Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor v. Local 1942, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Afl-Cio (1989)

Magistrate Judge Bittner concluded, however, that “the disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant is essential to the plaintiffs prosecution of this case and is critical in determining the reliability of the confidential informant, upon which the police officers entirely relied as a basis for their belief that the plaintiff had contraband in his person when the strip-search was conducted.” Balancing the government’s entitlement to assert the informer’s privileg…

Magistrate Judge Bittner concluded, however, that "the disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant is essential to the plaintiff's prosecution of this case and is critical in determining the reliability of the confidential informant, upon which the police officers entirely relied as a basis for their belief that the plaintiff had contraband in his person when the strip-search was conducted." Balancing the government's entitlement to assert the informer's privile…

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 376 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversing dismissal sanction for refusal to comply with a discovery order because “the district court abused its discretion by compelling discovery” and “such an abuse of discretion will not support a Rule 37(b) dismissal”).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989).

Dole v. Local 194.2, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 375 (7th Cir.1989) (“The informer’s privilege will yield upon a showing of substantial need.”); B.A.

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989) (interest of party seeking to discover informant's identity must be "credible").

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989) (interest of party seeking to discover informant’s identity must be “credible”).

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 376 (7th Cir.1989) (holding district court abused its discretion in dismissing Secretary of Labor’s complaint against union as a discovery sanction for the Secretary’s refusal to disclose names of individuals who gave statements to the Secretary’s investigators, as that information was protected by the informer’s privilege); Rice v. City of Chicago, 333 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing the pl…

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1989) the court’s premature ruling — which was quickly remedied — did not constitute reversible error.

Thus, we have held that “[t]he party opposing the privilege may overcome it upon showing his need for the information outweighs the government’s entitlement to the privilege.” Lawmaster, 993 F.2d at 774 (quoting Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir.1989)).

Thus, we have held that “[t]he party opposing the privilege may overcome it upon showing his need for the information outweighs the government’s entitlement to the privilege.” Lawmaster , 993 F.2d at 774 (quoting Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW , 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1989)).

We review this kind of evidentiary matter only for an abuse of discretion, recognizing that “ ‘[district courts have broad discretion in matters related to discovery.’” Jurcev v. Central Community Hospital, 7 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir.1993), quoting Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1989).

Jurcev v. Central Community Hosp., 7 F.3d 618 , 627 (7th Cir.1993); Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1989).

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir.1989) (fishing expedition based on speculative relevance not sufficient to warrant disclosure). 19 To argue entrapment, a defendant must show inducement and lack of predisposition.

On review, courts of appeal will only reverse a decision of a district court relating to discovery upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1989) (citations omitted).

Dole v. Local 1942, 870 F.2d at 375 (“[I]t cannot be assumed that the privilege has been waived where the Secretary’s answer [to an interrogatory] did not even disclose the identity of any informers but only named persons with ‘knowledge’ of this matter and simultaneously reasserted the informer’s privilege.”); Albany Business Journal, 780 F.Supp. at 940-41 (recognizing that the employer’s knowledge of the identities of employees who gave statements to the DOL is not “equiva…

See Rovario, 353 U.S. at 60 & n.8 (reasoning that the informant privilege can no longer apply when the informant’s identity becomes known “to those who would have cause to resent the communication”); cf. also Dole, 870 F.2d at 375 (“In the absence of an express identification, death, or perhaps overwhelming evidence as to the identity of the informant, it cannot be assumed that the privilege has been waived . . . .”); Chao, 254 F.R.D. at 660 (reasoning that the disclosure of…

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 375 (7th Cir. 1989); Hodgson, 459 F.2d at 307 .

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).

Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Valles, 41 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir.1994).

Dole v. Local 1942, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1989) (determining that party opposing the privilege must show a “credible need for the information in order to defend itself in the action—a need greater than the important policy consideration underlying the privilege”); Schultz v. Farino Excavating Co., 55 F.R.D. 346, 347 (E.D.

