Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel (1988)

Id. at 1156.

Sierra Club, 857 F.2d at 1318 ; Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1988). 45 The district court cured any alleged inadequacy in the EA by holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the environmental impact of the plan to kill bison cows and bulls, and to capture and sell bison calves. cf. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 851 F.2d at 1158 (remanding case for an evidentiary hearing because district court balanced the equities based only on an inadequate EI…

Sierra Club, 857 F.2d at 1318 ; Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1988).

As to the latter issue, I would require that the public interest be expressly considered on the record under the standard set forth in Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.1988).

As to the latter issue, I would require that the public interest be expressly considered on the record under the standard set forth in Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.1988).

Cf. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988) (motion for modification of relief was timely because it was filed as a court-ordered response to federal defendants’ timely Rule 59(e) motion, and was not itself a Rule 59(e) motion).

Corp. v. Gemini Management, 921 F.2d 241, 243 (9th Cir.1990) (striking of affirmative defenses under Rule 12(f)); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988).

Rule 59(e)'s ten-day limitation is "strictly construed," Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988).

This purpose lays as much stress on the developing [of] the coal resources as it does on the environmental effects of development. 16 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.1988) (citation omitted).

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.1988) (citation omitted).

To answer this question, I must look to the “underlying substantive policy” that Congress designed the statute to effect, rather than its statutory procedure. *1478 Gambell, 480 U.S. at 544 , 107 S.Ct. at 1403 , 94 L.Ed.2d at 555 ; Northern Cheyenne, 851 F.2d at 1156.

Plaintiffs cite Massachusetts v. Watt, in which the First Circuit enjoined a lease sale before determining whether a supplemental EIS was required.95 The First Circuit was concerned that “[o]nce large bureaucracies are committed to a course of action, it is difficult to change that course—even if new, or more thorough, NEPA statements are prepared and the agency is told to ‘redecide.’”96 But in a later decision, the First Circuit clarified that it “[i]n Watt, we simply held …

Plaintiffs cite Massachusetts v. Watt, in which the First Circuit enjoined a lease sale before determining whether a supplemental EIS was required.95 The First Circuit was concerned that “[o]nce large bureaucracies are committed to a course of action, it is difficult to change that course—even if new, or more thorough, NEPA statements are prepared and the agency is told to ‘redecide.’”96 But in a later decision, the First Circuit clarified that it “[i]n Watt, we simply held …

Plaintiffs cite Massachusetts v. Watt, in which the First Circuit enjoined a lease sale before determining whether a supplemental EIS was required.95 The First Circuit was concerned that “[o]nce large bureaucracies are committed to a course of action, it is difficult to change that course—even if new, or more thorough, NEPA statements are prepared and the agency is told to ‘redecide.’”96 But in a later decision, the First Circuit clarified that it “[i]n Watt, we simply held …

Second, since no presumption arises in favor of injunctive relief merely because plaintiffs demonstrate a probable NEPA violation, see Sierra Club III, at 503, and all traditional equitable standards remain applicable, see Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545 , 107 S.Ct. at 1404 ; Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 722 (9th Cir.1988), plaintiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm if construction is not enjoined pending a decision on the merits, see…

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988).

Id. at 500, 503-04 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted); see also N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel , 851 F.2d 1152 , 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Bureaucratic rationalization and bureaucratic momentum are real dangers, to be anticipated and avoided by the Secretary."); Nat.

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.1988).

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1988).

In Northern Cheyenne, the Court concluded the risk of this momentum was not great, because “the Tribe failed to demonstrate any significant difference between voiding and suspending the leases ...” Id., at 1157.

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir.1988).

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988).

“A court’s decision not to enjoin may not threaten the very existence of what Congress intended to preserve.” Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1988).

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988) (citation omitted).

However, “an injunction does not issue automatically on a showing that an environmental impact statement is defective.” Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1988), quoting Amoco v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 , 107 S.Ct. 1396 , 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987).

See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1156-58 (9th Cir.1988); State of Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 426-27 (7th Cir.1984); id. at 432-33 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir.1975); Friends of the Earth v. Hall, 693 F.Supp. 904, 913, 949 (W.D.Wash.1988); Stand Together Against Neighborhood Decay, Inc. v. Board of Estimate of the City of New York, 690 F.Supp. 1192, 1196 (E.D.N.Y.1…

See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1988) (merely holding that a court is not "compelled to issue an injunction without a balancing of the equities"); see also Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 890 , 110 S.Ct. 3177 , 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (holding that plaintiffs challenged an evolving series of agency operations rather than a final agency action); Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 737 , 118 S.Ct. 1665 (holding that although a fac…

See N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152 , 1157 (9th Cir.1988) (“Bureaucratic rationalization and bureaucratic momentum are real dangers, to be anticipated and avoided by the Secretary. ...

See Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489 , 1496-98 (9th Cir. 1995) (ban of timber removal could cause state and county intervenors irreparable harm due to inability to undertake "their legal duties to protect the public safety by preventing and fighting wildfires"); see also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1988) (cultural, social and economic harms to a tribe can constitute irreparable harm for purposes of NEPA injunct…

See Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489 , 1496-98 (9th Cir.1995) (ban of timber removal could cause state and county intervenors irreparable harm due to inability to'undertake “their legal duties to protect the public safety by preventing and fighting wildfires”); see also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1988) (cultural, social and economic harms to a tribe can constitute irreparable harm for purposes of NEPA injuncti…

See also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155-56, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1988); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 318, 323-24 (D.C.Cir.1987); Commonwealth of *940 Mass. v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 951-53 (1st Cir.1983).

See Scott v. Younger, 739 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir.1984) (ten-day time period “is jurisdictional and cannot be extended by the court”); see also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988) (ten-day time period is to be strictly construed).

Id. at 1042 (citing San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dept., 400 U.S. 968, 971 , 91 S.Ct. 368 , 369, 27 L.Ed.2d 388 (1970)) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.1988) (reversing district court’s decision to issue injunction under NEPA and Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, remanding for evidentiary hearing, and recognizing that “[b]ureau-cratic rationalization and …

See, e.g., Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988); A.D.

See, e.g., Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988); A.D.

Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544 , 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403-04 , 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); accord Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel 851 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.1988).

See also, Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir.1988); Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Thompson, 811 F.Supp. 635, 641 (D.Utah 1993); Coeur D’Alene Lake v. Kiebert, 790 F.Supp. 998 (D.Idaho 1992).

See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988) (“A motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment is appropriately brought under Rule 59(e).”); see also Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 1993 WL 393763 , * 1 (D.Kan.1993).

See, Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155-1156 (9th Cir.1988) (citing, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-174 , 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2291 , 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978)).

See also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988) (“a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment is appropriately brought under rule 59(e)”); Ray E.

See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988) (motions to amend summary judgment opinion properly brought under this rule).

See, e.g., Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988); A.D.