Portland Cement Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency (2011)
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Cir. 1992), an agency must have a similar obligation to acknowledge and account for a changed regulatory posture the agency creates— especially when the change impacts a contemporaneous and closely related rulemaking.” Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 187 (D.C.
holding that, before issuing a new rule based on the predicted emissions of certain pollutant sources, an agency should have considered the effect that a parallel pending rulemak-ing would have on those same emissions
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Natl Assoc Priv Fund Mgr v. SEC (2025)
See id. 665 F.3d at 187 (“It is not absurd to require that an agency’s right hand take account of what its left hand is doing.”).
“It is not absurd to require that an agency’s right hand take account of what its left hand is doing.”
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Natl Assoc Priv Fund Mgr v. SEC (2025)
See id. 665 F.3d at 187 (“It is not absurd to require that an agency’s right hand take account of what its left hand is doing.”).
“It is not absurd to require that an agency’s right hand take account of what its left hand is doing.”
The partial dissent contends that the Court may stay a Clean Air Act rule indefinitely, notwithstanding that language, pointing to the more general stay provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 705 , and our decision in Portland Cement Assoc. v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 189 (D.C.Cir.2011) (per curiam), which granted a stay pending reconsideration without explicitly squaring it with the Clean Air Act’s three-month limitation.
Because the Environmental Petitioners raised the relevant issues “with reasonable specificity” during the period for public comment, our jurisdiction is not in question. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (d)(7)(B); see Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 186 (D.C.
“While we certainly require some degree of foresight on the part of commenters, we do not require telepathy. We should be especially reluctant to require advocates for affected industries and groups to anticipate every contingency.”
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State of Texas v. EPA (2025)
While EPA possibly retained discretion not to use the CSAPR Update modeling, the petitioners have not shown that it was arbitrary or irrational to “acknowledge and account for” this evidence from “a contemporaneous and closely related rulemaking.” See Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 187 (D.C.
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Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers… (2022)
Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 192 (D.C.
per curiam
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Chesapeake Climate Action Network v. EPA (2020)
EPA argues that this forecloses relief, relying on Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, for the premise that a final rule is a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule where a petitioner commented on the issue. 665 F.3d 177, 189 (D.C.
per curiam
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Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency (2017)
Cir. 2015); Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 193 (D.C.
Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA 665 F.3d 177, 185 (D.C.Cir. 2011).
The EPA maintains the Final Rule does not constitute a final decision concerning the permitting of new or modified sources under the new NAAQS, and is therefore not subject to judicial review, see Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 193 (D.C.Cir.2011) (“The Clean Air Act gives [the court] jurisdiction to review only ‘final’ agency actions” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b))).
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New York Legal Assistance Group v. Cardona (2021)
While agencies are obligated to “reexamine their approaches if a significant factual predicate [in the rulemaking process] changes,” Portland Cement Ass’n v. E.P.A., 665 F.3d 177, 187 (D.C.
internal quotation marks omitted
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Casa De Maryland, Inc. v. Wolf (2020)
See Nken, 556 U.S. at 425-26 ; Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 909 F.3d 635, 647 (2018) (vacatur as available form of final relief); Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 189 (D.C.
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Mercy General Hospital v. Burwell (2019)
Agency, 665 F.3d 177, 194 (D.C.
“urg[ing] the [agency] to act expeditiously on remand” and observing that “any person may commence a civil action” in district court “to compel . . . agency action unreasonably delayed”
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Zhaoqing Tifo New Fibre Co. v. United States (2015)
Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 186 (D.C.Cir.2011); cf. Portland General Electric Co. v. Bonneville Power Administration, 501 F.3d 1009 , 1024 n. 13 (9th Cir.2007) (underscoring wisdom of excusing failure to exhaust where issue that a plaintiff seeks to litigate was raised by another party at the administrative level; "If we required each [party] ... to raise every issue or be barred from seeking judicial review of the agency's action, we would be sanctioning the…
See Portland Cement Association v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177 (D.C.Cir.2011).
See Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 187 (D.C.
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Clean Air Council v. E. Scott Pruitt (2017)
See Portland Cement Association v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 185 (D.C.
noting that review is available “if reconsideration is denied” (emphasis added)
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State of Arizona v. EPA (2023)
See Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177 , 193–94 (D.C.
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Valero Energy Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (2019)
See, e.g. , Portland Cement Ass'n v. EPA , 665 F.3d 177 , 193 (D.C.
per curiam
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Delaware Dept Nat Resources v. EPA (2018)
Comm’n, 866 F.2d 616, 621 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] recognized tenet of statutory interpretation directs that a specific provision in an enactment prevails over a seemingly irreconcilable general one.”); see also Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 193 (D.C.
per curiam
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District Hospital Partners v. Sylvia Mathews Burwell (2015)
See Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 187 (D.C.Cir.2011) (agency must account for and explain changes that affect “a contemporaneous and closely related rule-making”); Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 362 , 371 (D.C.Cir.1985) (noting that agency adopted "inconsistent” principles in different but related orders and remanding to agency for further explanation "[i]n light of this unexplained inconsistency”).