Confederated Tribes Of The Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Manuel Lujan (1991)

See Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498 (“Even partial success by the plaintiffs could subject both the Quinault Nation and the federal government to substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent legal obligations.”).

See Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498 ("Even partial success by the plaintiffs could subject both the Quinault Nation and the federal government to substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent legal obligations.").

See Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1317 (absent tribes are necessary parties to constitutional challenge to the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act); Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498 (Quinault Indian Nation is a necessary party to action challenging the Quinaults' governing authority); Makah, 910 F.2d at 559 (absent tribes are necessary parties to Makah's challenge to Department of Interior's intertribal fish allocation decision); McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir.19…

Although Rule 19(b) contemplates balancing the factors, “when the necessary party is immune from suit, there may be ‘very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor.’” Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1499).

Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498.

The district court correctly observed that “if SRP were to ignore [the] injunction, [Dawavendewa] and others like him would not receive the employment they seek,” whereas “[i]f SRP were to comply with the injunction, the Navajo Nation would be likely to take action against SRP under its lease.” We faced a similar situation in Confederated Tribes where we addressed an action *1156 brought by various Indian Tribes against federal officials challenging the United States’ contin…

See Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1317 (absent tribes are necessary parties to constitutional challenge to the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act); Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498 (Quinault Indian Nation is a necessary party to action challenging the Quinaults’ governing authority); Makah, 910 F.2d at 559 (absent tribes are necessary parties to Makah’s challenge to Department of Interior’s inter-tribal fish allocation decision); McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir.1…

Chehalis Indians, 928 F.2d at 1498; Makah Indians, 910 F.2d at 558-59 .

Chehalis Indians, 928 F.2d at 1498; Makah Indians, 910 F.2d at 558-59 . 45 Here, Stock West apparently concedes that the Tribe is an entity that should be joined if feasible.

Ass’n. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir.1994) (“[E]ven if the Association obtained its requested relief in [a dispute over which group of Indians are beneficial owners of a certain piece of property], it would not have complete relief, since judgment against the government would not bind the [other group of Indians], which could assert its right to possess the [property].”); Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9t…

See, e.g., Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1500 ("Courts have recognized that a plaintiff's interest in litigating a claim may be outweighed by a tribe's interest in maintaining its sovereign immunity."); Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 558 ("[L]ack of an alternative forum does not automatically prevent dismissal of a suit.

If the necessary party is immune from suit, there may be "very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor." Id. at 1499. 43 Based on the need to protect tribal sovereignty and because the factors do not clearly weigh in favor of allowing Kescoli to proceed with her action, the district court correctly determined that the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe are indispensable parties. 5.

See, e.g., Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1500 (“Courts have recognized that a plaintiff’s interest in litigating a claim may be outweighed by a tribe’s interest in maintaining its sovereign immunity.”); Ma-kah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 558 (“[L]ack of an alternative forum does not automatically prevent dismissal of a suit.

See, e.g., Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459-60 (9th Cir.1994) (governing tribe of reservation is necessary and indispensable party to suit challenging agency decision that fractional interests in trust property escheat-ed to governing tribe under federal statute); Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498 (Quinault Indian Nation is necessary and indispensable party to suit challenging the United States’ continuing recognition of Quinault Indian Nation as the …

Cf. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir.1991) (applying the four factors in Rule 19(b) in determining whether an Indian tribe, a necessary party immune from suit, is an indispensable party). 9 .

As was the case in Confederated Tribes, "the United States cannot adequately represent the [absent tribes'] interest without compromising the trust obligations owed to the plaintiff tribes." 928 F.2d at 1500. 23 Nor are the intervenor members of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council capable of adequately representing the interests of the absent tribes.

As was the case in Confederated Tribes, “the United States cannot adequately represent the [absent tribes’] interest without compromising the trust obligations owed to the plaintiff tribes.” 928 F.2d at 1500.

See Makah, 910 F.2d at 559 ; Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Rsrv. v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496 , 1500 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he United States cannot adequately represent the [absent tribe’s] interest without compromising the trust obligations owed to the plaintiff tribes.”).

While Virginia Surety has standing to bring this suit, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the case because of Virginia Surety’s failure to join Paumanock. ‘Whethér á non-party is ‘indispensable’ is determined by application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.” Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir.1991).

But the "lack of an alternative forum does not automatically prevent dismissal of a suit." Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted).

If the necessary party is immune from suit, there may be “very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor.” Id. at 1499.

See Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1458 (9th Cir.1994); Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir.1991); Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558-59 (9th Cir.1990).

“The inquiry is a practical, fact-specific one, designed to avoid the harsh results of rigid application.” Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1154 -55 (citing Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 558 ); Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498 (“There is no precise formula for determining whether a particular non-par ty is necessary to an action.

