Stolte v. Fagan (2012)

Relying on Stolte, the defendants assert that even if a timely objection was required to preserve the error for ordinary appellate review, appellate courts may still consider “whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed the result of the trial.” 20 291 Ga. at 483 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Stolte, 291 Ga. at 482 (2) (a), 483 (2) (b).

In its opinion, the Supreme Court characterized both the reputation comments and the trust comments as improper. 291 Ga. at 482 (2) (a),483 (2) (b).

Consequently, our appellate review of this issue is limited to “whether the improper argument [s] in reasonable probability changed the result of the trial.” Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 483 (2) (b) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012) (citation omitted).

Berryhill relies on Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 479-483 (2) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012), disapproved of on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686 , 706 n. 3 ( 820 SE2d 640 ) (2018), to support his assertion that this Court can review the improper 2 closing argument despite his failure to object.

At one 3 See Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 708 (12) ( 820 SE2d 640 ) (2018) (“[T]he trial court’s erroneous failure to excuse a prospective juror for cause, as shown by that juror’s voir dire responses, cannot serve as the basis for reversal on appeal unless that juror served on the defendant’s twelve-person jury.”), overruling Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 478-479 (1) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012) (“[L]itigants — criminal and civil — are entitled to the removal of unqualified jur…

Although CVS argues that it can still challenge the closing argument based on Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 479-483 (2) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012), we note that, after the briefs were filed in this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia overruled Stolte in its decision in Williams v. Harvey, 311 Ga. 439, 447-451 (1) (b) ( 858 SE2d 479 ) (2021), and so that case does not help CVS and did not influence our analysis. 26

See Caldwell v. State, 304 Ga. 51, 54 (2) ( 816 SE2d 13 ) (2018); Gray v. State, 298 Ga. 885, 887 (2) n.3 ( 785 SE2d 517 ) (2016); Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 273 (4) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015); Spears v. State, 296 Ga. 598, 608 (7) ( 769 SE2d 337 ) (2015); Nwakanma v. State, 296 Ga. 493, 500 (5) ( 768 SE2d 503 ) (2015); Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 379 (7) ( 744 SE2d 738 ) (2013); Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 140 (8) (b) ( 735 SE2d 736 ) (2012); Rice v. State, 292 Ga…

J., and Mercier, J., concur. 1 See Fuller v. Flash Foods, 298 Ga. App. 217 ( 679 SE2d 775 ) (2009) (on appeal from a jury’s verdict, we construe the evidence with every presumption and inference in favor of upholding the verdict). . 2 Joseph v. State, 231 Ga. App. 399, 403 (2) ( 498 SE2d 808 ) (1998) (citation omitted). 3 Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 483 (2) (b) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 4 See All Fleet Refinishing v. West Ga. Nat.

McMillian, J., concurs in judgment only. 1 See Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 478-479 (1) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012). 2 Guoth v. Hamilton, 273 Ga. App. 435, 438 (1) ( 615 SE2d 239 ) (2005). 3 Elliott v. Home Depot U. S. A., 275 Ga. App. 865, 867 (2) ( 622 SE2d 77 ) (2005) (footnote omitted). 4 Guoth, supra (citation omitted). 5 Cambron v. State, 164 Ga. 111, 113-114 ( 137 SE 780 ) (1927); see Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177, 178 ( 563 SE2d 847 ) (2002). 6 During general questioning, J…

Relying upon Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 481 (2) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012), Pulte argues that once the trial court sustained its objection, the trial court was required under OCGA § 9-10-185 to issue a curative instruction.

Accord Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 483 (2) (b) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012).

See Kelley v. Purcell, 301 Ga. App. 88, 91 ( 686 SE2d 879 ) (2009) (holding that despite defense attorney’s violation of collateral source rule during closing arguments, issue was waived for appeal by failure to object at the time argument was made); see also Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 482 (2) (b) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012) (“The proper time to object to improper argument is when it occurs.

See Kelley v. Purcell, 301 Ga. App. 88, 91 ( 686 SE2d 879 ) (2009) (holding that despite defense attorney’s violation of collateral source rule during closing arguments, issue was waived for appeal by failure to object at the time argument was made); see also Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 482 (2) (b) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012) (“The proper time to object to improper argument is when it occurs.

See Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 478 (1) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012); Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464, 465 (2) ( 339 SE2d 712 ) (1986).

“Where a party fails to object to certain inadmissible evidence, but later objects to substantially the same evidence, the objection should be overruled because the failure to object the first time makes this harmless error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Phelps v. Huff, 214 Ga. App. 398, 402 (2) (a) ( 448 SE2d 64 ) (1994); see also Bell v. Bell, 210 Ga. 295, 296-297 (4) ( 79 SE2d 524 ) (1954) (there is no ground for reversal where challenged evidence was previously a…

See Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477 (2) (b) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012); Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717 (6) ( 594 SE2d 631 ) (2004). 4.

See Stolte v. Fagan, 291 14 Ga. 477, 478 (1) ( 731 SE2d 653 ) (2012); Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464, 465 (2) ( 339 SE2d 712 ) (1986).