The University Of Maryland At Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Company (1991)

But see Peat Marwick, 923 F.2d at 272 (intimating that Burford abstention should not be extended beyond equitable claims).

But see Peat Marwick, 923 F.2d at 272 (intimating that Burford abstention should not be extended beyond equitable claims). 31 Decisional authority remains inconclusive as to whether Burford abstention may be ordered only in cases of an equitable nature, or whether, as Lac D'Amiante states in dictum, the distinction between legal and equitable relief is not dispositive in abstention cases.

University of Maryland emphasized, however, that “a district court has little or no discretion to abstain in a case that does not meet traditional abstention requirements,” id. at 270-71, and whether a case “falls in the area within which the district court may exercise discretion is therefore a matter of law, reviewable on a plenary basis.” Id. at 271.

University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 271.

University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 271. 50 Plaintiffs therefore argue that Burford abstention is inappropriate given this Court's statements in University of Maryland and Baltimore Bank.

University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 271.

Peat Marwick, 923 F.2d at 272.

However, as this same court acknowledged, id. at 271, the language in NOPSI was dicta.

Id. at 271-72.

Id. at 271-72. 23 A year later, however, another panel of this court reached the opposite result in another insurance abstention case.

The Third Circuit in University of Maryland wrote: In our view, Burford abstention may be ordered in insurance insolvency cases only when one of the parties to the action in which the federal court abstains is the insolvent insurer or its receiver, trustee, officers, and the like____ [The auditor’s] connection to the state regulatory mechanism (governing insolvency proceedings) that Burford is designed to protect is simply too attenuated to justify renunciation of a federal …

Consequently, “the mere existence of state administrative procedures, or even a complex state administrative apparatus, does not necessarily warrant abstention.” University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 272 (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the principle that suits to establish the validity of a claim, even against the insolvent company itself ... do not interfere with the functions of a receiver.” Id. at 274.

Id. at 267.

The Third Circuit reached this conclusion in Peat Marwick after noting that the language in NOPSI was dicta. 923 F.2d at 271.

University of Maryland v. Peat Manvick Main & Co., 923 F.2d at 273; see Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d at 884 n. 9.

University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d at 276; Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d at 346 .

On the other hand, in University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Company, 923 F.2d 265 , 273 (3d Cir.1991), a case related to the same rehabilitation proceedings and involving the same defendant as Foster, wherein certain policyholders commenced a class action on behalf of over 20,000 insureds, the Third Circuit Court stated, “the [class action] plaintiffs’ claims are brought against PMM for the alleged breach of duties owed by PMM directly to the plaintiffs, not to Mutua…

I begin with the Supreme Court’s admonition that abstention is the “exception and not the rule” and that a federal court’s obligation to adjudicate claims within its jurisdiction is “virtually unflagging.” University of Md., 923 F.2d at 271, (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 ).

Id. at 271.

Id. at 271.

Therefore, | the state and federal actions do not present identical claims.'® Univ. of Maryland | at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 1991) | (‘[T]he lack of identity of all issues necessarily precludes Colorado River abstention.”). | Although some issues appear to overlap, the parties are plainly different | and their relationships do not render the proceedings virtually identical.

The relationships between the parties also does not warrant calling them virtually identical.32 The Third Circuit has 25 Kelly, 868 F.3d at 283, 283 n.8. 26 Id. at 283 n.8. 27 Univ. of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 1991). 28 Id. at 284 . 29 See Doc. 26, at 8, 12-13. 30 On the later point, the Amended Complaint in the state court proceeding includes fiduciary duty, accounting, declaratory judgment, and breach of contract claims a…

Valley, Inc. v. Borough of Yardley, 385 F. App’x 135, 144 (3d Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential) (citing Univ. of Md. at Balt., 923 F.2d at 273-74).

See also Univ. of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 275–76 (3d Cir. 1991)(“The general rule regarding simultaneous litigation of similar issues in both state and federal courts is that both actions may proceed until one has come to judgment, at which point that judgment may create a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the other action.”).

See also Univ. of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 275-76 (3d Cir. 1991)(“The general rule regarding simultaneous litigation of similar issues in both state and federal courts is that both actions may proceed until one has come to judgment, at which point that judgment may create a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the other action.”).’ Another factor weighs against a too-early stay or dismissal.

But, “[t}]he general rule regarding simultaneous litigation of similar issues in both state and federal courts is that both actions may proceed until one has come to judgment, at which point that judgment may create a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the other action.” Univ. of Md. at Baltimore Cty. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 275-76 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing McClelland v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910); Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 554 (1877)).

