O'shea v. The Detroit News (1989)

Id. at 684-85.

Simply stated, the ADEA action is not preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because “employees have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of age or handicap without regard to the collective bargaining agreement’s language about an employee’s rights.” O’Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d at 687.

UPS points to language in O’Shea declaring that "[t]he Supreme Court has held many times that § 301 of the LMRA requires that all claims, state or federal, whose resolution depends on the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement be preempted by federal law.” 887 F.2d at 686 (emphasis added).

The discrimination claims are therefore not preempted. 43 O'Shea, 887 F.2d at 687.

O'Shea, 887 F.2d at 687.

The availability of this defense alone did not support removal to federal court because “Michigan employees have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of age or handicap without regard to the collective bargaining agreement’s language about an employee’s rights.” 922 F.2d at 293 , quoting O’Shea, 887 F.2d at 687.

Smolarek, 879 F.2d at 1335 ; O’Shea, 887 F.2d at 687.

Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 188, 193 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding defendant’s reliance on the CBA in defense of plaintiff’s ADA claim did not convert plaintiff’s claim into a § 301 claim); O’Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 , 687 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[E]mployees have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of age or handicap without regard to the collective bargaining agreement’s language about an employee’s rights.”).

See, e.g., Smolarek, 879 F.2d at 1333 (stating that “[t]he assertion of a defense requiring application of federal law, however, does not support removal to federal court”); O’Shea, 887 F.2d at 687 (stating that “[i]t is irrelevant to the preemption question whether or not the employer can defend by showing it had the right under the collective bargaining agreement to do what it did.”) The Court therefore holds that Plaintiffs state law claims are not preempted by the LMRA.

See, O'Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.1989); Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.1987); Chappell v. GTE Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 , 107 S.Ct. 1375 , 94 L.Ed.2d 690 (1987); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir.1984); Locke v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 676 F.2d 205 (6th Cir.1982). 75 With respect to Plaintiff's contention that her denial that her actions on Decemb…

Compare O’Shea v. The Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683, 687 (6th Cir.1989)(state law constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims not preempted because claims were “independent of any alleged violation of the contract” and state law age discrimination claim not preempted because “Michigan employees have the right not to be discriminated against ... without regard to the [CBA]’s language about employee’s rights”) and Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879…

See O’Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 , 687 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (finding that § 301 did not preempt intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where allegations were “independent of any alleged violation of the contract”): Mattis’s allegations, however, all involve workplace actions taken under the ostensible authority of the CBA, and seem to be a subtle attempt to present contract claims in tort clothing.

See O'Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 , 689 (6th Cir.1989). 32 In short, Bowdish failed to present sufficient evidence to withstand the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

See O'Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 , 688 (6th Cir.1989). 25 Higgins' evidence against Evans is that Evans held an "off the record" conference with her and then placed a record of the conference in Higgins' file.

Specifically, the amended language of that section stated in pertinent part: “this standard supersedes other applicable standards used to determine disability under either this chapter or chapter 4.” [Emphasis added.] In contrast, the above cited amend-atory language of § 131 evidences a legislative intent only to clarify the original intent of the act by correcting a perceived misinterpretation in Beauchamp , and leaving the act itself substantively unaltered. 446 N.W.2d at…

Specifically, the amended language of that section stated in pertinent part: "this standard supersedes other applicable standards used to determine disability under either this chapter or chapter 4." [Emphasis added.] 19 In contrast, the above cited amendatory language of Sec. 131 evidences a legislative intent only to clarify the original intent of the act by correcting a perceived misinterpretation in Beauchamp, and leaving the act itself substantively unaltered. 20 446 N.…

See, O’Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1989); Simpson v. Midland–Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1987); Chappell v. GTE Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 , 107 S.Ct. 1375 , 94 L.Ed.2d 690 (1987); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1984); Locke v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 676 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1982).

See O'Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 , 688 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that statements of co-workers and union official that employer made unfavorable shift assignments on the basis of age and was gathering data on older *475 employees was insufficient to create a factual issue precluding summary judgment); Young v. State Farm Mut.

See also La-Pointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 380-81 (6th Cir.1993) (“[T]he ADEA action is not preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because ‘employees have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of age or handicap without regard to the collective bargaining agreement’s language about an employee’s rights.’ ”) (quoting O’Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 , 687 (6th Cir.1989)); Patton v. Toshiba America Consumer Prod…

See also O’Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 , 687 (6th Cir.1989) (“All the plaintiff has to allege is that an action was taken against him because of a motive impermissible under [state law].