Ass’n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir.1994); Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1499 (“Indian tribes ... are sovereign entities and are therefore immune from nonconsensual actions in state or federal court.”).

See Pit River Home, 30 F.3d at 1101 (finding that the United States cannot adequately represent the interests of tribe because case involved “intertribal conflicts” which could subject the Government to “inconsistent duties or obligations”); Quileute, 18 F.3d at 1460 (“In disputes involving intertribal conflicts, the United States cannot properly represent any of the tribes without compromising its trust obligations owed to all tribes.”); Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1318 (“it is u…

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that some courts have held "that when the necessary party is immune from suit, there is very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor." Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1499, citing, Enterprise Mgt.

But the facts in Peabody Western Coal and Confederated Tribes are not akin to those before the Court 27 Dkt. 296 at 31. 28 See Alto, 738 F.3d at 1127 (finding a tribe’s presence does not preclude complete relief where “the injury complained of in the first three causes of action is the [Bureau of Indian Affairs]’s violation of the [Administrative Procedure Act] in carrying out a responsibility delegated to it by the [Tribe], under the [Tribe’s] own Constitution”). 29 Id. at …

Rule 19(a) “provides a two-pronged inquiry for determining whether a party is 14 ‘necessary.’” White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Confederated 15 Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498.

The determination is heavily influenced by the facts and circumstances of each case.” Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir.1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted) [hereinafter Chehalis ].

See Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498 (“judgment against the federal officials would not be binding on the [tribe], which could continue to assert sovereign powers and managément responsibilities over the reservation”).

The Ninth Circuit has noted that when the necessary party is immune from suit, there may be “very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor.” Quileute, 18 F.3d at 1460 (quoting Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir.1991)).

Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498.

Chehalis Indian Reservation, 928 F.2d at 1499-1500 (“[t]ribes are sovereign entities immune from nonconsensual actions in state or federal court.”); and Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 557 (waiver of sovereign immunity must be explicit).

Lujan, 928 F.2d at 1498.

P. 13(h) advisory committee note to 1966 amendment (emphasis added). 1 Circuit opinion, which stated that “[t]he completeness of relief [under Rule 19] must be 2 analyzed within…the four corners of the complaint.” Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian 3 Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1991) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part 4 and dissenting in part) (internal quotations omitted). 5 Footnote 3 in the Lujan concurrence further states: “[I]t must be note…

Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1991).

Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498.

The determination is heavily influenced by the facts and 6 circumstances of each case.” Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. 7 Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 8 Because, as discussed below, the facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that the 9 Rincon Band is not a necessary party under either subpart of Rule 19(a)(1), the Court need 10 not reach the second and third steps of the inquiry.

However, some courts have noted that “when the necessary party is immune from suit, there is very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor.” Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir.1991).

Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir.1991).

Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir.1991).

Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 1310 ; Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir.1991).

However, when a necessary party is immune from suit there is little need for balancing the Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b) factors because “immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor.” Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir.1991).

However, when a necessary party is immune from suit there is little need for balancing the Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b) factors because "immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor." Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir.1991).

Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1083-86 (tribal members sought to challenge, on equal protection principles, the terms of proposed leases with an absent tribe pursuant to an agreement entered into' by the absent tribe); Pit River, 30 F.3d at 1092-94 , (group of Indian familifes sought a declaration that they were the beneficial owners of a certain piece of real property despite the Secretary of the Interior’s declaration that the absent tribe was the beneficial owner); Quileute, 18 F.3…

Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1500-01 (9th Cir.1991) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the relevant question for Rule 19(a) must be whether success in the litigation can afford the plaintiffs the relief for which they have prayed.”).

Lujan, 928 F.2d at 1500 (a tribal defendant’s sovereign immunity may outweigh a plaintiffs interest in the litigation); Makah, 910 F.2d at 560 (“lack of an alternative forum does not automatically prevent dismissal”); Kescoli , 101 F.3d at *1031 1311 (protection of tribal sovereignty weighs heavily in Rule 19 analysis).

See Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496 , 1499 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Indian tribes ... are sovereign entities and are therefore immune from nonconsensual actions in state or federal court."). 4 .

Susenkewa v. Kleppe, 425 U.S. 903 (1976); Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.1989); Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir.1991); Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lujan, 728 F.Supp. 791, 796-797 (D.D.C.1990). 45 A forthright analysis of Plaintiff's complaint compels the conclusion that the a…

Alternatively, when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, complete relief 15 cannot be accorded if an absent third party would not be bound by the proposed injunction, 16 thereby preventing the injunction’s intended result with respect to the plaintiff. 17 Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1156–57; see Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Rsrv. v. 18 Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1991). 19 2.