In re Eagen (1997)

“Where the contract is a continuing one, the statute of limitations runs from the time when the breach occurs or when the contract is in some way terminated.” Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super.

See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525(a); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super.

Pa. 2015), and on the quantum meruit claim on “the date on which the relationship between the parties [was] terminated[,]” Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super.

Where the contract is a continuing one, the statute of limitations runs from the time when the breach occurs or when the contract is in some way terminated.” Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) (citations omitted).

Under Pennsylvania law, an unjust enrichment claim has a four-year statute of limitations, which “begin[s] to accrue as of the date on which the relationship between the parties is terminated.” Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997).

See Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 447 ; Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.1997), appeal denied, 725 A.2d 1217 (Pa.1998). “[T]he statute of limitations begins to run on a claim from the time the cause of action accrues.

Defendant cites Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997), for the proposition that the four-year period begins to run on the date the relationship between the parties is terminated.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(4); [8] Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) (stating plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment, an action based on a contract implied at law, is subject to a four-year statute of limitations).

Pa. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), and quantum meruit claims accrue on “the date on which the relationship between the parties is terminated,” Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super.

Reinsurance Co., 130 F. App’x 607, 609 (3d Cir. 2005), quoting Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997).

Co. v. Rosenthal, 484 F.3d 251 , 253 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) (breach of contract); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super.

Ryvamat is correct that common law unjust enrichment actions are subject to the four-year statute of limitations for contracts implied in law. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(4); Sevast v. Kakouras, 915 A.2d 1147, 1153 (Pa. 2007); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 1997).

See Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“clear, distinct and unequivocal acknowledgement of a debt as an existing obligation, such as is consistent with a promise to pay, is sufficient to toll the statute”); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 990 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“there can be no more clear and unequivocal acknowledgement of a debt than payment”).

Packer Soc’y Hill Travel Agency, Inc. v. Presbyterian University of Pennsylvania Medical Ctr., 635 A.2d 649, 652 (Pa. Super. 1993); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“In general, an action based on contract accrues at the time of breach.

According to statute, there is a four-year statute of limitations for such causes of action.”) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(4) and Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super.

Plaintiff quoted from Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 990 (Pa.Super. 1997) which holds that in order for a partial payment to toll the statute of limitations, the payment must constitute a constructive acknowledgement of the debt from which a promise to pay the balance may be inferred.

“This [Court] has recognized that there can be no more clear and unequivocal acknowledgement of a debt than payment.” Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 990 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation omitted). -3- J-A20024-17 The mortgage at issue in this action was not under seal.

“This court has recognized that there can be no more clear and unequivocal acknowledgement of a debt than payment.” Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 990 (Pa. Super. 1997).

See Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 447 ; Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 1997).

"Where the contract is a continuing one, the statute of limitations runs from the time when the breach occurs or when the contract is in some way terminated." Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super. 1997) (citing Thorpe v. Schoebrun, 195 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa.Super. 1963).

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(4); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. [ ] 1997) (stating plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment, an action based on a contract implied at law, is subject to a four-year statute of limitations).

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(4); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment, an action based on a contract implied at law, is subject to a four-year statute of limitations).

Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.1997) (citing Thorpe, 195 A.2d at 872 ).

“Where the contract is a continuing one, the statute of limitations runs from the time when the breach occurs or when the contract is in some way terminated.” Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing Thorpe v. Schoenbrun, 202 Pa. Super. 375, 378, 195 A.2d 870, 872 (1963)).

The court in its determination of whether there is a dispute upon the facts “must confine its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents.” AIU Insurance Co. v. Barxha, 2004 WL 2439234 , 1 (Pa.Com.Pl.) citing Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 988 (Pa. Super. 1997).

Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.1997).

Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.1997) citing, Packer Society Hill Travel Agency, Inc. v. Presbyterian University of Pennsylvania Medical Center, 430 Pa.Super. 625, 631 , 635 A.2d 649, 652 (1993).

Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 1997); Bednar v. Marino, 435 Pa. Super. 417, 427 , 646 A.2d 573, 578 (1994).

It may be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mellon Bank, 768 A.2d at 868 (quoting Citicorp North America Inc. v. Thornton, 707 A.2d 536, 538 (Pa. Super. 1998)); see also, Kelaco v. Davis & McKean General Partnership, 743 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. Super. 1999); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 988 (Pa. Super. 1997); Vetter v. Fun Footwear Co., 447 Pa. Super. 84, 87 , 668 A.2d 529, 530-31 (1995) (en banc…

Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 988 (Pa.Super.1997) (quoting Vetter v. Fun Footwear Co., 447 Pa.Super. 84 , 668 A.2d 529, 530-31 (1995) (en banc)). ¶ 9 In this action, Appellant seeks a declaration that Exhibit A is in violation of Exhibits B, C, and D.

It has long been established that “[a] partial payment stops the running of the statute because it is an acknowledgment of the debt as an existing obligation, from which the law necessarily implies a promise to pay.” Barnes v. Pickett Hardware Co., Ltd., 203 Pa. 570, 572 , 53 A. 378, 379 (1902); see also Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 990 (Pa.Super.1997) (rearg. denied Nov. 18, 1997) (“In order for a partial payment to toll the statute of limitations, the payment must const…

See Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) (“[Qjuantum meruit actions begin to accrue, as of the date on which the relationship between the parties is terminated.”) (citing Kenis v. Perini Carp., 452 Pa.Super. 634 , 682 A.2d 845, 849 (1996) (holding that attorney’s quantum meruit cause of action against his former client accrued as of the date of the attorney’s termination of representation)).

See Cole, 701 A.2d at 990 .

See also Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 1997)(plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment based on a contract implied by law is subject to a four-year statute of 13 FILED 1/12/2023 4:01 PM,Clerk of Judicial Records, Civil Division, Lehigh County, PA 2020-C-0881 /s/JW FILED 12/20/2022 2:54 PM, Clerk of Judicial Records, Civil Division, Lehigh County, PA 2020-C-0881 /s/JW limitations), "The statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and …

See Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.1997)(noting that a contract implied in law is subject to a four-year statute of limitations); Ragnar Benson Inc. v. Bethel Mart Assoc., 308 Pa.Super. 405 , 454 A.2d 599 (1982)(same).