Commonwealth v. Arriaga (2003)

This test measures “the likelihood that the difference between a group’s representation in the jury pool and its population in the community will result in a significant risk that the jury will not fairly represent the group.” Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 781 N.E.2d 1253, 1265 (Mass. 2003).

Arriaga , 438 Mass, at 563, 781 N.E.2d 1253 . 14 .

Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244 (emph. added); Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1235 ; Arriaga, 438 Mass. at 567 , 781 N.E.2d at 1265 (randomly generated computerized lists do not indicate systematic exclusion); accord Prince v. Parke, 907 F. Supp. 1243 , 1252 (N.D.Ind. 1995); Price v. State, 347 Ark. 708 , 727, 66 S.W.3d 653 , 665 (2002); see United States v. Greene, 971 F. Supp. 1117 , 1129 (E.D.Mich. 1997) (noting that "circuit courts have consistently found that drivers' license lists and v…

See, e.g., United States v. Rioux, 930 F.Supp. 1558, 1566 (D.Conn.1995) (“[T]he second and third prongs of the Duren test, unfair representation and systematic exclusion, are intertwined inextricably”); Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 566 , 781 N.E.2d 1253 (2003) (“Evidence of a disparity smaller than 10% can support a conclusion of unconstitutional underrepresentation of smaller minority groups, especially when coupled with persuasive evidence of systematic exclusio…

Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 561-562 (2003).

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga , 438 Mass. 556 , 781 N.E.2d 1253 , 1263 (2003) ("A defendant must present evidence of a statistically significant sample, usually requiring analysis of the composition of past venires.").

A defendant who asserts an abuse of this discretion on appeal “assumes a heavy burden.” Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 577 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Maltais, 387 Mass. 79, 92 (1982).

United States v Rioux, 930 F Supp 1558, 1566 (D Conn, 1995) (“[T]he second and third prongs of the Duren test, unfair representation and systematic exclusion, are intertwined inextricably.”); Commonwealth v Arriaga, 438 Mass 556, 566; 781 NE2d 1253 (2003) (“Evidence of a disparity smaller than 10% can support a conclusion of unconstitutional underrepresentation of smaller minority groups, especially when coupled with persuasive evidence of systematic exclusion.”) (emphasis a…

See also Weaver, supra, 267 F.3d at 236 (“ ‘[T]he jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.’”) (quoting Taylor, supra, 419 U.S. at 527 , 95 S.Ct. 692 ); United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1999)) (“[The] requirement of a fair cross-section ... does not guarantee that juries be ‘of any particular composition…

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 135 , 855 A.2d 726, 735 (2004). [7] Although Cronic itself did not involve presumptively ineffective assistance — indeed, the Court reversed the decision of the federal appellate court because the latter had erroneously applied a rule of assumed prejudice, see id. at 666-67 & n. 41, 104 S.Ct. at 2051 & n. 41 — the case has become associated with an exception to Strickland due to its recognition that prejudice may properly be pr…

Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 562-563 (2003); Commonwealth v. Tolentino, 422 Mass. 515, 518-519 (1996).

Cf. Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 354 , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004) (cross-examination of defendant's expert on voluntariness of confession "is an inadequate substitute for actual testimony from another qualified expert who has examined the defendant"). was not the time . . . to raise new arguments"); Baez v. Commonwealth, 494 Mass. 1001 , 1002 n.4 (2024) (declining to address "constitutional questions [that] were not properly before" single justice, where …

L. c. 278A, § 7, is not insulated from any exercise of discretion by the motion judge"); Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 569-570 (2003) (denial of motion for reconsideration regarding postconviction discovery under Mass. R.

"Discovery in the context of a new trial motion under [rule 30 (c) (4)] is not a matter of right." Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 569 (2003).

Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 577 (2003).

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 562 (2003) ("a requirement that each jury include members of every group in the community is impracticable"); Commonwealth v. Mora, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 575, 579 (2012) ("there is no right to the particular impartial jurors [who] the [defendant] speculates may be most favorably disposed to his defense" [quotation omitted]). 10The defendant made a Batson-Soares objection to the peremptory challenge of juror no. 34, referencing h…

The motion and affidavits must first establish a prima facie case before discovery is available." Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 569 (2003).

