Carter v. Johnson (1900)

“It is well settled that a judgment of the ordinary setting apart a year’s support is a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, and the presumption is that everything necessary to authorize the rendition of such judgment was properly done.” Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 112 Ga. 494, 495 (1) ( 37 SE 767 ).

“The presumption is that everything necessary to authorize the rendition of such judgment was properly done.” Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 112 Ga. 494, 495 ( 37 S. E. 767 ), and cit.

“When a year’s support is set apart to a widow, it becomes hers absolutely and unconditionally, and she can sell or dispose of it just as any other person might dispose of his property.” Lowe v. Webb, 85 Ga. 733 ( 11 S. E. 845 ); Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 112 Ga. 494, 497 ( 37 S. E. 767 ).

Viewed in this light, so far from anything said here being inharmonious with the rulings announced in Lowe v. Webb, 85 Ga. 731, 733 ( 11 S. E. 845 ), and Stringfellow v. String fellow, 112 Ga. 494, 497 ( 37 S. E. 767 ), the carefully guarded language in which that ruling is stated supports the proposition that there is in fact no year’s support and the year’s support is a mere contingency until it has been set apart by the ordinary.

See Tower v. Ellsworth, 112 Ga. 460 (1, 2) ( 37 SE 736 ); Ingalls v. Lamar, 115 Ga. 296 (2) ( 41 SE 573 ); Hall v. Holman, 15 Ga. App. 659 (2) ( 84 SE 174 ); Colclough v. Walker, 19 Ga. App. 23 (1) ( 90 SE 742 ); Schoeld’s Sons Co. v. Vaughn, 40 Ga. App. 568 ( 150 SE 569 ).

See Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 112 Ga. 494 ( 37 SE 767 ) (1900); Ranger Constr.

See also Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 112 Ga. 494, 497 ; Bardwell v. Edwards, 117 Ga. 825 .

See Carter v. Johnson, 112 Ga. 494 , following Dietz v. Fahy, 107 Ga. 325 , and the cases therein cited. 2.

See, in this connection, Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 112 Ga. 494 . 3.