United States v. Sandini (1989)

Id. at 304-05.

To obtain a reversal, an appellant “must demonstrate ‘clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.’ ” Console, 13 F.3d at 655 (quoting United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1989)) (emphasis in Sandini).

While there may have been an innocent explanation for Cartwright’s activity, 3 “[tjhere is no requirement ... that the inference drawn by the jury be the only inference possible or that the government’s evidence foreclose every possible innocent explanation.” United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92 , 97 n. 3 (3d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989)).

United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 305-06 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993).

Although “other inferences are possible from the evidence, ... that circumstance does not justify us in rejecting the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990).

In support, Gonzalez cites our decision in United States v. Sandini 888 F.2d 300, 309 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990), for the proposition that “[t]he district court has to grant severance if it becomes obvious after the commencement of trial that joinder is no longer appropriate.” As an initial matter, we do not read Sandini as broadly as Gonzalez suggests we should.

These tangled defenses are, in part, exactly why our severance doctrine asks whether juries “can reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants in view of its volume and limited admissibility.’” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1065 (3d Cir. 1971)); see also United States v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 262, 266 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a defendant must 24 …

See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 168-71 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of severance where two brothers were charged with the same six crimes and only one of the brothers was charged with two additional but related crimes); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 304-07 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of severance where one conspirator was charged with a more serious 15 As a reminder, Kidada abetted the murders of the six Coleman family members.

See, e.g., United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting “the fact that the jury acquitted [a codefendant] is critical proof that the jury was ‘able to separate the offenders and the offenses’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding claim of prejudice “without merit” where a codefendant was acquitted of some charges, “a fact indicating that the jury carefully weighed the evidence relating to each an appro…

What they say in their . . . closing arguments . . . is not evidence." See United States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1342 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that Bruton "does not apply when an attorney for a co-defendant implicates the defendant during closing argument"); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Bruton is directed toward preserving a defendant's right to cross-examination, and thus has nothing to do with arguments of counsel," which "are simply not e…

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel This Court has expressed a “strong preference for reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 1989) (collecting cases).

“We have repeatedly expressed our strong preference for reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) (observing that a district court generally constitutes “the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation”).

Her remaining arguments were either waived by her failure to raise them then, see United States v. Pultrone, 241 F.3d 306, 307-08 (3d Cir.2001), or should be brought before the District Court in collateral proceedings, see United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311-12 (3d Cir.1989).

Nance proposes that the unusual circumstance here that amounts to a miscarriage of justice is that his counsel was ineffective by failing to preserve his right to bring the recusal claim on direct appeal. 12 Specifically, Nance asserts that “[i]n light of the simultaneous and contradictory statements about whether and how [he] could seek relief from the district court’s denial of the disqualification motion, it was incumbent upon counsel to act to ensure that [he] would have…

United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir.1989).

However, “[w]e have repeatedly expressed our strong preference for reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.” United, States v. Sandini 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir.1989) (citations omitted).

Further, “evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States *103 v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)).

Accordingly, “[w]e have repeatedly expressed our strong preference for reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct ap *109 peal.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir.1989) (citing Gov’t of V.I. v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 950 (3d Cir.1986)).

Console, 13 F.3d at 655 (citing United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir.1989)).

However, we have a “strong preference for reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir.1989).

United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir.1989) (internal citation and emphasis omitted)).

United States v. *640 Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 466-67 (3d Cir.1997); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 309 (3d Cir.1989).

United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir.1989).

See United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[C]laims predicated upon attorney’s error do require a showing of prejudice and therefore may involve facts not adequately developed in the record.") (emphasis in original).

United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir.1988).

Such a claim should be taken up “in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 .” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir.1989).

United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 305 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 .

See, e.g., United States v. Rieger, 942 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir.1991); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311-13 (3d Cir.1989); United States v. Sturm, 671 F.2d 749, 750 (3d Cir.1982).

See, e.g., United States v. Oliva, 46 F.3d 320, 323 (3d Cir.1995); United States v. Rieger, 942 F.2d 230, 235-36 (3d Cir.1991); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311-12 (3d Cir.1989).

Although "other inferences are possible from the evidence, . . . that circumstance does not justify us in rejecting the jury's verdict." United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S. Ct. 1831 (1990).

The "'evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt'." United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990).

The “ ‘evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990).

"By its terms, recourse may be had to [Rule 52(b)] only on appeal from a trial infected with error so `plain' the trial judge [was] derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it." Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 ; see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985); Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 630-31 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993); Government 12 of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d …

“By its terms, recourse may be had to [Rule 52(b)] only on appeal from a trial infected with error so 'plain' the trial judge [was] derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 ; see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985); Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 630-31 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993); Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d Cir…

In applying these guideposts to a severance request, this Court must “balance the potential prejudice to the defendant against the advantages of joinder in terms of judicial economy.” See United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 305-06 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990).

See U.S. v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1342 (3d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We have, [], never held that Bruton applies [when an attorney] implicates a defendant during a closing argument and we perceive of no reason to do so because the arguments of counsel are simply not evidence. . .”); see also Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 275 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that prosecutor’s statements were “harmless-error” and affirming low…

In rejecting this claim, the Third Circuit held that Bruton does not apply “when the attorney for a co-defendant implicates a defendant during a closing argument ... because the arguments of counsel are simply not evidence.” Id. at 310-11; accord United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1398-1400 (10th Cir.1985) (jury instruction deemed adequate where incriminating comments were made by pro se co-defendant during opening statement) (applying Frazier).

See United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Bruton is directed toward preserving a defendant’s right to cross- examination, and thus has nothing to do with arguments of counsel based on their interpretation of the evidence.”).

“It is not sufficient for [a defendant] . . . merely to allege that severance would have improved his chances for acquittal.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1989).

United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir.1989). 9 .

Rather, a complaining defendant must show “that the jury ‘was unable to sift through the evidence and “make an individualized determination as to each defendant.”’” United States v. Cassano, 132 F.3d 646, 651 (11th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Shivers, 66 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson, 763 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir 1985); cf. State v. James Murray, No. 01C01-9702- CR-00066, 1998 Tenn.…

The government asserts that a presumption in favor of joint trials operates most strongly in conspiracy cases, citing United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir.1989), and United States v. Jackson, 649 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir.1981), because the government’s proof in such cases necessarily relies on showing a connection between conspirators, which often may be achieved most effectively through a joint trial.

Further, “[t]he evidence need not unequivocally point to the defendant’s guilt so long as it permits the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1129 (citing United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989)).

Finally, “it is difficult to conclude that there is a prejudicial spillover where, as here, there is substantial independent evidence of [petitioners’] guilt.” United States v. Sandini 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom., Thomson v. United States, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990).

United States v. Sandini 888 F.2d 300, 308 (3d Cir.1989).

See United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 925 , 112 S.Ct. 340 , 116 L.Ed.2d 280 (1991); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 305 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990); United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 563 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 , 109 S.Ct. 1637 , 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989).

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 , 113 S.Ct. 938 , 938, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (“Rule 14 leaves the determination of risk of prejudice and any remedy that may be necessary to the sound discretion of the district courts”); United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 305-06 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990)), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 962 , 113 S.Ct. 1388 , 1…

United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir.) (citing United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 305-06 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990)), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 962 , 113 S.Ct. 1388 , 122 L.Ed.2d 763 (1993); United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir.1978).

In support, Gonzalez cites our decision in United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 309 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990), for the proposition that "[t]he district court has to grant severance if it becomes obvious after the commencement of trial that joinder is no longer appropriate." 121 As an initial matter, we do not read Sandini as broadly as Gonzalez suggests we should.

"The evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)).