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1989) (determining that party opposing the privilege must show a “credible need for the information in order to defend itself in the action—a need greater than the important policy consideration underlying the privilege”); Schultz v. Farino Excavating Co., 55 F.R.D. 346, 347 (E.D.

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he government need not make a threshold showing that . . . retaliation is likely, because of the significant policy consideration behind the privilege, as well as the difficulty of such proof.”).

Workers, AFL- CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he government need not make a threshold showing that . . . retaliation is likely, because of the significant policy consideration behind the privilege, as well as the difficulty of such proof.”).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1989)).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he government need not make a threshold showing that . . . retaliation is likely, because of the significant policy consideration behind the privilege, as well as the difficulty of such proof”).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he government need not make a threshold showing that . . . retaliation is likely, because of the significant policy consideration behind the privilege, as well as the difficulty of such proof.”).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).2 It allows the government to withhold, as a matter of right, the identity of individuals who furnish information about violations of the law to law enforcement, United 2 The parties devote a not insignificant portion of their briefs arguing about whether the privilege in fact belongs to Defendant Officers, the Chicago Police Department, the FBI, or some combination of the three.

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989). 7 The privilege gives way, however, “[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, 8 or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an 9 accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–61. 10 “[T]he party seeking disclosure has the burden of showing that its need for the information 11 outweighs the government’s interest in nondisclosure.” In re …

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing cases).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also In re United States, 565 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The doctrine of informer privilege is applied in civil cases as well as criminal. ...

The informer’s privilege applies in both criminal and civil contexts, but the Seventh Circuit has noted that the privilege “is arguably greater” in the civil context “since not all constitutional guarantees which inure to criminal defendants are similarly available to civil defendants.” Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).

App. 3d 28, 32 (1996) (quoting Dole v. Local 1942, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989)).

Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Circ.1989) — also fails, as Mayor Hanson, unlike the Secretary, has no statutory obligation to investigate a complaint once received, nor any obligation to initiate litigation upon finding probable cause to support the complaint, see 29 U.S.C. § 482 . 5.

Indeed, ”[t]he doctrine of the informer's privilege is not a recent phenomenon, having its roots in the English common law.” Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989). 3 .

Id. "[Blare speculation that the information may possibly prove useful" is not enough to justify the disclosure of a confidential informant's identity, and an informant's identity shall not be disclosed "to permit 'a mere fishing expedition." State v. Cook, 582 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (quoting Dole v. Local 1942, et al., 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cr.1989)).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1989) (“District courts have broad discretion in matters relating to discovery.”); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir.1985)(quoting United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1382 (D.C.Cir.1984)) (noting that trial judges have “wide discretion with respect to discovery matters”; moreover, “a trial court’s ‘discovery rulings are reversed only on a clear showin…

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989).

Resp. to PL Suppl. to Mot. to Compel at 2; Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1525 (7th Cir.1990); Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989).

It is the party seeking disclosure who bears the burden of proving that disclosure "is essential to a balanced measure of the issues and the fair administration of justice.” Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989).

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372-73 (7th Cir.1989) (informer’s privilege).

The purpose of the informer’s privilege “ ‘is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement.’ ” Sims, 808 F.Supp. at 615 (quoting Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989)).

See generally Mankey v. Bennett, 38 F.3d 353, 356 (7th Cir.1994); DeRanće, Inc. v. PaineWebber, Inc., 872 F.2d 1312, 1324 (7th Cir.1989); Dole v. Local 1942, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1989); and Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Company, 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir.1985).

“The confidential informant privilege ‘will not yield to permit a mere fishing expedition, nor upon bare speculation that the information may possibly prove useful.’ ” Valles, 41 F.3d at 358 (quoting Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir.1989)). “ ‘The defendant must explain to the court as precisely as possible what testimony he thinks the informer could give and how this testimony would be relevant to a material issue of guilt or innocence.’ ” United States …

Significantly, the Seventh Circuit has held that it is a defendant’s burden to “establish a genuine need for disclosure before disclosure should be ordered.” Id. at 842 ; see also United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 273 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 502 , 121 L.Ed.2d 438 (1992); Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir.1989).