Raul F. Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corporation (1993)

For this LPI relies heavily upon Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1993), in which the First Circuit held that "[e]ven if bought for investment, the land itself does not constitute a business enterprise." In that case the investors purchased lots in Florida; the land had value in itself, and the seller had created no "enterprise" that would have an effect upon that value.

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 18 The Supreme Court has long espoused a broad construction of what constitutes an investment contract, aspiring "to afford the investing public a full measure of protection." Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 .

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1993) (citations omitted).

Indeed, the Commission concedes in its petition that “in other cases where pre-purchase efforts were considered, those courts also found significant post-purchase efforts.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1993) (interest in undeveloped land not security without post-purchase managerial efforts by promoter); Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79-80 (9th Cir.1980) (same with respect to silver bars); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 …

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1993).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1993) ("A 'hostile' witness, in the jargon of evidence law, is not an adverse party but a witness who shows himself or herself so adverse to answering questions whatever the source of the antagonism, that leading questions may be used to press the questions home."); see also Fed.

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir.1993); Fed.R.Evid. 103(a).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 13-14 (1st Cir.1993) (affirming denial of motion to amend where claim raised far into discovery); Campana v. Eller, 755 F.2d 212, 215-16 (1st Cir.1985) (same).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1993) (“Trial judges are constantly making judgments about the use of leading questions, the need to clarify witness answers, and similar matters of trial management.

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1993).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1993).

In reviewing this type of trial management, “the widest possible latitude is given to the judge on the scene.” Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1993).

Thus, although trial judges are to be given the “widest possible latitude” in making judgments about the need to clarify testimony, Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., *561 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1993), we would reject defendants’ arguments here even if we were not required to grant such latitude.

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1993)).

Rodriguez v. Banco Central _________ _____________ Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1993).

Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir.1993).

The Rodriguez plaintiffs ultimately lost what remained of their case after a seven-week jury trial when Judge Fuste directed verdicts for the defendants on the only surviving claims and this court upheld his ruling on appeal, see Rodriguez ___ _________ v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1993). ___________________ Following the interment of the Rodriguez litigation, renewed attention focused on the Gonzalez litigation (which was pending before Judge Laffitte).

The Rodriguez plaintiffs ultimately lost what remained of their case after a seven-week jury trial when Judge Fuste directed verdicts for the defendants on the only surviving claims and this court upheld his ruling on appeal, see Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir.1993).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir.1993).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1993).

Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corporation, 990 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir.1993) (citation omitted) (holding that the offer and sale of undeveloped lots in swamp land does not constitute securities where sellers did not represent to purchasers that they would directly undertake development of the area and where most purchasers bought the'land for residential, not investment, purposes).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1993)).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that although a “simple sale of land, whether for investment or use, is not a ‘security,’” “the commitments and promises incident to a land transfer, and the network of relationships related to the project, can cross over the line and make the interest acquired one in an ongoing business enterprise”). 1.

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1993)).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1993)).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he rules generally 23 permit leading questions to be used against an opposing party.”). 24 … 25 … 26 … 27 … 28 … 1 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 2 (1) Plaintiff's MIL No. 1 (Doc. 199) is denied. 3 (2) Plaintiff's MIL No. 2 (Doc. 200) is denied. 4 (3) Plaintiff's MIL No. 3 (Doc. 201) is denied. 5 (4) Plaintiff's MIL No. 4 (Doc. 206) is granted. 6 Dated this 28th day of December, 2022. 7 8 Lm ee” 9 f t _o——— Dominic W.

Idaho Mar. 10, 2011); see also Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 7 | 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The magistrate judge correctly ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , the in 8 | forma pauperis statute, does not waive payment of fees or expenses for witnesses.”).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1993) ("A 'hostile' witness, in the jargon of evidence law, is not an adverse party but a witness who shows himself or herself so adverse to answering questions, whatever the source of the antagonism, that leading questions may be used to press the questions home.").

