .

See Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 941.

See E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 940-42 (7th Cir.1988) (new Supreme Court interpretation of statute meets first Chevron requirement where it is contrary to prior interpretation).

See E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 , 941 (7th Cir.1988).