United States v. Philbert Ray Smith (1990)

United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Von Washington, 915 F.2d 390, 392 (8th Cir.1990). 9 Since the sentencing court in this case effected a departure from the original guideline range of six to twelve months, it should have taken the steps necessary to justify the departure.

United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135 (11th Cir. 1990), superseded by statute on other grounds, 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1994), as recognized in Cook, 291 F.3d at 1300 n.3. 12 Case: 19-12735 Date Filed: 11/14/2019 Page: 13 of 19 “In a probation revocation proceeding, all that is required is that the evidence reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of probation; evidence that would establish guilt beyond…

See United States v. White, 925 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that sentences under § 3565 cannot be based on a defendant’s probation-violating conduct); United States v. Von Washington, 915 F.2d 390, 391-92 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam); United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135 (11th Cir.1990).

LEXIS 29189 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. White, 925 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Von Washington, 915 F.2d 390, 392 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135-36 (11th Cir.1990).

The same distinctions we apply to Alii and Foster are also applicable to United States v. Von Washington, 915 F.2d 390, 391 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam), and United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135 (11th Cir.1990).

See United States v. White, 925 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Von Washington, 915 F.2d 390, 392 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135-36 (11th Cir.1990); cf. United States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir.1991) (noting this requirement applies to probation revocation but not to termination of supervised release).

See also United States v. Foster, 904 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir.1990) (“when imposition of a sentence has been suspended and probation has been revoked, the court may impose only the sentence it originally might have imposed”); United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 136 (11th Cir.1990); and United States v. Von Washington, 915 F.2d 390 (8th Cir.1990).

United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135 (11th Cir.1990) (emphasis added).

At the time that Brown committed the bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (a)(2) required a district judge, upon revoking a defendant’s probation, to “impose any other sentence that was available under subchapter A at the time of the initial sentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (a)(2) (1988); see United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135 (11th Cir.1990) superseded by 1994 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (a)(2); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 702 , 120 S.Ct. 1795, 1801-02…

See United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135 (11th Cir.1990).

See United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133 (11th Cir.1990) (finding error in consideration of statutory maximum rather than guideline range in resentencing upon revocation of probation); see also United States v. Maltais, 961 F.2d 1485, 1486 (10th Cir.1992) (finding initial guideline sentencing range, rather than higher U.S.S.G.

See United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding error in consideration of statutory maximum rather than guideline range in resentencing upon revocation of probation); see also United States v. Maltais, 961 F.2d 1485, 1486 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding initial guideline sentencing range, rather than higher U.S.S.G.

See United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 135 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Granderson, 969 F.2d 980, 984-85 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 3059 , 125 L.Ed.2d 742 (1993); United States v. Milano, 32 F.3d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir.1994).

See also United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133 (11th Cir.1990).