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that “the Supreme Court cases mark out a concept, not a precise definition,” and require that the term “securities” be “flexibly applied to capture new arrangements comprising the essence of securities, however they may be named”) (citing Joiner Leasing, 320 U.S. at 351 ); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir. 1975) (following a “flexible approach” that depends “not upon the form, but upon the substance and economic …

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1993) (observing that "the Supreme Court cases mark out a concept, not a precise definition,” and require that the term "securities” be "flexibly applied to capture new arrangements comprising the essence of securities, however they may be named") (citing Joiner Leasing, 320 U.S. at 351 , 64 S.Ct. 120 ); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir.1975) (following a "flexible approach” that depends "not upon ■the form, but upon the substance…

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that “the Supreme Court cases mark out a concept, not a precise definition,” and require that the term “securities” be “flexibly applied to capture new arrangements comprising the essence of securities, however they may be named”) (citing Joiner Leasing, 320 U.S. at 351 ); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir. 1975) (following a “flexible approach” that depends “not upon the form, but upon the substance and economic …

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir.1993) ("The further along a case is toward trial, the greater the threat of prejudice and delay when new claims are belatedly added.”). 62 .

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir.1993) (“The further along a case is toward trial, the greater the threat of prejudice and delay when new claims are belatedly added.”).

At the time of the PCRA hearing, he was a district justice. 42 A federal court has offered the following definition: "A ‘hostile’ witness, in the jargon of evidence law, is not an adverse party but a witness who shows himself or herself so adverse to answering questions, whatever the source of the antagonism, that leading questions may be used to press the questions home.” Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1993). 43 The assumption, of course, is th…

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that land sales contracts were not securities, because they involved no investment in an enterprise, even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Trial judges are constantly making judgments about . . . matters of trial management.

The First Circuit has left no doubt that “‘[t]he further along a ease is toward trial, the greater the threat of prejudice and delay when new claims are belatedly added.’ ” Executive Leasing Corp. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 48 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir.) (quoting Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir.1993)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 171 , 133 L.Ed.2d 112 (1995).

The First Circuit has left no doubt that " ' [t]he further along a case is toward trial, the greater the threat of prejudice and delay when new claims are belatedly added.'" Executive Leasing Corp. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 48 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir.) (guoting Rodriquez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1993)), cert, denied, ___ U.S. , 116 S. C t . 171 (1995).

Clearly, witnesses in such a category have a "built-in incentive to slide away from the question or slant the answer." Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1993).

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 , 88 S.Ct. 548, 553 , 19 L.Ed.2d 564 (1967); Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1993).

Infusion of such matters into this case may also reguire the parties to obtain additional 14 experts in order to analyze defendants' economic power in the relevant market. "'The further along a case is toward trial, the greater the threat of prejudice and delay when new claims are belatedly added.'" Executive Leasing, supra, 48 F.3d at 71 (guoting Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1993)).

Infusion of such matters into this case may also require the parties to obtain additional experts in order to analyze defendants’ economic power in the relevant market. “ ‘The further along a case is toward trial, the greater the threat of prejudice and delay when new claims are belatedly added.’ ” Executive Leasing, supra, 48 F.3d at 71 (quoting Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir.1993)).

Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that land sales contracts were not securities, because they involved no investment in an enterprise, even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land). a.

Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1993), citing SEC v. W.J.

See Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 777 F. Supp. 1043, 1053-54 (D.P.R. 1991), aff’d, 990 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1993); Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide 90 (4th ed. 2015).

See Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 777 F. Supp. 1043, 1053-54 (D.P.R. 1991), aff’d, 990 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1993); Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide 90 (4th ed. 2015).

See also Adams v. Hyannis Harborview, Inc., 838 F.Sup. 676, 685 (D.Mass. 1993), citing Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1993) (defining security as an “interest in a ‘common enterprise’ that, through the efforts of the promoter or others, is expected to generate profits for the security holder, either for direct distribution or as an increase in the value of the investment”).

See Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 12 (noting that this court “took steps to preserve what claims [we] could for the buyers” and “permitted the buyers to go to trial on ... marginal RICO security claim[s]”).