CSX Corporation v. United States (2021)

But “[r]espect for our precedent re- quires us not to adopt” a new legal rule “that would effectively neu- ter our previous holding.” CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 682 (11th Cir. 2021); see Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 949 F.3d 1319 , 1335 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020) (Newsom, J., concurring) (“[A] healthy respect for the decisions of [our] colleagues . . . counsels a fairly rigorous application of the prior-panel-precedent rule.”).

CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 678 (11th Cir. 2021).

By contrast, in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 , 233–35 (2011), a statute that spoke about “unavoidable” side effects did not incorporate a comment from the Second Restatement of Torts that carved out “unavoidably unsafe products” because “unavoidable” is “hardly a rarely used word” and there is no “special significance to the term ‘unavoidable’ standing alone.” And in Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 594 U.S. 338, 353 (2021), the Court rejected the no…

We presume that a word “bear[s] the same meaning throughout a text.” CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 680 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra, § 25, at 170).

Whether an employee has “opposed” an unlawful employment practice depends on whether the em- ployee’s activity would be understood as opposition “in ordinary discourse” and in how “we would naturally use the word.” Id. at 277 ; see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (“It’s a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.”) (cleaned up); …

Whether an employee has “opposed” an unlawful employment practice depends on whether the em- ployee’s activity would be understood as opposition “in ordinary discourse” and in how “we would naturally use the word.” Id. at 277 ; see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 , 539 (2019) (“It’s a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.”) (cleaned up);…

Compare id. at 408 (“recogniz[ing] the appealing simplicity of [the debtor’s] USCA11 Case: 20-13832 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 21 of 41 20-13832 Opinion of the Court 21 ‘plain language’ reading of [section] 101(5)(B)” but rejecting that reading), and id. at 412 & n.5 (Flaum, J., concurring in the result) (agreeing with the majority opinion “that adding the word ‘alter- native’ immediately before ‘right’” in the statute “is necessary for th[e] statute to work in the real wo…

Those arguments are foreclosed by the law-of-the- case doctrine, which “bar[s] relitigation of issues resolved explicitly or by necessary implication in an earlier appeal.” CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F. 4th 672, 678 (11th Cir. 2021).

See CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 680 (11th Cir. 2021) (“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, . . . judicial inquiry is complete.”).

(Dkt. 21 at 14.) See CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 680 (11th Cir. 2021) (Courts “do not consider legislative history when the text is clear. ...

See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. “when conflicting provisions simply cannot be reconciled.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 183; see CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 683 (11th Cir. 2021).

See CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 680 (11th Cir. 2021) (“To the extent that legislative history is useful at all in statutory interpretation, ‘we do not consider legislative his- tory when the text is clear.’” (citation omitted)).

See CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 680 (11th Cir. 2021) (describing the consistent-usage canon as “stat[ing] that a ‘word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout the text.’” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 25, at 170 (2012))).46 Broader context confirms this reading.