Springfield Hosp., Inc., Springfield Med. Care Sys., Inc. v. Guzman (2022)

See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 416 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[T]here is a distinct difference between jurisdictional questions of a statutory nature and jurisdictional questions of a constitutional nature.”).

“In looking at a statute’s plain meaning, we also must consider the context in which the statutory terms are used, as we do not . . . construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation modified); United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 7, 2004) (“The text’s plain meaning can best be understood by looking to the statutory scheme as a whole and placi…

We interpret the language “with a view to [each term’s role] in the overall statutory scheme.” See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The terms “part” and “component” are undefined, so we give them their “ordinary meaning[s], considering the ‘commonly understood meaning of the statute’s words at the time Congress enacted the statute, and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022), quoting In re Bernard L.

And we reach this conclusion even though by its express terms § 3582(c)(1) as originally enacted applied to “any case.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1) (1984). “[W]e do not construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.” Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022).

“We review de novo a bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 415 (2d Cir. 2022).

Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 415 (2d Cir. 2022).

He also argues that the provision is unconstitutionally vague because it effectively prohibits individuals with venereal diseases from having consensual sex. 50 "Our analysis begins, as it must, with the plain text." Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022).

Loans under the PPP, a program established in the wake of 4 the COVID pandemic by amendment to § 7(a) of the Small Business Act, “are 5 made through private lenders and participants sign promissory notes, subject to 6 [Small Business Administration (SBA)] guarantees.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. 7 Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 423 (2d Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).

While we have acknowledged the doctrine’s “enigmatic 4 origins,” In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 167 (2d Cir. 2016), equitable mootness is 5 now firmly established by this Court’s caselaw, see, e.g., MPM Silicones, 874 F.3d at 804–05; 6 BGI, 772 F.3d at 107–09; Charter, 691 F.3d at 481–82; Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 143–44. 7 Whatever merit there may be to U.S. Bank’s criticisms of the doctrine and of the bankruptcy 8 process in general, a panel of this Court “is bo…

On this topic, the Court’s analysis is guided by the Second Circuit’s recent decision holding that “the question of the SBA’s sovereign immunity under Section 634(b)(1), related to the issue of the availability of injunctive relief, is not a threshold question [that a court] must decide before holding that [a plaintiff’s] claim fails on the merits.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 416 (2d Cir. 2022); see also id. (explaining the “distinct difference between …

The purpose was to “provid[e] small businesses with the funds necessary to meet their payroll and operating expenses and therefore keep workers employed.” See Springfield Hosp., 28 F.4th at 409.

No. 116-139, 134 Stat. 620 (2020). 4 Hosp., 28 F.4th at 409 (“The PPP provides potentially forgivable loans to eligible small businesses, allowing the recipient to seek loan forgiveness if at least 60% of the loaned funds are used for specified expenses, such as payroll.”).

Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 408-09 (2d Cir. 2022).

Since the words “other” and “similar” appear in the list of matters upon which the government may not discriminate against bankruptcy debtors, “grant’s” meaning must be narrowed “to only those [grants] that conceivably resemble the other listed terms in the statute—licenses, permits, charters, and franchises.” Id. at 419 (applying the canon of construction noscitur a sociis, which “counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is a…

Instead, the Second Circuit described how Congress authorized the SBA to loan billions in federal dollars through section 7(a) loans, which are “the SBA’s primary mechanism for providing financial assistance to businesses.” Springfield Hosp., 28 F.4th at 409, 423 .

See Elden, 88 F.4th at 1296 & n.5; cf. Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022).

See United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Statutory construction begins with the plain text and, if that text is unambiguous, it usually ends there as well.”); Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022) (same).

Pa. Dec. 30, 2024) (“When reviewing a federal agency decision, ‘the court cannot substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency, but the court must ensure that the ‘agency ... acted within a zone of reasonableness and, in particular, has reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably explained the decision.’ ” (quoting F'C.C. v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021)). 13 program, not a grant program.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.…

Mar. 13, 2024) (“Although subject-matter jurisdiction [and potential waiver of sovereign immunity] is ‘usually’ a ‘threshold issue that must be decided before proceeding to the merits of a given case,’ the Second Circuit [has] held . . . that ‘the question of the SBA’s sovereign immunity is not a threshold question a court must decide before holding that a claim fails on the merits.’” (quoting Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 416 (2d Cir. 2022)). determine to…

(Pet. at 3.) Even if that were true – and it is not, as the Government does not make PPP loans, but simply guarantees them, see, e.g., Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 408 (2d Cir. 2022); Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. United States Small Bus.

