Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin (2006)

Id. at 627.

Other testimony, according to the judge, “suggested] that [Dor] was the shooter.” But the judge concluded, relying on Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006), that this evidence was “not ‘so overwhelming’ to affect the sufficiency of the evidence.” The judge reasoned that any motions to suppress the identifications by Hardin and Jewell would have been denied under the then prevailing case law.

We therefore consider the state of the evidence at that point in the trial to determine whether, in the "light most favorable to the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the contrary evidence presented by the [juvenile]," it "was sufficient . . . to permit the [factfinder] to infer the existence of the essential elements of the crime charged." Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794 , 799 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 197 (2006) (“one in two of any randomly selected individuals”); Commonwealth v. Gaynor, supra at 250 (“one in 490 African-Americans”); Commonwealth v. McNickles, 434 Mass. 839, 851 (2001) (“one out of eighty-three Hispanics”). 29 The Commonwealth’s expert in this case distinguished between nonexclusion and inconclusive results, using the term “inconclusive” the same way the term was used in Commonwealth v. Mathews, 450 Ma…

We also consider the state of the evidence at the close of all the evidence, to determine whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case.'" Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984). 1.

"Because the defendant moved for required findings at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the evidence," Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), we also must "determine whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case," id., quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984). 5 To begin, we do not agree with the factual premise of the defendant's argument, which is that "the only perso…

That the DNA match may not be absolute goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 493 (Ind.2012); see also State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512 , 954 N.E.2d 596 , 616-17 (2011) (recognizing that expert testimony that “1 of 3,461 people could possibly be included as a potential source of the DNA” and that “the statistic has to be more than 1 in 280 billion to say to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty [that] this person is a so…

There was also evidence in Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 202 (2006), that the defendant had the means (an aluminum bat) to commit the crime.

Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188 , 843 N.E.2d 617, 627 (2006) (reversing the Massachusetts Appeals Court who had concluded that the evidence was insufficient).

See also Commonwealth v. Dubois, 451 Mass. 20, 28 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006) ("Deterioration only occurs where the Commonwealth's evidence of necessary elements 'is later shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect'").

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and must disregard contrary evidence presented by the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert, unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth's evidence, or any inference drawn from such evidence, is 'conclusively incorrect.'" Lawson, 475 Mass. at 817 , quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006).

We also consider the state of the evidence at the close of all the evidence, to determine whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case.'" 3 Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 202 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984).1 "To sustain a conviction of OUI, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) while impaired by the influence of intoxicating…

Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006).

Where, as Frederick and Angela do here, a defendant claims that the defense case deteriorated the Commonwealth's case, the question is not whether "the defendant contradicted the Commonwealth's evidence" but instead whether the "evidence for the Commonwealth necessary to warrant submission of the case to the jury" was "shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect." Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006), quoting Kater v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 17, 20 (199…

Instead, the defendant told the 7 Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006) (in deciding motion for required finding of not guilty, "a judge . . . must disregard contrary evidence presented by the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert, unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth's evidence, or any inference drawn from such evidence, is 'conclusively incorrect'").

Rather, the contrary evidence must have been "so overwhelming that no rational jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty." Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006).

"Because the defendant moved for required findings at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the evidence," we also must "determine whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case." Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984). 1.

Indeed, when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence we must "disregard contrary evidence presented by the defendant including the testimony of a defense expert, unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth's evidence . . . is 'conclusively incorrect.'" Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 817 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006).

We also consider the state of the evidence at the close of all the evidence, to determine whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case.'" Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984).

Commonwealth v. Gomez, 450 Mass. 704, 710 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006).

We also consider the state of the evidence at the close of all the evidence, to determine whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case.'" Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984). 2.

Thus, we first "consider the state of the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth's case to determine whether the defendant's motion should have been granted at that time." Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279 , 2 283 (1984).

"Because the defendant moved for required findings at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the evidence, '[w]e consider the state of the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth's case to determine whether the defendant's motion should have been granted at that time.'" Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984).

"Because the defendant moved for required findings at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the evidence, '[w]e consider the state of the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth's case to determine whether the defendant's motion should have been granted at that time.'" Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794 , 799 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).

Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794 , 799-800 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006). 7 Rodriguez, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 215 (2007). c.

West, 487 Mass. at 799-800, quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).

Where the parties differ is whether the erroneous testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. "[T]estimonial evidence of a defendant's refusal to comply with a police request may not be admitted against him." Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 205 (2006).

