Jennings v. Suggs (1935)

Moreover, “may” is not invariably construed as permissive, rather than mandatory. “[W]here the word as used concerns the pub- *165 lie interest or affects the rights of third persons, it shall be construed to mean ‘must' or ‘shall.’ ” OCGA § 1-3-3 (10). “ ‘In the construction of statutes, may is held to mean shall . . . where the thing to be done “is for the sake of justice, or for the public benefit.” ’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141, 142 (1)…

Garrison v. Perkins, 137 Ga. 744, 755 ( 74 SE 541 ); Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141, 142 ( 178 SE 282 ); Harrell v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 709, 720 ( 10 SE2d 386 ).

They also did not use the word “obligatory” as it appears in the two sections of the act of 1854, supra. This does not weaken, however, the imperative character of the duty laid upon the trial judge and upon this court in dealing with the effect of a refusal to give a requested charge, for the reason that “In the construction of statutes, may is held to mean shall in two cases, viz.: where the thing to be done fis for the sake of justice, or for the public benefit.” Weems v.…

Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141, 142 ( 178 S. E. 282 ); Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway Co. v. Sasser, 130 Ga. 394 ( 60 S. E. 997 ); Whitley v. State, 134 Ga. 758, 772 ( 68 S. E. 716 ); Smith v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 46 Ga. App. 456 ( 167 S. E. 769 ); Tucker v. Thomasville, 53 Ga. App. 226 ( 185 S. E. 398 ); 25 R.

See also Birdsong & Sledge v. Brooks, 7 Ga. 88, 89 (1). “ ‘In the construction of statutes, may is held to mean shall in two cases, viz., where the thing to be done “is for the sake of justice, or for the public benefit.” ’ Weems v. Farrell, 33 Ga. 413, 419 .” Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141 (1), 142 ( 178 SE 282 ). *389 Decided May 8, 1997.

See Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141 , 178 S.E. 282 (1935), Ewing v. Union Central Bank, 254 Ky. 623 , 72 S.W.2d 4 (1934).

See Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141 ( 178 SE 282 ) (1935).