Strong v. Board Of Ed. Of Uniondale Ufsd (1990)

Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether procedural due process protections extend to employee discipline short of termination, see Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 , 117 S.Ct. 1807 , 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997), we have done so in the case of a tenured state employee's suspension without pay, see, e.g., Strong, 902 F.2d at 211; Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trustees of the Ct. State Univ., 850 F.2d 70 , 72 (2d Cir.1988) (observing that a school's "decision to suspend [the pl…

We have stated that “an important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted may justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation.” Strong v. Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir.1990).

Auth., 52 F.3d 623 , 628 (7th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff bus driver suspended without pay after bus hit and injured pedestrian; no pre-suspension hearing necessary as employer's interests "clearly outweigh[ed]" those of plaintiff); Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1562 (10th Cir. 1992) (court discussed Loudermill but applied the Mallen exception where a teacher was suspended without pay and without a hearing after the school learned that the teacher had been arrested…

Strong v. Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir. 1990); see also N.Y.

See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-42 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Strong v. Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.1990).

Auth., 52 F.3d 623 , 628 (7th Cir.1995) (plaintiff bus driver suspended without pay after bus hit and injured pedestrian; no pre-suspension hearing necessary as employer's interests "clearly outweigh[ed]" those of plaintiff); Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1562 (10th Cir.1992) (court discussed Loudermill but applied the Mallen exception where a teacher was suspended without pay and without a hearing after the school learned that the teacher had been arrested o…

Strong v. Board of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 250 , 112 L.Ed.2d 208 (1990).

In some situations, however, "an important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted may justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation." Strong v. Board of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir.1990).

“The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 ; see Adams v. New York State Ed. Dep’t, 752 F.Supp.2d 420, 455 (2d Cir.2010); Strong, 902 F.2d at 211 (“Under New York law a tenured teacher may be removed only pursuant to certain substantive and procedural safeguards, including notice and …

It is also clear that the alleged property interest is constitutionally protected. "[T]he state-law property interest of government employees who may only be discharged for cause ... is a constitutionally protected property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment," O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187 , 196 (2d Cir.2005) ( citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Strong v. Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d C…

To prevail on a procedural due process claim, "a plaintiff must identify a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause," Harrington v. County of Suffolk, 607 F.3d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 2010), and demonstrate that he or she was deprived of that property "right without due process of law." Woe v. Spitzer, 571 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 998 (2d Cir. 1994)) (additional citation omitted). "[I]t is well established that the stat…

Dist., 902 F.2d 208 , 211 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The constitutional contours of due process turn on the specific circumstances of the case, including the governmental and private interests at issue.”).

Dist., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[Plaintiff’s] position as a tenured teacher is indisputably a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

Dist., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[Plaintiff’s] position as a tenured teacher is indisputably a property interest protected by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.”); Sever v. Bd. of Educ. of the Maine-Endwell Cent.

Dist., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.1990), would in this case be inadequate to satisfy the requirements of due process, especially given Jacobs’s failure to utilize the process afforded him by state law to appeal the arbitrator’s decision, 2 see New York Educ.

Dist., 902 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897 , 111 S.Ct. 250 , 112 L.Ed.2d 208 (1990); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3).

Dist., 902 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir.1990).

As the Second Circuit recently noted, “an important governmental interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted[,] may justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation.” Strong v. Board of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir.) (citing Federal Deposit Ins.

Strong v. Board of Education, 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.1990).

Id. at 202; see Strong v. Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 208 , 212-13 (2d Cir.1990) (“Legitimate requests for medical information by those responsible for the health of the community do not rise to an impermissible invasion of privacy.”).

Under New York law a “tenured teacher has a protected property interest in her position and a right to retain it subject to being discharged for cause in accordance with the provisions of [the Education Law].” Gould v. Board of Educ., 81 N.Y.2d 446, 451 , 599 N.Y.S.2d 787 , 616 N.E.2d 142 (1993); accord Strong v. Board of Educ., 902 F.2d 208 , 211 (2d Cir.1990) (position as tenured teacher is a property interest protected by Fourteenth Amendment); see also N.Y.

Under New York law a "tenured teacher has a protected property interest in her position and a right to retain it subject to being discharged for cause in accordance with the provisions of [the Education Law]." Gould v. Board of Educ., 81 N.Y.2d 446, 451 (1993); accord Strong v. Board of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir. 1990) (position as tenured teacher is a property interest protected by Fourteenth Amendment); see also N.Y.

See, e.g., Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 F.4th 1070, 1077 (2d Cir. 2021) (“The procedures outlined in New York Education Law § 3020-a exceed this [constitutional] standard by requiring ‘notice and a full-blown adversarial hearing’ prior to the termination of a tenured teacher.” (quoting Strong v. Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir. 1990)); Jacobs, 271 F. App’x at 89 (“Nor do we identify any other argument in the complaint as to why § 3020-a, which provides…

See id.

See Strong v. Board of Educ., 902 F.2d 208 , 211 (2d Cir.1990); see also Ezekwo v. New York City Health & Hosp.

See Strong v. Board of Education, 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.1990) and Pl.’s Mem. at 14.

See Strong v. Bd. of Educ. of Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 902 F.2d 208 , 211 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that plaintiff's position as a tenured teacher was "indisputably a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment”). 5 .

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. at 903 ; see also Strong v. Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 902 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.1990). 4 The root requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

See Strong v. Board of Educ., 902 F.2d 208 , 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897 , 111 S.Ct. 250 , 112 L.Ed.2d 208 (1990).