Alvin Hill, Cross-Appellant v. Lee Roy Black, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, Cross-Appellees (1991)

But see Hill v. Black , 920 F.2d 249 , 250 (5th Cir. 1990), modified on other grounds on denial of reh'g , 932 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the court has jurisdiction to reach issues unaddressed by the Supreme Court's mandate on remand).

Such an obvious statement by the Mississippi Supreme Court that state law precluded consideration of Bell’s claim easily constitutes reliance on an independent state-law ground. 9 Because the state’s highest court relied on that ground, we defer to its denial of relief. 10 Bell could have sought to excuse his state court procedural default by showing cause and prejudice or by demonstrating that ignoring the federal claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. …

Bell points to no “objective external factor [that] impeded the defense counsel’s ability to comply with the state’s procedural rules,” Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 372-73 (5th Cir. 1991), nor does he claim to be actually innocent, see id.

However, rather than seeking fees from the plaintiffs, Judge Wood sought fees against the named defendant, the State of Texas, on the grounds that the “Texas attorney general could not have won the case without her and that he did not adequately defend her interests or perform his official duties.” LULAC, 932 F.2d at 369.

Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir.1991).

Counsel is not required “to anticipate a state appellate court’s willingness to reconsider a prior holding” or a federal habeas court’s willingness to “repudiate an established rule.” Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir.1991).

Similarly, the procedural default is not “adequate” if the state courts themselves bypass the petitioner’s default and consider his claims on the merits, see, e.g., Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 , 981, 109 S.Ct. 309 , 530, 102 L.Ed.2d 328 , 562 (1988), if the procedural rule appears to be discretionary, see, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 , 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1987 , 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988); Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d…

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 753 , 111 S.Ct. at *846 2566; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 , 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 , 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (holding that proof of ineffective assistance by counsel satisfies the “cause” prong of the exception to the procedural default doctrine); Matchett v. Dretke, 380 F.3d at 848-49 (recognizing that ineffective assistance by counsel on direct appeal satisfies the “cause” portion of the “cause and actual prejudice” exception to proced…

See Sawyers v. Collins, 986 F.2d at 1499-1500 . [48] See Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d at 220-21 ; Glover v. Cain, 128 F.3d at 902 ; Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 858, 859 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134 , 118 S.Ct. 1091 , 140 L.Ed.2d 147 (1998); Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d at 847; Reed v. Scott, 70 F.3d at 846; and Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d at 339 . [49] See Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d at 860 ; and Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d at 342 . [50] See Glover v. Cain, 128 F.3d at 902 …

See Pitts v. Anderson, 122 F.3d at 279 , (recognizing that proof of ineffective assistance will satisfy the cause test); Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d at 849; and Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 372-73 (5th Cir.1991). .

See Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d at 849; and Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 372-73 (5th Cir.1991). 82 .

In Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir.1992), the court determined that a state court rule that appears to be discretionary cannot act as a bar to federal review, (citing, inter alia, Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 , 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1987 , 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (“state procedural ground is not adequate unless the procedural rule is strictly, or regularly followed”) (quoting Hathom v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 , 102 S.Ct. 2421, 2426 , 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1…

To establish cause, a party is required to show that “some objective external factor impeded the defense counsel’s ability to comply with the state’s procedural rules or to show a prior determination of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 372-73 (5th Cir.1991).

Counsel is not required “to anticipate a state appellate court’s willingness to reconsider a prior holding” or a federal habeas court’s willingness to “repudiate an established rule.” Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1991).

See id.

See Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir.1991).

Estelle McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 , 41 A984) (“A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.”) Federal courts ““do not sit as a ‘super’ state supreme court’ in [a habeas corpus ] proceeding to review errors under state law.” Dickerson, 932 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Martin v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 356, 357 (5" Cir. 1970)). -2|- “A state court’…