Chapple v. Hight (1926)

See Chapple v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 631 (1) ( 131 SE 505 ) (1926) (“The law compels an election between inconsistent remedies.”). where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of an action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.” Standridge v. Spillers, 263 Ga. App. 401, 403 (1) ( 587 SE2d 862 ) (2003) (punctuation omitted).

See OCGA § 5-6-38; Truelove v. Buckley, 318 Ga. App. 207, 212-213 (2) ( 733 SE2d 499 ) (2012). 161 Ga. 629, 632 (1) ( 131 SE 505 ) (1926) (“[A]s a general rule[,] courts can not create liens; and yet a special lien on specific property may be decreed whenever under the rules of equity the circumstances require this remedy.”).

See OCGA § 5-6-38; Truelove v. Buckley, 318 Ga. App. 207, 212-213 (2) ( 733 SE2d 499 ) (2012). 16 161 Ga. 629, 632 (1) ( 131 SE 505 ) (1926) (“[A]s a general rule[,] courts can not create liens; and yet a special lien on specific property may be decreed whenever under the rules of equity the circumstances require this remedy.”). 14 decision.

News 2409, 2411. [6] "[A]ny ambiguity in § 1360 should be construed in favor of the Indians... ." In re Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292, 296 (N.D.Cal. 1977). [1] See Houck v. Kroger Co., 555 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.Civ.App. 1977); Chapple v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629 , 131 S.E. 505, 506 (1926).

In Lovell v. Frankum, 145 Ga. 106 ( 88 SE 569 ), it was held: "In an action for damages for breach of contract to give a note, with deed to secure it for money loaned, in the absence of any special facts authorizing equitable relief, the plaintiff is not entitled to a special lien on the land for damages which he may recover." In Chapple v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 632 ( 131 SE 505 ), it was said: "We agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error that as a general rul…

See, e.g., Clover Cable of Ohio v. Heywood, 260 Ga. 341, 344 (1990) (“When a party entitled to a statutory lien has been prevented from perfecting such lien by the acts of the adverse party, it has been held that such party is entitled to an equitable lien for the improvements made on a quantum meruit theory.” (punctuation omitted)). 35 charge or encumbrance upon the [property].”); Chapple v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 632 (1926) (“[A] special lien on specific property may be decre…

An injunction may issue where, as here, it is necessary “to preserve the status until the true rights of all the parties are ascertained. . . .” Chappie v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 632 (1) ( 131 SE 505 ) (1926).

As in all equity actions, the jury may decree a special or equitable lien on specific property “whenever under the rules of equity the circumstances require this remedy.” Chapple v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 632 ( 131 SE 505 ) (1926); Routon v. Woodbury Banking Co., 209 Ga. 706, 707-708 ( 75 SE2d 561 ) (1953); see First Nat.

Further, our Supreme Court has held that “a special lien on specific property may be decreed whenever under the rules of equity the circumstances require this remedy.” Chapple v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 632 ( 131 SE 505 ); Murphey, Taylor &c., Inc. v. Williams, 223 Ga. 99, 104 ( 153 SE2d 542 ).

Chapple v. Right, 161 Ga. 629, 631 ( 131 S. E. 505 ).

Co. v. Triad Drywall, LLC, 321 Ga. App. 451, 453-54 (1) ( 739 SE2d 493 ) (2013) (“[A] party to a contract may waive a contractual right, and . . . any such waiver may be accomplished expressly or implicitly through the party’s conduct.”). 12 his election between two inconsistent rights.”12 Specifically, acting on the theory that the contract is still in force, “as by continuing performance, demanding or urging further performance, or permitting the other party to perform and…