Mark Rogers v. James Dzurenda (2022)

Id. at 1184-85.

Rogers v. Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 2022).

These notes do not contradict the prosecutor’s testimony at Orth’s trial that, at the time of trial, Zafranovich had received no deal in exchange for his testimony in Orth’s trial. 4 reasonableness (the deficient performance prong); and (2) that there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome if counsel performed effectively (the prejudice prong).” Rogers v. Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1181 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88, 6…

While a petitioner must prove both 24 prongs to be entitled to relief, “a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 25 deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 26 deficiencies.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 . 27 To satisfy the deficient performance prong, “the petitioner must show that counsel made 1 Sixth Amendment.” Rogers, 25 F.4th at 1181 (quotations and alterations omitted).

Rogers v. Deurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2022).

“If trial 5 counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable or did not prejudice [the Petitioner], then 6 appellate counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to raise a meritless claim of ineffective 7 assistance of counsel, and [the petitioner] was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s omission.” 8 Id. at 1108 . 9 To satisfy the deficient performance prong regarding trial counsel, “the petitioner must 10 show that counsel made errors so serious that they were not f…

It also argues Alvarado cannot show he suffered 14 prejudice from any alleged error. 15 To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Alvarado “must prove (1) that 16 his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . and (2) that 17 there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome if counsel performed effectively.” 18 Rogers v. Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1181 (9th Cir. 2022).

See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Rogers v. Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1181 (9th Cir. 2022); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 825 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2016).

First, “[a] lawyer who knows of but does not inform his expert witnesses about [] essential pieces of information going to the heart of the case for mitigation does not function as ‘counsel’ under the Sixth Amendment . . . .” Caro v. Calderon (“Caro I”), 165 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Rogers v. Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1187 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he prevailing norms [in 1981] required counsel to give their competency experts everything [counsel] possibly could b…

See Rogers v. Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171 , 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding deficient performance when counsel’s opening statement gave the jury “inadequate context for how the evidence would relate to the insanity defense”).

See Rogers v. Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) (stating that opening statements help “contextualize the evidence the jury will hear and . . . help the jury understand each side’s theory of the case”).

See Rogers v. Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding deficient performance when counsel’s opening statement gave the jury “inadequate context for how the evidence would relate to the insanity defense”).