Aversa v. Taubes (1993)

As such, a CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) demand made during discovery “does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information ‘at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompli anee with the statute’ ” (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993], quoting Lillis v D’Souza, 174 AD2d 976, 976 [1991]; see David D.

As such, a CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) demand made during discovery “does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information ‘at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompli anee with the statute’ ” (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993], quoting Lillis v D’Souza, 174 AD2d 976, 976 [1991]; see David D.

White Corp . ( 46 AD3d 660 [2d Dept 2007]); Aversa v Taubes ( 194 AD2d 580, 582 [2d Dept. 1993]); Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec.

White Corp . ( 46 AD3d 660 [2d Dept 2007]); Aversa v Taubes ( 194 AD2d 580, 582 [2d Dept. 1993]); Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec.

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) “does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute, unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party” (Cutsogeorge v Hertz Corp., 264 AD2d 752, 753-754 [1999], quoting Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993…

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) “does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute, unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party” (Cutsogeorge v Hertz Corp., 264 AD2d 752, 753-754 [1999], quoting Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993…

Although CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) requires a party, upon request, to identify the expert witnesses the party expects to call at trial, it “does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information ‘at any specific time’ ” (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993], quoting Lillis v D’Souza, 174 AD2d 976, 976 [1991]; see Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26, 35 [2012]).

Although CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) requires a party, upon request, to identify the expert witnesses the party expects to call at trial, it “does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information ‘at any specific time’ ” (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993], quoting Lillis v D’Souza, 174 AD2d 976, 976 [1991]; see Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26, 35 [2012]).

“CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information ‘at any specific time, nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute,’ unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party” (Hernandez-Vega v Zwanger-Pesiri Radiology Group, 39 AD3d 710, 710-711 [2007], quoting Aversa v Taubes,…

“CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information ‘at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute,’ unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party” (Hernandez-Vega v Zwanger-Pesiri Radiology Group, 39 AD3d 710, 710-711 [2007], quoting Aversa v Taubes, …

“CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information ‘at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute,’ unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party” (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993], quoting Lillis v D’Souza, 174 AD2d 976 [1991]; see Gayz v Ki…

“CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information ‘at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute’, unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party” (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993], quoting Lillis v D’Souza, 174 AD2d 976 [1991]; see also Lano…

Contrary to defendants’ contentions, plaintiffs’ belated disclosure of the expert was not intentional or willful (see Cutsogeorge v Hertz Corp., 264 AD2d 752, 753-754 [1999]; Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993]) and “[t]he expert testimony offered no surprises” (Lillis v D’Souza, 174 AD2d 976, 976 [1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 858 [1991]).

Based on the foregoing, as well as the lack of any willful or intentional failure by the defendant to comply with discovery obligations (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [2d Dept 1993]), grounds for preclusion of expert testimony under CPLR 3126 have not been established.

CELR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance, “ ‘unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party’ ” (Browne v Smith, 65 AD3d 996 , 997 [2009], quoting Hernandez-Vega v Zwanger-Pesiri Radiology Group, 39 AD3d 710, 711 [2007]; see Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993]).

CELR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance, “ ‘unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party’ ” (Browne v Smith, 65 AD3d 996 , 997 [2009], quoting Hernandez-Vega v Zwanger-Pesiri Radiology Group, 39 AD3d 710, 711 [2007]; see Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 582 [1993]).

Furthermore, since the plaintiffs failed to offer any reasonable excuse for the inordinate delay in seeking to amend the bill of particulars, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion by denying the alternative request to amend (see, CPLR 3025; Volpe v Good Samaritan Hosp., 213 AD2d 398 ; see also, Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580, 583 ).

Since the case had not been placed on the court’s trial calendar and more discovery was to take place, and given the lack of prejudice to the plaintiff, the court erred in precluding the appellant from adducing expert testimony at trial for failure to respond to the plaintiff’s request to disclose information about its expert witness (see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; cf. Corning v Carlin, 178 AD2d 576 ; see also, Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580 [decided herewith]; Lillis v D’Souza,…