The defendant's claim that, as a matter of law, the presence of the U-Visa issue created reasonable doubt that precluded a guilty finding is simply an incorrect statement of the law.4 See Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006) ("if the Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the crime, the fact that the defendant has presented evidence that he did not does not affect the sufficiency of the evidence unless the contrary eviden…

Rather, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence that the defendant knew the check was forged, an argument that goes to the third and fourth elements.8 7 Ordinarily, we would also "consider the state of the evidence at the close of all the evidence, to determine whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case." Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 379, quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).

"Because the defendant moved for required findings at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the evidence, '[w]e consider the state of the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth's case to determine whether the defendant's motion should have been granted at that time.'" . . . threatens, attempts or causes physical, emotional or economic injury . . . or . . . intimidates or harasses another person who is a . . . judge . . . [or] clerk . . . with …

As the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the evidence,3 we first "consider the state of the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth's case to determine whether the defendant's motion should have been granted at that time." Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984).

In deciding such a motion at the close of all the evidence, a judge must view the evidence in the fight most favorable to the Commonwealth and must disregard contrary evidence presented by the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert, unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth’s evidence, or any inference drawn from such evidence, is “conclusively incorrect.” See Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v.…

Once the defendant’s evidence has been submitted, we ask whether the Commonwealth’s case deteriorated because necessary evidence was “later shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect.” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006), quoting Kater v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 17, 20 (1995).

See Commonwealth v. Dubois, 451 Mass. 20, 28 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006) (“Deterioration only occurs where the Commonwealth’s evidence of necessary elements ‘is later shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect’ ”).

Ibid. 6 Contrast Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 205-206 (2006) (evidence that the defendant initially consented to a police request to search his apartment and test a red stain on a closet door but later changed his mind and removed the stain was admissible because it was necessary to explain the loss of evidence and to put the defendant’s destruction of the evidence in context).

While evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts is not admissible to show bad character or propensity to commit a crime, Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986), such evidence is admissible if relevant to show the defendant’s motive, intent, or state of mind, see Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 208 (2006).

We agree with the motion judge that “the defendant’s change in attitude toward Deane and his false denial of participation in the drug transaction are simply insufficient to establish the requisite knowledge and shared intent.” That the defendant seemed “kind of distant” and “wasn’t as friendly” may evidence consciousness of guilt, see Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 200 (2006), on which the Commonwealth relies, 4 as may his false statements to police.

Deterioration occurs “not because the defendant contradicted the Commonwealth’s evidence . . . but because evidence for the Commonwealth necessary to warrant submission of the case to the jury is later shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect.” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006), quoting Kater v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 17, 20 (1995).

The inferences drawn need only be “reasonable and possible.” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198-199 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 487 (1988).

See Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 141, 143 (1999) (error to admit evidence that defendant refused to submit to fingerprint test); Commonwealth v. Hinckley, 422 Mass. 261, 264 (1996) (refusal to turn over sneakers); Commonwealth v. McGrail, 419 Mass. 774, 779-780 (1995) (refusal to take field sobriety test); Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 314-315 (1992) (refusal to submit to hand swabbing for evidence of gunpowder residue).” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mas…

While we observe that the Commonwealth’s case here did not deteriorate as a result of the defense’s evidence, see Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203-205 (2006); compare Commonwealth v. McGovern, 397 Mass. 863, 867-868 (1986); Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291 , 294 n.2 (2002), in this appeal the defendant does not request that we consider the evidence presented by him, nor do we do so.

Deterioration only occurs where the Commonwealth’s evidence of necessary elements “is later shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect.” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006), quoting Kater v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 17, 20 (1995).

Deterioration only occurs where the Commonwealth’s evidence of necessary elements “is later shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect.” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006), quoting Kater v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 17, 20 (1995).

Commonwealth v. Burke, supra at 532-533 . 7 The testimony referring to the defendant’s assertion of his right to remain silent was also not necessary “for the limited purpose of clarifying why a police interview ended abruptly.” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 206 (2006).

The evidence, however, may be admissible for other relevant probative purposes, Commonwealth v. Cordle, 404 Mass. 733, 744 (1989), S.C., 412 Mass. 172 (1992), including “to show knowledge, intent, motive, opportunity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 208 (2006). “[E]vidence of a sexual assault on a person other than the victim is only admissible if it is connected ‘in time, place, or other relevant circumstances to the particular…

Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 190 (2006).

We also consider the state of the evidence at the close of all the evidence, to determine whether the Commonwealth’s position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case.” Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984).

See Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).

See Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).

See Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).