Law v. Griffith (2010)

Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Mass. 2010); see also Mark A. Hall & Carl E.

See Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 360 (2010) ("certainly jurors are aware that health insurance is a present day reality"); Goldstein, 364 Mass. at 813 ("censored subjects . . . may insinuate themselves into the case through casual assumptions by the jurors, for example, assumptions about the prevalence of liability insurance or the availability of workmen's compensation").

See id.; see also, e.g., Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai’i 81, 101 P.3d 1149, 1160 (2004) (holding in medical malpractice case that a plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical services, and not the amounts actually paid by Medicaid/Medicare); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393 , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1033 (2008) (holding that the collateral source rule bars evidence that a plaintiff’s losses have been compensated by insurance, even to establish rea…

ECF No. 43, PageID.476-477 (citing Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 355 (2010)).

Such evidence includes “testimony about the range of charges the provider has for the same services.” Weston v. AKHappytime, LLC, 445 P.3d 1015, 1028 (Alaska 2019); see also Melo, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (relevant evidence of the reasonable value of medical services includes “evidence as to what the provider usually charges for the services provided”); Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Mass. 2010) (a party wishing to challenge the reasonableness of a medical bill may “eli…

Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Mass. 2010).

See, e.g., Law v Griffith, 457 Mass 349, 357; 930 NE2d 126 (2010) (“The only patients actually paying the stated charges are the uninsured, a small fraction of medical bill payors.”).

Cos., 194 F.3d 265, 273-74 (1st Cir.1999) (explaining that when evidence of collateral source payments is offered in federal court not for the purpose of reducing a damages award improperly, but rather because it “is relevant to some other contested issue,” that evidence — -including proof of -insurance coverage — “may be admitted if it is not unfairly prejudicial”); Law , 457 Mass, at 360-61, 930 N.E.2d 126 (same rule applies in state court).

Holding, Inc., 783 F.Supp.2d 262, 267 (D.N.H.2011); Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga.App. 512 , 208 S.E.2d 302, 310-12 (1974); Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1162-63 (Haw.2004); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393 , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1033 (2008); Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349 , 930 N.E.2d 126, 132-36 (2010); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1 , 361 734, 736 (1987); Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 530, 536 (S.D.2007); Wilson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 289 P.3d 369, 381 (Utah 20…

Its purpose is “tort deterrence.” Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 355 (2010).

See id. (emphasizing that the collateral source rule traditionally applies to compensation received from third parties); Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196 , 202–03 (Mass. 1974) (cataloguing SJC and Supreme Court cases where a payment has been considered collateral); N.L.R.B. v. - 49 - Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951) (distinguishing direct and collateral source income).

See Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 355-356 (2010).

See note 8, supra. The judge’s review for necessity and duplication of services should include, but not be limited to, any overlap of these claimed expenses. 10 In tort cases, the common-law collateral source rule provides that “the value of reasonable medical expenses that an injured plaintiff would be entitled to recover from the tortfeasor as a component of her compensatory damages is not to be reduced by any insurance payments or other compensation received from third pa…

See Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 352 (2010); M.S.

See, e.g., Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 353 (2010).