Continental Illinois Securities Litigation v. Continental Illinois Corporation (1992)

But see In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 572-73 (7th Cir.1992) (leaving method of calculation discretionary but expressing a preference for percentage method).

See id. ("Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit could be thought the equivalent of the lawyers' nonlegal but essential case-specific expenses, such as long-distance phone calls, which are reimbursable.").

See id. ("Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit could be thought the equivalent of the lawyers' nonlegal but essential case-specific expenses, such as long-distance phone calls, which are reimbursable.").

See id. (“Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit could be thought the equivalent of the lawyers’ nonlegal but essential case-specific expenses, such as long-distance phone calls, which are reim bursable.”)- Continental Illinois would not justify the damages distribution in this case, as the much higher awards in the consent decree went to a large group of class members, not …

In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d at 571 (ci- tations cleaned up).

In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d at 571 (ci- tations cleaned up).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of 23 Case: 18-12344 Date Filed: 09/17/2020 Page: 24 of 48 reh’g (May 22, 1992), and “to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action” and “to recognize [a class representative’s] willingness to act as a private attorney general,” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948 , 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009).

See, e.g., Kaufman v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., 877 F.3d 276 , 287–88 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming attorney fee award for intervenors who con‐ tributed to settlement approval); Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 8 No. 17‐3541 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that objectors who improve set‐ tlement “will receive a cash award that can be substantial”), citing In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 629 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2011) (increasing class counsel’s fee…

See, e.g., Kaufman v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., 877 F.3d 276 , 287–88 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming attorney fee award for intervenors who con‐ tributed to settlement approval); Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 8 No. 17‐3541 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that objectors who improve set‐ tlement “will receive a cash award that can be substantial”), citing In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 629 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2011) (increasing class counsel’s fee…

See, e.g., Kaufman v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., 877 F.3d 276 , 287–88 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming attorney fee award for intervenors who con‐ tributed to settlement approval); Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 8 No. 17‐3541 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that objectors who improve set‐ tlement “will receive a cash award that can be substantial”), citing In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 629 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2011) (increasing class counsel’s fee…

The Bankses cite to a Seventh Circuit case, Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.), for the proposition that across the-board-fee reductions are inherently an abuse of discretion.

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992) (computer- assisted research expenses); Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639 (photocopying, travel, and telephone calls).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir.1992) (computer-assisted research expenses); Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639 (photocopying, travel, and telephone calls).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The object in awarding a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . is No. 04-3140 3 to give the lawyer what he would have gotten in the way of a fee in an arm’s length negotiation, had one been feasi- ble.”).

Litig., 962 F.2d at 569 (“[R]isk of loss varies over the life of a case.”).

In Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d at 569 (“The judge committed the same error when he refused to allow paralegal services to be compensated at market rates * * * But his mistake went deeper.

Continental Illinois Securities, 962 F.2d at 572 (“This was a contingent fee suit that yielded a recovery for the ‘clients’ (the class members) of $45 million.”).

See Continental, 962 F.2d at 572 (“The object in awarding a reasonable attorneys’ fee . . . is to simulate the market.”); RJR Nabisco, Inc. Sec.

Litig., 962 F.2d at 572 (“The object in awarding a reasonable attorney’s fee ... is to simulate the market where a direct market determination is infeasible.”).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir.1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir.1992) (“The object in awarding a reasonable attorney’s fee * * * is to give the lawyer what he would have gotten in the way of a fee in arm’s length negotiation, had one been feasible.

“The object in awarding a reasonable attorney’s fee ... is to give the lawyer what he would have gotten in the way of a fee in an arm’s length negotiation, had one been feasible.” In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir.1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir.1992); In re Synthroid Marktg.

Litig., 962 F.2d 566 , 571 (7th Cir.1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“We know that in personal-injury suits the usual range for contingent fees is between 33 and 50 percent... .”).

Cal. 2014) (quoting Matter of Continental 17 Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992). (“[I]f reimbursement at market rates is disallowed, the effect will be to induce lawyers to substitute their own, more expensive time for that of ... the computer.”).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992). (“[I]f reimbursement at market rates is disallowed, the effect will be to induce lawyers to substitute their own, more expensive time for that of ... the computer.”).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992), “the courts in this circuit generally use current rates.” Skelton v. Gen.

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh'g (May 22, 1992), and “to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action” and “to recognize [a class representative's] willingness to act as a private attorney general,” Rodriguez v. West Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Hadix_v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 895, 897 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “applications for incentive awards are scrutinized ca…

“In other words the object is to simulate the market where a direct market determination is infeasible.” Steinlauf v. Continental Illinois Corp., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir.1992).

Rev. 267 , 285 (1998); cf. Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“We know that in personal injury suits the usual range for contingent fees are between 33 and 50 percent”).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir.1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a court cannot deny large portions of fees “on the basis of [its] inarticulable and unsubstantiated dissatisfaction with the lawyers’ efforts to economize on their time and expenses”).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992)). “[I]n private contingency fee cases . . . plaintiffs’ counsel routinely negotiate agreements providing for between thirty and forty percent of any recovery.

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Tomazzoli v. Sheedy, 804 F.2d 93, 98 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Schlacher, 574 F.3d at 858 (“[W]hen fees are less substantial, we may affirm so long as the district court exercised its discretion in a manner that is not arbitrary and is likely to arrive at a fair fee.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court may either strike the problemat…

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992) (when the court uses current rates, it “must be sure to make some provision for the interval between the ‘current’ period and the date the lawyers actually receive their money”).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1992).

Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) (“in personal-injury suits the usual range for contingent fees is between 33 and 50 percent”).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992), for this proposition. .

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir.1992); see also In re U.S. Bancorp, 291 F.3d at 1038 .

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir.1992).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir.1992); see also Morjal, 2013 WL 2368062 , at *2 (finding that time spent ensuring compliance with local rules is compensable).

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir.1992).