Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises (1992)

Id. ("[T]here is not a sufficient nexus between ... [the] list ... for the purpose of soliciting votes in a proxy contest and the provision of benefits....").

That section provides that the Administrator, as fiduciary to the Plan, 4 must discharge his duties of plan administration “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and — (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan....” ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(A). 5 We interpret the fiduciary duties under ERISA by “ ‘bearing in mind …

Cf. Acosta, 950 F.2d at 620 (considering whether a participant-shareholder list was a plan asset).

As we have previously recognized, Congress intended § 404 to use “ ‘the common law of trusts to define the general scope of [a fiduciary’s] authority and responsibility.’ ” Acosta, 950 F.2d at 618 (alteration in original) (quoting Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 , 105 S.Ct. 2833, 2839 , 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985)).

Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir. 1991) (“To determine whether a particular item constitutes an ‘asset of the plan,’ it is necessary to determine whether the item in question may be used to the benefit (financial or otherwise) of the fiduciary at the expense of plan participants or beneficiaries.”).

Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir. 1991) (“To determine whether a particular item constitutes an ‘asset of the plan,’ it is necessary to determine whether the item in question may be used to the benefit (financial or otherwise) of the fiduciary at the expense of plan participants or beneficiaries.”).

Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 619 (9th Cir. 1991) (as amended).

Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir. 1991)), that definition assumes fiduciary status and is thus not helpful in determining whether a party is in fact a fiduciary under 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (A)(21)(i). 22 THE DEPOT V.

Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991), as amended on reh’g (Jan. 23, 1992).

Enter., 950 F.2d 611, 619 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a fiduciary is affirmatively required to “inform beneficiaries of circumstances that threaten the funding of benefits”).

Id. at 618-19 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 34 The final sentence in this quoted passage reflects the holding of Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir.1987).

Id. at 618-19 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir. 1991).

It does include all items in the nature of quick assets, such as cash, checks and other negotiable instruments ....”) Furthermore, “[t]o determine whether a particular item constitutes an ‘asset of the plan,’ it is necessary to determine whether the item in question may be used to the benefit (financial or otherwise) of the fiduciary at the expense of plan participants or beneficiaries.” Acosta, 950 F.2d at 620; Kayes v. Pac.

See, e.g., Farr v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 151 F.3d 908, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty when fiduciary provided information regarding tax consequences of electing an early retirement option, but left out known facts regarding possible adverse tax consequences); Barker v. American Mobil Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an ERISA fiduciary has a duty to investigate suspicions he has with respect to plan funding an…

Id. at 1418 ; Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991). 10 While the express terms of the Service Agreement between CSA and PPI provided that PPI was not a fiduciary of the Plan, CSA contends that PPI became one by virtue of its actions subsequent to its hire.

Id. at 1418 ; Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir.1991).

Id. at 1006 (citing Acosta v. Pacific Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Mertens, 508 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2071 ; Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 617-18 (9th Cir.1991); see also Concha, 62 F.3d at 1501-02 ("there need not be an express delegation of fiduciary [authority] for persons performing duties of a fiduciary nature to be considered fiduciaries").

Mertens , 508 U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2071 ; Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 617-18 (9th Cir.1991); see also Concha, 62 F.3d at 1501-02 (“there need not be an express delegation of fiduciary [authority] for persons performing duties of a fiduciary nature to be considered fiduciaries”).

To determine whether a particular item constitutes an "asset of the plan," it is necessary to determine whether the item in question may be used to the benefit (financial or otherwise) of the fiduciary at the expense of plan participants or beneficiaries. 109 Id. at 620 (citations omitted).

Instead, the plaintiff must show that the defendant fiduciary engaged in “self-dealing” by “actually us[ing] its power to deal with the assets of the plan for its own benefit or account.” Acosta, 950 F.2d at 621.

ERISA provides no explicit definition of “plan assets.” See Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir.1991).

Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 12 1991).

Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir. 1991), as amended on 20 reh’g (Jan. 23, 1992) (“ERISA does not expressly define the term “assets of the plan.”). 21 In the section for ERISA definitions, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (43) says that “the term ‘plan assets’ 22 means plan assets as defined by such regulations as the Secretary may describe.” 23 Unfortunately, the Secretary of Labor has not defined plan assets in terms of employer 24 contributions -- whether vested or nonvested.

Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 619 (9th Cir. 1991).

Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir. 1991).

Id. at 1140 (‘Thus, if Parker in fact exercised any discretionary authority over Plan assets, then he was a fiduciary, regardless whether the Plan itself named him as such.’); Acosta v. Pacific Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating the statutory language ‘makes clear that a ^person’s actions, not the official designation of his role, determine whether he enjoys fiduciary status.’).” In Hecht , the court held that, the defendant’s fiduciary status was suffici…

Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir.1991), as amended on reh’g (Jan. 23, 1992); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir.1987); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 126 (7th Cir.1984).

The Ninth Circuit has also held that “an ERISA fiduciary has an affirmative duty to inform beneficiaries of circumstances that threaten the funding of benefits” and “to provide an individual faced with termination of plan coverage, upon request, ‘complete and correct material information on [his] status and options.’ ” Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 619 (9th Cir.1991), as amended by 1992 U.S.App.

Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611 , 618 (9th Cir.1991), the Ninth Circuit stated that while an ERISA “plan itself cannot be sued for breach of fiduciary duty”, this “does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that a plan cannot be properly named in a suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty.” Indeed, the court concluded “even though Acosta cannot sue the SoCal Gas Plan for breach of fiduciary duty per se, he may, as he has done here, join the Plan in his action for breach of fiduciary…

This two-pronged test conforms to the approach outlined by the Ninth Circuit in Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir.1991), where the first prong (i.e., the relationship between the item held and the entity’s fiduciary status) was implied, and the second prong was explicit.

This functional approach emphasizes that the acts or responsibilities, not the job title or whether they performed those acts on someone else’s behalf, controls whether fiduciary liability exists. “[A] person’s actions, not the official designation of his role, determined whether he enjoys fiduciary status.” Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir.1991).

Acosta, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir.1991).

Patient Advocates relies on Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir.1991), where the court said that "[i]n order to determine whether a particular item constitutes an 'asset of the plan,’ it is necessary to determine whether the item in question may be used to the benefit (financial or otherwise) of the fiduciary at the expense of the plan participants or beneficiaries.” Acosta involved allegations of fiduciary self-dealing, allegations not present in this …

Mertens, 508 U.S. at 260-62 ; Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 617-18 (9th Cir.1991).

Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618-19 (9th Cir.1991).

Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir.1991); Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1574 (11th Cir.1991) (ERISA defines fiduciary not simply in terms of designated offices, but also more flexibly, with reference to the functions preformed by a person).

See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 , 109 S.Ct. 948, 954 , 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir.1991); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins.

See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 , 109 S.Ct. 948, 954 , 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir.1991); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins.

Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir.1992); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d at 278 .

However, common law trust duties regarding the disclosure of information to beneficiaries [or participants] may be read into ERISA ... only to the extent that they relate to the provision of benefits or the defrayment of expenses, and only insofar as they do not contradict or supplant the existing reporting and disclosure provisions.” Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618-19 (9th Cir.1991), amended on rehear *911 ing, 1992 U.S.App.

Id. at 620.

Id. at 618. 7 While it is difficult to envision a situation in which a plan (not its administrators) could act as a fiduciary, this Court need not decide whether a plan can or cannot act as a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA. 8 Even assuming a plan can act as a fiduciary, I find that the defendant plans in this case are not fiduciaries with respect to the management, control or administration of Fund F assets.

The Ninth Circuit held in Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir.1991): ERISA does not expressly define the term “assets of the plan.” Nor has this circuit had an occasion to delineate the precise boundaries of the terms it is used in section 406(b)(1).

The Ninth Circuit held in Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir.1991): ERISA does not expressly define the term "assets of the plan." Nor has this circuit had an occasion to delineate the precise boundaries of the terms it is used in section 406(b)(1).

However, section 404(a) further provides that a fiduciary must discharge its duties “for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” Acosta, 950 F.2d at 618 (citations omitted).

See Acosta v. Pacific Enters. , 950 F.2d 611 , 617 (9th Cir.1991).

See Acosta , 950 F.2d at 618 (holding that "to the extent that a plaintiff seeks to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan, the plan may be named as a defendant").