Cluster 574995 (1992)

Id. at 1278.

Rather than categorize each phrase the employee uttered, we "consider whether the speech at issue was made primarily in the employee's role as citizen, or primarily in the role of employee." Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 727 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 , 103 S.Ct. at 1690 ); seePearson, 952 F.2d at 1278 ("Pearson's complaints primarily pertained to ... [her employee grievance].

Rather than categorize each phrase the employee uttered, we “consider whether the speech at issue was made primarily in the employee’s role as citizen, or primarily in the role of employee.” Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 727 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 , 103 S.Ct. at 1690 ); see Pearson, 952 F.2d at 1278 (“Pearson’s complaints primarily pertained to ... [her employee grievance].

Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.1992). 27 Viewed in combination, these facts indicate that Gonzalez, even though she was involved in a continuing battle with Moran over Moran’s discriminatory directives, see infra Part IV, wrote this portion of the letter in order to “further her own private interest,” rather than “to raise issues of public concern,” Morgan, 6 F.3d at 754 ; see Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1986) (holding that the public concern req…

Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (11th Cir.1992); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, 922 F.2d 1515 , 1519-20 (11th Cir.1991).

Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (11th Cir.1992); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, 922 F.2d 1515, 1519-20 (11th Cir.1991).

Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 1992).

Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 1992); cf. Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 710 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (providing 13 The Court’s holding in Garcetti directly impacts the second element of a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 1992); cf. Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 710 (11th Cir. 1992) (providing testimony regarding the public disposition of money); Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1992) (campaigning publicly for sheriff candidate); Stewart v. Baldwin Cty.

"The threshold question of whether such speech 'relates to matters of public concern is a question of law, and is therefore, readily susceptible to disposition on summary judgment.' ” See Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority, 952 F.2d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.1992). 20 .

Auth, 952 F.2d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.1992), only a position not easily reconciled with the Seventh Amendment would pretermit the trial of these facts in favor of a judicial termination about the merits of this suit.

In the Eleventh Circuit, it is recognized that “summary judgment is not a proper vehicle for resolving claims of employment discrimination which ... turn on an employer’s motivation and intent.” Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority, 952 F.2d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.1992).

Pearson, 952 F.2d at 1278-79.

Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir.1992); Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633, 637-38 (11th Cir.1991); Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 794 (11th Cir.1989); Worsham v. City of Pasadena, 881 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (5th Cir.1989); Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1404 (8th Cir.1988).

See, e.g., Rahn v. Drake Center, Inc., 31 F.3d 407, 412-15 (6th Cir.1994) (hospital nurse’s press release challenging hospital president’s proposed spending of money raised by tax levy *1425 and new work rules did not touch upon matter of public concern); Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750 (11th Cir.1993) (employee’s claims that her supervisor had engaged in sexual harassment did not constitute speech regarding public concern), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2708 , 129 L.Ed.2d 83…

Autk, 952 F.2d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.1992) (noting that Supreme Court decision applies retroactively to case where final judgment has not been reached); In re Rivers, 89 B.R. 1006, 1007 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1988) (Drake, J.) (holding that Supreme Court Timbers decision did not apply retroactively to case where final order had been entered and not appealed); see also Lee Servicing Co. v. Wolf (In re Wolf), 162 B.R. 98, 105 (Bankr.D.N.J.1993); In re Lesh, 159 B.R. 982, 984 (Bankr.M.D.…

Pearson v. Macan-Bibb County Hospital Auth., 952 F.2d 1274 *1565 (11th Cir.1992); Bausworth, supra, at 1198 .

In Pearson, the court held that because there were genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff's Title VII claim, summary judgment as to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was also necessarily precluded. 952 F.2d at 1281.

Pearson, 952 F.2d at 1279.

Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority, 952 F.2d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir.1992) citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 28, 29 , 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981).

See, e.g., Pearson, 952 F.2d at 1281 (reversing summary judgment on § 1983 equal protection claim of intentional racial discrimination "[f]or the[] same reasons" as reversing summary judgment on Title VII disparate treatment claim because "the substantive elements of proof are the same under both statutes"). 5 19 For this reason, once Title VII was clarified as proscribing intentional same-sex sexual harassment, a reasonable official was given fair notice that such conduct i…

See Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 3 23- 952 F.2d 1274 , 1277–78 (9th Cir. 1979).

See Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority, 952 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir.1992) (noting that the date of the discriminatory act starts the running of the 180-day period); Rucker v. Western Electric Company, 521 F.Supp. 986, 988 (N.D.Fla.1981). 2.