Cluster 554027 (1991)

The plaintiff “assert[ed] that its claims arise out of a collateral agreement with [the defendant], namely an agreement to value [the plaintiff’s] forward contracts, and because the collateral agreement lacks an arbitration clause, the claims are not arbitrable.” Id. at 251.

Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 249).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991).

Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 249).

Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 250 (holding that Vermont statute requiring that arbitration agreement be signed was preempted by the FAA). 17 .

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir.1991) (finding the FAA and the Convention preempted a Vermont statute that required any agreement to arbitrate be displayed prominently in the contract or contract confirmation and be signed by the parties); F.A.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir.1991) (finding the FAA and the Convention preempted a Vermont statute that required any agreement to arbitrate be displayed prominently in the contract or contract confirmation and be signed by the parties); F.A.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.1991), courts must treat agreements to arbitrate like any other contract, see Volt Info.

Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 249-50 (holding Convention and FAA preempt Vermont statute); Genesco, Inc. v. T.

Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 249-50 (holding Convention and FAA preempt Vermont statute); Genesco, Inc. v. T.

Reaseguradora Nacional De Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42 , 45 (2d Cir.1993); Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 249; Conticommodity Servs. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (2d Cir.1980).

Id. (“[Plaintiff] would have us read each of these provisions in a vacuum.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991)).

Indeed, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 248) (stating that although “parties may not be compelled to submit a[ ] dispute to arbitration unless they have' contracted to do so, federal arbitration policy requires that ‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues’ should be resolved in favor of arbitration’ ” (quoting Moses H.

In accordance with that policy, courts should “construe arbitration clauses as broadly as possible,” Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 250 (internal quotation and citation omitted), and “any doubts concerning the scope of arbi-trable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H.

Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 248 (holding that, while “parties may not be compelled to submit a commercial dispute to arbitration unless they have contracted to do so, federal arbitration policy requires that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir.1983) (same).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing the FAA at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 , 2).

“The goal of the [New York] Convention is to promote the enforcement of arbitral agreements in contracts involving international commerce so as to facilitate international business transaction on the whole.” Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 507 , 520 n.15, 94 S.Ct. 2449 , 2457 n.15 (1974).

Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991), but also at whether the individual continues to perform services following notice of the obligation to arbitrate disputes.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991); accord Lebovits v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, No. 20 Civ. 1116, 2021 WL 1198967 , at *5 (S.D.N.Y.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that the “purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is to prevent unfair surprise and oppression”)); Clinton v. Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 476, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“For a contract to be held unconscionable, the party alleging the defect must generally show both substantive and procedural unconscionability. . . .

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 15 1991); Exch.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that FAA preempts VAA acknowledgement requirement). ¶ 40.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 , 520 n.15 (1974)).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 1991)) (alterations in original). “‘[N]arrow clauses [] limit arbitration to specific types of disputes . . . [and are] not the sort of broad clause in which parties agree ‘to submit to arbitration disputes “of any nature or character,” or simply “any and all disputes . . . .”’” McDonnell Douglas Fin.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1991)).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1991) (“state statutes such as the Vermont statute directly clash with… the Arbitration Act because they effectively reincarnate the former judicial hostility towards arbitration.

(London) , 923 F.2d 245 , 251 (2d Cir. 1991) ("These are not two individual, free standing [ ] clauses; rather, they are interrelated in an integral fashion. [Plaintiff] would have us reach each of these provisions in a vacuum.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting S.A.

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.1991); see also Pick Quick Food, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 342, 952 F.Supp.2d 494, 505 (E.D.N.Y.2013).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir.1991)).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249-50 (2d Cir.1991) (holding that FAA preempts VAA); Little v. Allstate Ins.

Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir.1991) (“Federal policy requires us to construe arbitration clauses as broadly as possible.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.1991) (citation omitted). “[L]anguage excluding certain disputes from arbitration must be ‘clear and unambiguous’ or ‘unmistakably clear’ and ... arbitration should be ordered ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’ ” Genesco, Inc. v. T.

Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.1991) (“[FAA] applies in federal court to diversity suits which relate to contracts involving interstate or international commerce.”).

The court held that the FAA and the Convention preempted the Vermont stat *456 ute, which “effectively reincarnate[d] the former judicial hostility towards arbitration”'in contravention to the FAA’s policy liberally favoring arbitration. 923 F.2d at 250.

Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir.1991)).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.1991)).

Co., v. Building Systems, Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir.1995) (matters are arbitrable “ ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute’”) (quoting Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir.1991)).

(London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.1991) (noting that the “purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is to prevent unfair surprise and oppression” (internal quotations omitted)).

Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.1991).

Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir.1991), quoting, McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A. & S. Transp.

Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft, Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 501 U.S. 1267 , 112 S.Ct. 17 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1991)); see also Deloitte Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9 F.3d 1060, 1063 (2d Cir.1993).

Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2nd Cir.1991) (finding that a plaintiff must show “ ‘unfairness, undue oppression, or unconscionability’ ” before a federal court will strike an arbitration agreement as a contract of adhesion) (citations omitted).

Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 250, quoting S.A.

The arbitration clause in this case, covering any dispute “arising out of [the] Agreement or any matter related thereto,” has been held to be “the paradigm of a broad clause.” Id. (citing Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 251).

In Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Limited, 923 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir.1991), Threlkeld and Metallgesells-chaft (“MG”) — a London-based corporation which was a member of the London Metal Exchange — entered into an informal agreement in 1986 for MG to purchase and sell forward contracts for metals on the London Metal Exchange (“LME”).