In order to prevail on his claim, the defendant must demonstrate that "(1) the group allegedly discriminated against is a 'distinct group' in the community, (2) that the group is not fairly and reasonably represented in the venires in relation to its proportion of the community, and (3) that underrepresentation is due to systemic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process." Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 562-563 (2003).

See Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 626 (2004) (concession that defendant was shooter not manifestly unreasonably where consistent with only viable defense); Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 581-583 (2003) (concession of guilt not manifestly unreasonable where it “does not undercut viable defenses”). 3.

“When the evidence implicating the defendant is strong, and a concession does not undercut viable defenses, a tactical concession ... is securely within the realm of effective representation.” Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 470 Mass. 765, 771 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 581-582 (2003).

“When the evidence implicating the defendant is strong, and a concession does not undercut viable defenses, a tactical concession of guilt by counsel in a murder prosecution is securely within the realm of effective representation.” Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 581-582 (2003).

Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 577 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Mattais, 387 Mass. 79, 92 (1982).

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556 , 565-567 & n.5 (2003) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, we apply the absolute disparity test to determine whether underrepresentation of a group is substantial”).

The Commonwealth had the right to rebut any “adverse testimony or inferences developed during cross-examination.” Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 577 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 69 (1998).

We therefore concluded that the contested evidence properly was admissible as prior consistent statements used to rebut allegations of recent contrivance, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 580 (2003), and that, in the circumstances of that case, the evidence was more probative than prejudicial.

The lack of any focus on consequences has a direct bearing on the defendant’s entitlement to a hearing, for decided cases require a hearing on a motion for a new trial only when the motion and accompanying affidavits raise a “substantial issue.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 260 (1981); Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 571 (2003).

These include whether the victim’s death was an accident, whether Sarah’s memory that the SUV was on her mother was accurate, whether the SUV actually backed over the victim, whether the defendant flagged down the emergency vehicles, and the reasons the defendant stood back while emergency personnel tended to her. 7 As the judge noted, “the guaranty of the right to counsel is not an assurance to defendants of brilliant representation or one free of mistakes.” Commonwealth v.…

Commonwealth v. Ar-riaga, 438 Mass. 556, 570-571 (2003) (within judge’s sound discretion whether defendant raised substantial issue).

See, e.g., Orange, supra, 447 F.3d at 798 ; United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 6-11 (1st Cir.1999); People v. Burgener, 29 Cal.4th 833 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1, 22 (2003); Diggs v. United States, 906 A.2d 290, 296-97 (D.C.2006); Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556 , 781 N.E.2d 1253, 1264-65 (2003); People v. Smith, 463 Mich. 199 , 615 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (2000).

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Russin, 420 Mass. 309, 317 (1995); Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 421 Mass. 64, 69 (1995); Commonwealth v. Robbins, supra at 446-447 ; Commonwealth v. Britto, supra; Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 570-571 (2003); Commonwealth v. Cook, 438 Mass. 766, 775-777 (2003); Commonwealth v. Facella, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 358 (1996).

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 569 (2003).

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 581 (2003). “[W]e consider whether there was error in the course of the trial and, if so, whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury’s decision.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 354 (2001), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992).

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 570 (2003), and cases cited.

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 577 (2003) (defendant “essentially invited the Commonwealth to address the issue on redirect examination, and the Commonwealth was entitled to do so in an attempt to rehabilitate its witness”).

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 578-579 (2003) (after testimony on redirect as to truth-telling obligations pursuant to cooperation agreement, Ciampa requirements satisfied when “judge immediately cautioned the jury that only they, and not the district attorney, are the determiners of truth [and] repeated a similar instruction in her jury charge”). b.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556 (2003); Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86 (2000); Commonwealth v. Tolentino, 422 Mass. 515 (1996); Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86 (1980).

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 580 (2003); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 422 Mass. 269, 274-275 (1996); Commonwealth v. Brookins, 416 Mass. 97, 102-103 (1993), and cases cited.

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 571-572 (2003).

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 571 (2003) (fair jury represent cross section of community selected free from discrimination against groups therein); Commonwealth v. Martin, 357 Mass. 190, 191 (1970), quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community”); Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 512 (1969) (“A fa…