Section 1106 of the CARES Act set out the process of loan forgiveness, see CARES Act § 1106 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636m), and provides that “[a]n eligible recipient shall be eligible for forgiveness of indebtedness” on the portions of the PPP loan used for certain enumerated 4 purposes, such as payroll costs and payments for rent, utilities, and mortgage interest, 15 U.S.C. § 636m(b); see also id. § 636(a)(36)(A)(iv) (defining “eligible recipient”); see also Springfield Ho…

FURMAN, United States District Judge: In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, more commonly known as the “CARES Act,” which established the Paycheck Protection Program or “PPP.” The PPP authorized the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) “to guarantee favorable and potentially forgivable loans to businesses negatively impacted by the pandemic.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 4…

While seemingly sufficient on its face, a closer review of the relevant statutes suggests otherwise.5 In March 2020, Congress enacted the CARES Act in response to the COVID-19 pandemic to, inter alia, “alleviate the pandemic’s substantial economic effects on small businesses.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 409 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub L.

Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 415-16 (2d Cir. 2022).

Gasparik v. Stony Brook Univ., 296 F. App’x 151, 152 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming District Court’s dismissal of an immune party for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.) Such a determination is a threshold issue “that must be decided before proceeding to the merits of a given case.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 416 (2d Cir. 2022).

Indeed, Fratello “could not have overruled” Rweyemamu “even had it presumed to do so, as a subsequent [Second Circuit] panel is bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of [the] Court or by the Supreme Court.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 421 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 Thus, Rweyemamu — with its favorable citation to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bollard — remains go…

But, as the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have repeatedly emphasized, “a court may engage with legislative history only when the plain meaning of a provision is ambiguous.” Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 422 (2d Cir. 2022) (emphasis added); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“This Court has explained many times over many years that, when the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an end.”).

See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 416 (2d Cir. 2022) (“When a jurisdictional issue is statutory in nature, we are not required to follow a strict order of operations but instead may proceed to dismiss the case on the merits rather than engage with the jurisdictional question, particularly when the jurisdictional issue is complex and the merits are straightforward.”); see also Rutigliano, 887 F.3d at 108 (“[W]e need not decide if, or when, coram nobis might…

See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 415 (2d Cir. 2022).

See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 11 28 F.4th 403, 427 (2d Cir. 2022). 12 B.

See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022).

See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F. 4th 403 , 415-16 (2d Cir. 2022). plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

See Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 415 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 , 155 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Co. v. Quicken Loans Inc., 810 F.3d 861, 868 (2d Cir. 2015); see Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022) (court’s “analysis begins, as it must, with the plain text of [the statute]”). “[I]f [the] statutory language is plain, [the court] must enforce it according to its terms.” Am.

See Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 415 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 , 155 (2d Cir. 2001)).

See Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 415 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 , 155 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Auth. v Ononuju , 109 Va Cir 208 [VA Cir Ct, Dec. 20, 2021, Docket Nos CL20-1540-00, 01]; see also Springfield Hosp., Inc. v Guzman , 28 F4th 403, 426 [2d Cir] [listing "foreclosure moratoriums" as one of the benefits of the CARES Act]).

Pa. Sept. 2, 2022) (citation omitted); see also Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403 , 415 n.16 (2d Cir. 2022) (stating that “our sister circuits are split on Section 634(b)(1)’s reach” and collecting cases).

Co. v. Quicken Loans Inc., 810 F.3d 861, 868 (2d Cir. 2015); see Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022) (court’s “analysis begins, as it must, with the plain text of [the statute].”). “[I]f [the] statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.” Am.

But the Cooke Court did not cite, let alone overrule, Tapia-Ortiz, and the Second Circuit has repeatedly admonished that its decisions are binding until “they are overruled either by an en banc panel . . . or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004); accord Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403 , 421 (2d Cir. 2022).

“This immunity extends to federal agencies and officers acting in their official capacities.” Foster v. FEMA, 128 F. Supp. 3d 717, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); see Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403 , 416 (2d Cir. 2022) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994))).

See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 408 (2d Cir. 2022); see also Pub L.

See, e.g., Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403 , 422 (2d Cir. 2022).

See, e.g., Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 422 (2d Cir. 2022).

See Springfield Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022) (explaining that an analysis at Chevron step two must begin with the “plain text of [the statute]”).