John Auriemma v. James Montgomery and Donald Hubert (1988)

Juries v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir.1992) (“Absolute immunity is granted with an eye to the function performed by the sued official, not to the status or identity of that official.”); Auriemma, 860 F.2d at 277 (“Absolute immunity is designed to protect the functions that particular government officials perform, not the government officials themselves.”).

Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989).

See, e.g., Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 (“A -10- No. 21-1689, Howard v. Livingston Cnty., et al. prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.”); Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435 , 1447 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Conducting a preliminary investigation is generally removed from a prosecutor’s role in a judicial proceeding; ‘such investigations take place outside the adversarial arena with its attendant safegu…

See Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Absolute immunity is designed to protect the functions that particular government officials perform, not the government officials themselves.”); Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Absolute immunity is granted with an eye to the function performed by the sued official, not the status or identity of that official.”).

See Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Absolute immunity is designed to protect the functions that particular government officials perform, not the government officials themselves.”); Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Absolute immunity is granted with an eye to the function performed by the sued official, not the status or identity of that official.”).

Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (no absolute immunity for parole officers’ actions involving “day-to-day duties in the supervision of a parolee”); Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 288-89 (7th Cir. 2004) (no absolute immunity for clerks of court whose duty to “maintain the official record was purely ministerial,” involving “none of the discretion that ... is at the heart of absolute judicial immunity”); Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 , 438 (7th Cir. 2001) …

While immunity may “protect the functions that particular government officials perform,” it does not shield “the government officials themselves.” Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1988).

While immunity may “protect the functions that particular government officials perform,” it does not shield “the government officials themselves.” Au‐ riemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1988).

In that regard, in determining whether a government official is entitled to immunity, this Court applies a “functional approach.” Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.1988).

Hartford, 954 F.2d 63 , 66 (2d Cir.1992); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir.1988).

Hartford, 954 F.2d 63 , 66 (2d Cir.1992); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir.1988).

See Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1075-77 (7th Cir.1998); McKenzie v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 486 (7th Cir.1996); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1988).

Athough absolute immunity applies only to activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” see id., we have previously held that a prosecutor’s actions within the confines of state or federal discovery procedures fall within the protected category, see Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir.1998); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988).

Conducting a preliminary investigation is generally removed from a prosecutor's role in a judicial proceeding; "such investigations take place outside the adversarial arena with its attendant safeguards that provide real and immediate checks to abusive practices.” Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989). 8 .

Cf. Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278-79 (7th Cir.1988) (declining to extend absolute immunity to attorneys' extrajudicial investigation because such an investigation is not subject to judicial safeguards and protections), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989).

Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278-79 (7th Cir.1988) (declining to extend absolute immunity to attorneys’ extrajudicial investigation because such an investigation is not subject to judicial safeguards and protections), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989).

However, this does not provide a "blanket of immunity." Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989).

Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989).

The Court strongly rejected the idea that absolute immunity is not available for claims of “willful suppression by a prosecutor of exculpatory information,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n. 34, and it is "now [a] well-settled rule that a prosecutor cannot be held personally liable for the knowing suppression of exculpatory information." Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 279 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (19…

The Court strongly rejected the idea that absolute immunity is not available for claims of "willful suppression by a prosecutor of exculpatory information," Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n. 34, and it is "now [a] well-settled rule that a prosecutor cannot be held personally liable for the knowing suppression of exculpatory information." Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 279 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (19…

See id.; Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (decision of prosecutor to investigate a criminal charge entitled to absolute immunity); Gobel, 867 F.2d at 1204 (actions undertaken as part of the preparation of the prosecutor’s case are absolutely immune, even if such actions could be characterized as “investigative” or “administrative”); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (extra-judicial investigation by government attorneys not entitl…

See id.; Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (decision of prosecutor to investigate a criminal charge entitled to absolute immunity); Gobel, 867 F.2d at 1204 (actions undertaken as part of the preparation of the prosecutor's case are absolutely immune, even if such actions could be characterized as "investigative" or "administrative"); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (extra-judicial investigation by government attorneys not entitl…

Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 279 (7th Cir.1988); Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1205 (7th Cir.1989).

Id. at 278 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).

Cf. Auriemma, 860 F.2d at 279 (attorneys not entitled to absolute immunity for extra-judicial investigation because such investigation is not subject to the rules of discovery and, falling outside the judicial process, cannot be halted by the trial court).

Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1988).

Conducting a preliminary investigation is generally removed from a prosecutor’s role in a judicial proceeding; ‘such investigations take place outside the adversarial arena with its attendant safeguards that provide real and immediate checks to abusive practices’” (quoting Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988))).