See, e.g., Univ. of Md. at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 276 (3d Cir. 1991) (“While certain issues to be litigated in the... federal claim may be identical to issues that have or will be raised ... in state court, the lack of identity of all issues necessarily precludes Colorado River abstention”); see also Cerelli v. Cooper, Civ.

University of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 276 (3d Cir.1991).

Furthermore, “Burford abstention may be ordered in insurer insolvency cases only when one of the parties to the action in which the federal court abstains is the insolvent insurer or its receiver, trustee, officers, and the like.” University of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Company, 923 F.2d 265, 271 (3rd Cir.1991).

Cases are distinct when there is a “lack of identity of all the issues,” University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 268-69 (3d Cir.1991), and when the claims, parties or requested relief differs.

That court found that, while certain issues to be litigated in the federal action would be similar to those raised in the state proceeding, “the lack of identity of all issues necessarily precludefd] Colorado River abstention.” Univ. of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 276.

In so holding, the court characterized the connection between the claim and the state regulatory apparatus as “simply too attenuated to justify renunciation of a federal court’s obligation to exercise the jurisdiction granted to it by Congress.” Id. at 271.

See e.g., Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.1993); University of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Co.,. 923 F.2d 265, 271-72 (3rd Cir.1991); Duane v. Government Employees Ins.

Compare Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 882-84 (1st Cir.1993) (stating that “NOPSI cabins the operation of the Bwrford doctrine”; court did not abstain) and Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1505 (8th Cir.1992) (refusing to apply the Bwrford doctrine and concluding that NOPSI undermined -prior cases applying Burford) and University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 272 (3d Cir.1991) (intimating that NOPSI might have undermined the Third Circuit’s pr…

See Peat Marwick Main, 923 F.2d at 272.

See University of Md. _____ ___ _________________ v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 271-72 (3d Cir. 1991). _______________________ 7The estates of insolvent insurance companies are exempt from the operation of the federal bankruptcy laws.

See University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 271-72 (3d Cir.1991). 7 .

Co. v. Chatterjee, 636 F.2d 37 , 41 (3d Cir. 1980)); see also Univ. of Md. at Balt. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 276 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that abstention is inappropriate where there is a “lack of identity of all issues” between lawsuits and “no theoretical obstacle to both actions proceeding independently”).

See Univ. of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 275 (3d Cir.1991).

See University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. , 923 F.2d 265 , 275 (3d Cir. 1991) (Court of Appeals can affirm the judgment below on any ground, including a ground not relied upon in the decision below).

See University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 275 (3d Cir.1991) (Court of Appeals can affirm the judgment below on any ground, *849 including a ground not relied upon in the decision below).

See also University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 272 (3d Cir.1991) (reaffirming the Third Circuit’s statement in Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives v. Farmers Cheese Coop., 583 F.2d 104, 111 (3d Cir.1978), that traditionally, abstention is proper only in cases involving equitable relief, and trying to harmonize that statement with Lac D’Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d 1033 , 1044-45 (3d Cir.1988), which permitted Burford ab…

See University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 273-274 (3d Cir.1991) (distinguishing between a claim that is personal to an individual shareholder and one that is derivative of the insolvent insurer’s loss); see also In re Bane, 426 B.R. 152, 157-158 (Bankr.

Such circumstances are rare given the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Id; see also Univ. of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 275–76 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The general rule regarding simultaneous litigation of similar issues in both state and federal courts is that both actions may proceed until one has come to judgment, at which point that judgment may create a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect…

See also Univ. of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 275–76 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The general rule regarding simultaneous litigation of similar issues in both state and federal courts is that both actions may proceed until one has come to judgment, at which point that judgment may create a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the other action.”).

Motion to Stay “The rule is well recognized that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 , 96 S.Ct. 1236 , 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) (hereinafter “Colorado River ”); accord University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 275-76 (3d Cir.1991) (“The general rule regarding simultaneous litig…

Three courts of appeals have held that because abstention under Colorado River applies only to instances of concurrent jurisdiction between a federal court and a state court, a “district court has no discretion to stay proceedings as to claims within exclusive federal jurisdiction.” Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 433 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.1982)); Medema v. Medema Builders, Inc., 854 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir…

See, e.g., Univ. of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 271 (3d Cir.1991) (holding Burford abstention only applicable when the insolvent insurer is one of the parties); Glushakow v. Confederation Life Ins.

The court also finds that Grimes’ precedential value is suspect because “Grimes was based mainly on Second Circuit authority *335 which ‘adopted a broad view of abstention’ ... [and] NOPSI does not permit a broad view of abstention.” Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497 (8th Cir.1992) (citation omitted); see Univ. of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 , 272 (3d Cir.1991) (“It is clear that, after NOPSI, federal courts should be more wary of extending the sco…