Hartford, 954 F.2d 63 , 66 (2d Cir. 1992); Auriemma 2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”). v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1988)).

In Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1988) the court held that actions taken by government attorneys in preparing their clients’ defense (hiring investigative consultants to obtain credit reports on plaintiffs through the use of false pretenses) were “sufficiently removed from the judicial process that the government defense attorneys should not be entitled to any greater protection than the qualified immunity to which executive officials are normally entit…

Further, it emphasized that “litigation tactics subject to supervision by the court cannot constitute independent grounds of [Title VII] liability.” Id. (citing Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1988)).

App’x 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1991); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 276, 278 (7th Cir. 1988); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1986); Ellison v. Stephens, 581 F.2d 584, 585 (6th Cir. 1978), and at least two judges on this Court have followed suit, see Ruiz Rivera v. Holder, 666 F. Supp. 2d 82, 95 (D.D.C. 2009), Bennett v. Stephens, No. 88-cv-2610, 1989 WL 17751 , at *1 (D.D.C.

See, Steffes v. Stepcan Co., 144 F.3d 1070 (7" Cir. 1998); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7" Cir. 1988); Rosania v. Taco Bell of America, 303 F. Supp.2d 878 (N.D.

Ind. Sept. 8, 2015) (quoting Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1988)).

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , absolute immunity is the exception, not the rule, and whether absolute immunity applies depends on the nature of the function performed by the government official: “[Ajbsolute immunity from civil liability for damages is of a ‘rare and exceptional character.’ ” Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 , 106 S.Ct. 496 , 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985)).

Root seeks to dismiss Johnson’s federal claims on the ground that he is entitled to absolute immunity for the conduct Johnson alleges. 1 “[AJbsolute immunity from civil liability for damages is of a ‘rare and exceptional character.’ ” Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 , 106 S.Ct. 496 , 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985)).

However, “absolute immunity from civil liability for damages is of a ‘rare and exceptional character,’ ” Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 , 106 S.Ct. 496 , 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985)), and there is a presumption against granting government officials absolute immunity.

Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988).

If the government attorney is performing acts ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase’ of the litigation, that attorney is entitled to absolute immunity from damage liability.”) (internal citations omitted); Ellison v. Stephens, 581 F.2d 584, 585 (6th Cir.1978) (“[T]he imposition of a legal defense, whether valid or not, is unquestionably ‘an integral part of the judicial process’ and may not be the basis of a civil rights action ... for such conduct.”); see also, Rob…

Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989).

Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989).

Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 365 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Burns and Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277-8 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989). 5 The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

See, e.g., Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1988).

See, e.g. , Auriemma v. Montgomery , 860 F.2d 273 , 276 (7th Cir. 1988) ; Murphy v. Morris , 849 F.2d 1101 , 1105 (8th Cir. 1988) ; Barrett v. United States , 798 F.2d 565 , 572 (2d Cir. 1986).

The issuance of an arrest warrant has several key characteristics in common with a judicial act: it involves the exercise of discretion in applying the law to the facts of a particular case, poses a heightened risk of vexatious litigation, and is “open to correction through ordinary mechanisms of review.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227 , 108 S.Ct. at 544 ; see also Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed…

The issuance of an arrest warrant has several key characteristics in common with a judicial act: it involves the exercise of discretion in applying the law to the facts of a particular case, poses a heightened risk of vexatious litigation, and is "open to correction through ordinary mechanisms of review." Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227 , 108 S.Ct. at 544 ; see also Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed…

See Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that "administrative tasks . . . are not intimately associated with the judicial process").

See Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (extra-judicial investigation by government attorneys defending government officials and entities not entitled to absolute immunity) (cited in Snell, 920 F.2d at 693 ).

See Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989) (investigative activities by prosecuting attorney receive only qualified immunity “even though one may safely assume that government officials often expect that the fruits of any such investigation may ultimately end up in court”).

See Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3215 , 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989); Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723, 724 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 , 108 S.Ct. 143 , 98 L.Ed.2d 99 (1987). *656 The government argues that Mr. Johnson and Mr. Juppe are shielded from liability in their personal capacities in counts I through V by absolute quasi-judicial immunity and that Mr. Schafer is protected from liability in …

See also Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.1988) (municipal attorney not entitled to absolute immunity with respect to extrajudicial investigation); Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.1986) (county coroner entitled to qualified immunity from claim that she failed to disclose exculpatory evidence); Holdeman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 649 F.Supp. 1188 (N.D.Ind.1986), aff'd 840 F.2d 20 (7th Cir.1988) (mere furnishing of information by a private party to a law …